

პოლიტიკა  
კავკასიის  
ბარშემო



# პოლიტიკა კავკასიის გარშემო

## V საერთაშორისო სამეცნიერო კონფერენცია

შრომათა კრებული



უნივერსიტეტის  
გამომცემლობა

Ivane Javakishvili Tbilisi State University  
Institute for Georgia's Neighbourhood Studies

# POLITICS AROUND THE CAUCASUS

## **V International Scientific Conference**

PROCEEDINGS

2019

ივანე ჯავახიშვილის სახელობის თბილისის სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტი  
საქართველოს სამეცნიერო კვლევის ინსტიტუტი

## პოლიტიკა კავკასიის გარშემო

### V საერთაშორისო სამეცნიერო კონფერენცია

შრომათა კრებული

სამეცნიერო რედაქტორი – პროფ. რევაზ გაჩეჩილაძე

© ივანე ჯავახიშვილის სახელობის თბილისის სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტის გამომცემლობა, 2021

ISBN 978-9941-13-986-4 (pdf)

## შინაარსი

<b>რედაქტორისგან</b>	9
<b>MAIA MANCHKHASHVILI MERI GABEDAVA</b>	
Perspectives of economic collaboration between Georgia and Iran	11
<b>NIKA CHITADZE</b>	
Development of relations with China as one of the main foreign policy priorities of Georgia	16
<b>VAJA SHUBITIDZE</b>	
Georgia and the beginning of European integration	21
<b>GELA TSAAVA</b>	
Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners in the Occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region	24
<b>AYSEL BAGHIROVA</b>	
The causes and dynamics of conflict in Tskhinvali region (1989-2008)	31
<b>DODO CHUMBURIDZE</b>	
Aspects of Caucasian Policy during the Tenure of Aleksey Yermolov -Governor and Chief Administrator of Georgia: Georgia and Chechnya	39
<b>VALERI MODEBADZE</b>	
A Georgian minority in Iran	47
<b>არჩილ სიხარულიძე</b>	
პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცეში ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციების წარმატების შაბლონი	51
<b>ALEXANDER RUSETSKY</b>	
Deformation of perception of geography of the complex system of the Abkhazian conflict	62
<b>KONSTANTIN VEKUA</b>	
Anaklia Peace Zone and the New Silk Road	66

LASHA BAZHUNAISHVILI  
IRAKLI GORGILADZE

Asymmetric Strategies and New Balance of Power in the Black Sea 71

MARIAM GURESHIDZE

Reasons for Immigration of the Vaynakh (Kists) to Georgia and the Qadiriyya Sufi Order  
in the Pankisi Gorge 84

SIMON GURESHIDZE

Libya and the Impact of Tribal Conflict on the “Arab Spring” 90



## რედაქტორისგან

თბილისის სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტის საქართველოს სამეზობლოს კვლევის ინსტიტუტმა 2019 წლის ნოემბერში ჩაატარა მე-5 კონფერენცია, რომელიც მიეძღვნა საქართველოს სამეზობლოში არსებულ პრობლემებს, ასევე, მეზობელი ქვეყნების ურთიერთობას საქართველოსთან. წინამდებარე კრებულში წარმოდგენილია საერთაშორისო კონფერენციაზე „პოლიტიკა კავკასიის გარშემო“ გაკეთებული მოხსენებები.

გარდა ქართველი მეცნიერებისა, კონფერენციაში მონაწილეობდნენ ირანის, თურქეთის, იტალიისა და სომხეთის მეცნიერები.

გამოცდილი მეცნიერების შრომებთან ერთად, კრებულში გამოქვეყნებულია დოქტორანტების შრომებიც.

საქართველოს ირგვლივ რთული და მკვლევრისათვის საინტერესო მოვლენები ვითარდება. ინსტიტუტს სურს, მოიზიდოს მეცნიერები, რომლებიც ამ მოვლენებს და მათ საფუძვლებს იკვლევენ.

ვიმედოვნებ, კონფერენცია „პოლიტიკა კავკასიის გარშემო“, რომელიც ყოველწლიურად ტარდება, მეტ მონაწილეს მოიზიდავს და უფრო ნაყოფიერი იქნება.

პროფესორი **რევაზ გაჩეჩილაძე**,

საქართველოს სამეზობლოს კვლევის ინსტიტუტის დირექტორი



# Maia Manchkhashvili Meri Gbedava

Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University  
Sokhumi State University

## Perspectives of economic collaboration between Georgia and Iran

### Abstract

Our report is related to the relations of the Islamic Republic of Iran with my country-The Republic of Georgia. The aim of our report is to demonstrate the position and role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in South Caucasus and Middle East region and therefore, the importance of collaboration, including the economic collaboration, between these two countries.

In the report, we will try to explain that in many cases, political processes and the geopolitical location of countries affect the establishment of collaborative relations between two countries and impede it. However, in the modern world, we cannot deny the importance of economic relations and in many cases, diplomatic and political decisions gain a positive direction as a result of the increased significance of the economic relations. For this reason, notwithstanding the fact that not only economic, but also other types of relations are not developing successfully between Georgia and Iran, we would like to emphasize the importance of these relations.

During the process of working on the report, we used the quantitative study method, namely, The Documents Analysis method.

We researched and studied the scientific literature available in Georgian language about the economic relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Georgia and about Iran itself. We also reviewed the materials related to this subject, which are available in international scientific bases (EBSCO, J-STORY). In addition, we reviewed press materials and information published on official web pages of the relevant authorities. On the basis of the collected data, we have tried to draw conclusions and to analyze the character of processes, which are ongoing between these two countries.

We believe that our study will modestly contribute to the expansion of studies related to the relations between Georgia and Iran and once again, it will emphasize the high political and economic benefit of close relations between these two countries.

**Keywords:** Economic collaboration; Georgia-Iran relationship; perspectives of economic relationship.

## I. Introduction

After the geopolitical changes which took place in the world at the end of the XX century, the Islamic Republic of Iran started to establish relationships with Georgia, as an independent country. During the era of the Soviet Union, the relationships were not only limited, but also strictly controlled and the borders were closed. After gaining independence, both countries had to start to regulate relationships from the very beginning and defining the fields of collaboration.

The economically strategic partners in foreign trade policy of Georgia were slowly identified from the 90ies and Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Germany and Azerbaijan were established as leading economic partners.

The economic relationships with Iran are extremely curtailed. There are several reasons for this. One of the primary reasons is the political situation established in the South Caucasian region. Notwithstanding the above mentioned, both countries strive to establish good partnership relations and as officials also declare, this opportunity has great potential on both sides. Collaboration in the field of Agriculture, transport and power are defined as priorities.

Economic relationships, increased demands on resources and the desire to control the raw materials in the world politics, often result in certain political processes. We should evaluate the relationships between Georgia and Iran following the above mentioned reality as a result of which, the relationships established between the two countries during the last 25 years would become highly comprehensible.

Notwithstanding the above mentioned, the non-usage of the available important potential is also an incorrect approach and therefore, both states should promote the usage of this potential.

## II. Geopolitical aspects of Economic Collaboration

The South-Caucasus region and the states of this region are up to now unable to implement a successful foreign policy due to their complex geopolitical location. It is true that any country has to take certain circumstances in consideration when implementing economic or political actions, however, the above mentioned particularly relates to the category of states, such as states having developing economy.

The period following the Cold War happened to be difficult enough for the South-Caucasus region. Despite the fact that the states obtained independence, they faced the toughest economic challenges. While Russia used all available leverages in order to ensure that these countries remain attached to the former metropolitan country. The conflicts factor was added to all the above mentioned, which turned out to be the best leverage for Russia. Therefore, the established geopolitical situation forces Georgia (as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan) to plan foreign economic relations within an extremely limited choice. From the foreign and domestic factors, which influence the success of these relations, we have to distinguish the foreign factors, because Georgia has to take in consideration the requirements of its strategic partners and to make these types of relationships more active or less active. As to the domestic factors, it should be mentioned that the underdeveloped economic sector and numerous problems impede Georgia in establishing more fruitful trade relationships.

The main factor in the development of trade and economic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran is the geopolitical situation established around Iran. We mean the creation of blockade conditions against Iran. This fact affected the development of Iran's foreign economic relations in a remarkable way and not only. Within these limited possibilities, it is very difficult to make the trade relations fruitful. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned, both parties, especially during the recent period, try to make these relations as profitable as possible.

## III. Georgia-Iran Economic Relations' trends

Georgia-Iran relations have existed for centuries. However, these two countries had to start the establishment of economic, political, cultural or other types of relations from the beginning since the nineties.

Notwithstanding the fact that in general, political processes have a significant influence on any type of relations, we would like to emphasize the importance of economic relations and we would like to note that if countries are able to become good trade partners, they will also be able to make the political dialogue between them successful as well. Our approaches are founded on this principle and we wish that Georgia-Iran economic relations trend develops in this direction.

However, let's follow the facts: if we consider particular examples and convert these relations to numbers, we will see that in many cases, Iran is not included even in the first dozen of Georgia's trade partners. If we review the data of the National Statistics Bureau of Georgia, the trade turnover in the nineties was extremely low. However, it is characterized by an increasing trend in the 2000 -s and is lower than the average compared to similar data of other countries:

Figure 1: Trade Export-Import: Trade Turnover between Georgia and Iran 2000-2010 Years (in dollars):

2000	6,801.5	5,879.8	12,681.3
2001	4,311.4	6,315.3	10,626.7
2002	3,316.4	8,096.8	11,413.2
2003	3,426.3	6,995.7	10,422.0
2004	4,500.7	15,157.9	19,658.6
2005	4,681.2	25,999.8	30,681.0
2006	2,699.4	40,301.8	43,001.2
2007	6,050.0	51,732.9	57,782.9
2008	10,060.0	52,080.0	62,140.0
2009	6,425.8	29,895.0	36,320.8
2010	12, 140.7	55,079.5	67220.2

Source: website of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Geostat-National Statistics office of Georgia.

The corresponding figures of 2013-2014 is as follows:

Export to Iran: 2013-46 946,3 and 2014-28 198,5.

And in accordance with 2015 data, the export amount was 52 150, 8 and the import- 20 163, 7 within the period of January-July.

After imposing of sanctions on Iran by the USA and the Western Countries, numerous Iranians try to build a business in Georgia. During the last recent years, according to official data, up to six thousand Iranian enter Georgia legally (კვირის პალიტრა (2013, 22 აპრილი) <https://www.kvirispalitra.ge/ras-weren-chvenze/16758-zogierthi-iranelisthvis-saqar-thvelo-samothkhea.html>) and many of them carry out successful activity within our country. 150 small and medium companies having Iranian capital are already registered in Georgia (ნატროშვილი, 2013). The airline company "Fly-Georgia" is founded by Iranian businessmen. Georgian party also tries to make investments in Iran and in this regard, the undertaking "Madneuli" is particularly active.

In the Georgia-Iran trade sector, agricultural products, livestock, household appliances, chemical products and food products prevail. Iran mainly imports household appliances and chemical products to Georgia. Negotiations are currently ongoing related to the importation of agricultural machinery at lower prices and the construction of factories processing the products produced in the field of livestock.

The importation of energy resources to Georgia has a great potential. Iran owns huge energy resources, while Georgia, currently and especially in the future, needs a reliable partner for energy safety. Iran can be a reliable partner for Georgia. In 2006, during the gas blockade of Russia against Georgia, Tehran provided the Georgian population with gas supply (ტაბულა (2010, 31 მაისი) <http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/52627-saqartvelo-iranis-urtiertobe-bi-rusetis-nerviulobis-axali-mizezi>).

#### IV. Water-a resource, the crisis of which the Middle East is experiencing.

It is very well known for everyone that the majority of the Middle East countries have serious problems of water resources. On the other hand, water is the resource that Georgia has in huge reserve, with its whole diversity: in each region of Georgia, there are plenty of natural sources, sulfur, mineral waters and waters containing large amounts of iron.

One interesting example of Georgia-Iran trade collaboration would be the importation of water resources to Iran. This proposal is topical already since the nineties, but the project cannot be realized to the political conjuncture. The subject is related to pumping water from the river Mtkvari and the Lake Sevani to the Lake Urmia by means of three special stations. All of the three stations are located on the territory of Iran. As to the Lake Urmia, it is in the UNESCO list of biosphere reserves since 1976 and special environment protection measures application is planned on it. The studies showed that from 1972 to 2014, only 12% of water supply volume is left in the Lake Urmia. Pursuant to the statement of the Minister of Labor and Social Protection-Ali Rabiei in August 2015: "Georgia has great water resources, which can solve the deficit created in the Lake Urmia" (ნიკლაური, 2015). In case of implementation of this presumable plan, Iran will provide Georgia with gas supply, which creates interesting perspectives of trade collaboration.

#### Conclusion

The dynamics of Georgia-Iran economic relations do not allow us to speak about the successfulness of the trade relations between the two countries. It is very secondary to define if the reason of the above-mentioned is the geopolitical conjuncture or the economic development figures of these countries themselves. The main point is that the Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the leading countries in the Middle East and South-Caucasus region and it is recommendable to improve the quality of relations between these two countries.

Despite the fact that the trade turnover and economic relations in general are quite modest, we think that the existing trend should be assessed as positive.

It is true that the existing political conjuncture greatly impedes the development of these relations, but on the other hand, exactly within the political context, the deepening of Georgia-Iran relations would be quite interesting. Georgia, due to its strategic location, can play an irreplaceable role for Iran and exactly the development of economic relations can result in the positive trend of political processes. From 2010, the enforcement of visa-free regime between Georgia and Iran allowed many Iranians and Georgians to cross the borders and try to arrange their lives. Although there are many unpleasant moments in these processes, for example, certain banks refuse to make financial transactions/transfers to the Islamic Republic of Iran (გოგუა, 2013), but these problems can be solved.

In our opinion, the governmental and non-governmental sectors of both countries should fully utilize the potential available in regard to the development of relations between Georgia and Iran.

## References:

### References:

1. გოგუა, თ., (2013, 6 სექტემბერი), ქართულ-ირანული ნახევრად გასაიდუმლოებული ურთიერთობები, <http://bfm.ge/index.php?newsid=4474#.VbjWOvntmko>
2. ექსპერტები საქართველო-ირანის ურთიერთობებს პერსპექტიულს უწოდებენ (2007, 20 ივნისი), <http://www.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=15565>
3. ზოგიერთი ირანელისათვის საქართველო სამოთხეა (2013, 15 აპრილი), <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21974676>
4. ნატროშვილი, ნ., (2013, 2 ივლისი), სანქციები და ირანული ბიზნესი საქართველოში, <http://www.netgazeti.ge/GE/105/News/21217/>
5. საქართველო-ირანი: კითხვები მეტია, ვიდრე პასუხები (ნაწილი 1), (2010, 8 ივნისი), <http://expertclub.ge/portal/cnid—4895/alias—Expertclub/lang—ka-GE/tabid—2546/default.aspx>
6. საქართველო-ირანის ურთიერთობები – რუსეთის ნერვიულობის ახალი მიზეზი (2010, 31 მაისი), <http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/52627-saqartvelo-iranis-urtiertobebi-rusetis-nerviulobis-axali-mizezi>
7. ნიკლაური, ე., (2015, 18 აგვისტო) „ირანი ქართულ წყალს ნავთობსა და გაზში გაგვიცვლის?“, <http://dl2.archiveshare.net/v2/18082015/e/a/3/e/0/e67fca5aa91e2a3f0f20ef10a0c1824071/5f6f01b65399441811952b4ec281294e965a25d6/web/?archSh=1>
8. Askari, H., (1994), “It’s time to make peace with Iran”, Harvard Business Review, January-February, p.50-64.
9. Kakachia, K., (2011) „Iran and Georgia: Genuine Partnership or Marriage of Convenience?“, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 186, September.
10. Katouzian, H., (2001), “The Political Economy of Iran, Since the Revolution: A Macro-Historical Analysis”, Oxford University Press, p.55.-66.
11. Mohsen, M. & Majid M., (2010) „The relationship between oil revenues and economic growth, using threshold methods (the case of Iran)“, OPEC Energy Review March, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
12. SADRI, H., & NADER ENTESSAR, (2009), „Iranian-Azeri Dynamic Relations: Conflict & Cooperation in Southern Caucasus“, Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, Nuova Serie, Vol. 76, No. 1 (301) (Gennaio-Marzo), pp. 59-79  
Published by: Maria Grazia Melchionni, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42740780>

## Development of relations with China as one of the main foreign policy priorities of Georgia

### Abstract

Bilateral relations between Georgia and Peoples Republic of China are developing in various directions since 1992.

China was one of the first countries who recognized independence of Georgia after the disintegration of the USSR. Very soon China opened embassy in Tbilisi, which gave a strong boost to the historical, political, economic relations between two countries.

Georgia-China Ties in the trade/Economic relations have expanded from the period, when Georgia managed to overcome the crisis, related to the Georgia-Russia war.

During the last period, China has shown a growing interest in Georgia. Chinese interests in Georgia currently focus on the economic sphere. However, the two countries share a common foundation for closer diplomatic cooperation. Additionally, deepening economic relations have a geopolitical corollary—by increasing its economic footprint; China would have a growing interest in Georgia’s stability and security, especially after presenting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. The BRI is a diverse series of projects and encompasses both land and sea corridors and includes 65 countries, nearly two-thirds of the world’s population, and one-third of global GDP. Within this project, Georgia can help shorten the distance between China and Europe, which will be positively reflected on the transit potential of this South Caucasus country.

**Keywords:** Georgia, China, cooperation, belt and road initiative, trade, geopolitics

### Introduction

Relations between the two countries began during the ‘functioning ‘Great Silk Road ‘‘connecting China with the Black Sea coast. This road started in China and 2 branches were heading towards the West. Central Asia was connected with the Caucasus crossing Georgia and the Black Sea to Greek cities, reaching Rome.

The development of the Great Silk Road contributed to the development of economic and cultural ties between East and West.

In the modern era, diplomatic relations between China and Georgia were established on June 9, 1992, when bilateral communiqués were signed (ჩიჭავჭავაძე, 2011).

China and Georgia deepen cooperation every year. The Chinese side recognizes the independence and territorial integrity of Georgia and welcomes the efforts of Georgia aimed at ensuring stability and economic development of the country.

Various public and private circles in China are expanding business cooperation with Georgia in the humanitarian, educational, and cultural fields. Between the regions and cities of the two countries, exchanges often take place.



In the future, the Chinese side will continue to develop friendly relations between China and Georgia. Both countries are particularly focused on: Firstly, strengthening ties and consultations between the respective authorities of the two countries at different levels. On the other hand, the volume of trade and economic relations between China and Georgia is increasing. Cooperation in agriculture, transport, infrastructure, and other areas is also a priority.

In recent history, bilateral relations are becoming more intense. In 2006, joint business forums were held as part of the visit of the President of Georgia and the Minister of Economic Development to China. The Agreement on Technical and Economic Cooperation between the Government of Georgia and the People's Republic of China 2008 was concluded on March 21. New agreements in this area were concluded on December 29, 2009 and July 4, 2010 (ჩიტიანი, 2011)

On March 17-22, 2010, by the invitation of the Chinese side, a delegation of the Georgian parliament visited China (ჩიტიანი, 2011).

At the beginning of 2014, the Georgian delegation led by then-Minister of Economy Giorgi Kvirikashvili visited China. During the visit, the Georgian delegation met with the leaders of the Silk Road Foundation, the parties discussed the new initiative of China, bilateral trade and prospects for Chinese Georgian relations. It was after this meeting that the Chinese side first announced that the new Silk Road would also pass through Georgia. It also became known that Georgia will be the first country in the region with which China will begin negotiations on free trade (თოფურია, 2015).

After the Davos summit in early 2015, a meeting of Chinese and Georgian officials once again confirmed the start of a free trade agreement between China and Georgia, in addition, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed and the future active cooperation between the countries was emphasized in the framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt project. China's Minister of Commerce Kao Huchen stated that this step is of "strategic importance" for Sino-Eurasian economic cooperation.

It is important to note that although China is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, official Beijing, despite Kremlin efforts, refused to recognize the "independence" of the two occupied regions of Georgia.

In general, we can say that China's interest in Georgia and the South Caucasus as a whole is neither new nor unexpected, but China has never considered this region geopolitically, given recent developments, Georgia and the region as a whole can play a key role in China's plans.

## **II. Economic-trade cooperation between two countries before signing free trade agreement**

As noted, diplomatic relations between China and Georgia were established in 1992, mainly focused on the economic aspect, but even in this respect it wasn't perfect, in the twentieth century, trade between the two countries amounted to only \$ 3.7 million. However, in recent years, China's interest in our country has grown significantly, if at the beginning of the XXI century this was manifested in Chinese loans for the development of infrastructure, in recent years, China itself has become one of the main investors and players. Very soon, the "Middle Kingdom" became the third trading partner of Georgia after Turkey and Azerbaijan. If the trade turnover between the countries in 2006 amounted to 115 million US dollars, by 2014 it was 820 million US dollars. Exports from Georgia increased by 1800 (!) percent in 2014 compared to 2009 (თოფურია, 2015). With regard to foreign direct investment, by 2011 they amounted to 9.6 million US dollars compared with 200 million US dollars in 2014 (თოფურია, 2015). At present, China can already be considered one of the closest economic partners of Georgia, however, China's interest is only growing now, and these numbers will increase significantly in the future. China begins to invest in energy, transportation systems and infrastructure.

Naturally, the question arises, why China became interested in Georgia and why it invests quite a lot, although our country was not even mentioned in the initial plan.

### III. "Middle Kingdom" in the middle of Europe and Asia

It may be very difficult to pinpoint when and why China decided to include Georgia in its ambitious plans, the main reason is probably related to the geopolitical situation in Georgia, in which the "Middle Kingdom" can consider our country as the best bridge between Europe and Asia. In addition, we can also consider as an extra advantage the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway since one of the points of the Chinese plan involves the construction of railroads between the countries, amid the recession in China's economy, the rail link between Asia and Europe is already attractive to China.

Many experts believe that when it comes to cooperation between China and Georgia on the Silk Road and the role of Georgia as a transit country, official Beijing must take into account many interesting factors, in particular, China, which considers Georgia as a reliable transit country in terms of energy and transport, seeking to become a logistics center with the help of international partners. China oversees the process of building a new deepwater port in Georgia with an annual cargo turnover of 100 million tons (თოფურია, 2015). The construction of this port covers seven stages, and there is great interest from Chinese companies wishing to participate in this project.

Georgia and China are negotiating infrastructure projects: building roads, building bridges and so on. In 2015, on the initiative of both parties, a pilot train was sent from China to Georgia, which took only nine days to travel from the Far East to Georgia. It was the first test train that made it clear that there was a great opportunity to reduce the time needed to travel by rail; the distance will be reduced by about 7,000 kilometers which is a clear alternative to freight (თოფურია, 2015). Consequently, Georgia can become attractive to one of the largest countries in the world, which provides the shortest route from China and in general, it will connect Asia and Europe through this shortest route.

In discussing China-Georgia relations, it is important to emphasize Georgia's role in the new "Silk Road Project", specifically – the goal of Georgia is to make country a center of peace, logistics and trade, which is Georgia's historic mission.

During the meeting of the Prime Ministers of the People's Republic of China and Georgia in 2015, one of the largest companies in the world, the Chinese Railway Construction Corporation signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Georgian Railway (დანელია, 2017).

During the signing of the memorandum, it was mentioned that Georgia and China have already achieved success in the rail sector. In particular, the first freight rail service from China to Georgia was implemented, which arrived in Georgia in record time – nine days, when shipping by the same route takes about 45-60 days. Further improvement and development of this sector is planned in the future.

Within the visit to China, the head of the Government of Georgia met the president of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; the parties discussed prospects for future cooperation. The representatives of the Georgian delegation focused on the favorable conditions for the business sector in Georgia, the strategic geographical location of the country and the free trade agreement with the European Union.

"Georgia will be one of the first countries where Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will launch projects" – the bank's president, Litsun Son, makes this statement (Ministry of Economy, 2017).

At the meeting it was noted, that there are many areas in the Georgian economy that attract Chinese companies. In particular, investors are interested in transport (railways, ports), energy (renewable energy, Hydro resources), industry, tourism, healthcare, agriculture, and other sectors.

During the Prime Minister's visit, it was also announced that one of the largest Chinese corporations "DonfgangElettrie" would be involved in the construction of Tkibuli's 150 MW thermal power plants. The CEO of the corporation, Cepheu personally stated this. The project envisages the construction of a coal-fired thermal

power plant in Tkibuli municipality. Its installed capacity is 150MW, with annual output of 1 billion kWh. The total cost of the project is USD 180-200 million (Ministry of Economy, 2018).

The Prime Minister's visit also revealed that one of the China's largest companies, the "Dzuhai Dang Heng Qi Company" might launch a new road project in Georgia, with an investment worth more than a billion dollars.

It is remarkable that during the Prime Minister's visit to Beijing, the Dalian Municipality and the Autonomous Republic of Adjara signed a memorandum of cooperation.

At the end of the visit, the Prime Minister restated that Georgia is looking forward to future cooperation with China, especially within the project of the Silk Road. Prime Minister believes that Georgia is successfully using its strategic location to become part of the "One Belt-One Road" initiative and its vision, as indicated in the action plan of the government of China.

After the Prime Minister's visit, it became known that the largest Chinese state-owned energy company, POWERCHINA, got interested in the Anaklia port project.

#### **IV. The main reasons for China's interest in Georgia**

Belorussia and Hungary were considered to support China within ambitious new Silk Road project in Europe, it was these two countries that China saw as a bridge, but it seems "The Middle Kingdom" was more fascinated by geographical location of Georgia. In addition, if it had to invest heavily in the railway system in Belarus and Hungary, in Georgia, there was an almost ready-made Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. It turned out that it was also possible to transport goods from China to Georgia faster. The Chinese are also well aware that Georgia has signed a deep and comprehensive trade agreement with the EU, enabling Chinese companies to export their products to the European market through Georgia without any barriers, moreover, since the signing of the free trade agreement between China and Georgia, the conversation about it has actually turned into a real conversation.

As a result of Chinese investment, Georgia could become a stronghold and main bridge for China to the new Silk Road project, thus, due to the downturn in the Chinese economy Beijing's main interest lies in the implementation of this project, albeit at a relatively low price.

#### **V. Why is the Georgian government trying to interest China?**

Naturally, engaging in such an ambitious and grand project as the New Silk Road will bring great benefit to our country, this is about strengthening trade and economic relations, seeking additional investments, implementing infrastructure projects, creating new jobs, accelerating growth and developing the country's economy.

In March 2015, the Georgian government decided to conduct an analysis of the feasibility of a free trade agreement with China. A preliminary assessment of the study showed that trade liberalization could increase Georgian exports to China by 9 percent, and Chinese exports to Georgia by 1.7 percent. In addition, our ambitions relate to the development of our services sector, especially the strategic tourism sector. Trade provides an opportunity to see the wonders of the world, and this key instinct is crucial for another strategically important sector of Georgia – tourism. China and Georgia are linked by a rich and fascinating history that must be traced back thousands of years. We offer a wide variety of sights and cultures at competitive prices to demanding Chinese tourists. At the crossroads of Europe and Asia, in the mountains and seas, we offer first-class ski resorts and beaches, a wide range of archaeological sites, unsurpassed nature, and the world's first wine tasting.

It is noteworthy that the export of Georgian wine to the Chinese market in 2014 and 2015 increased by 41 and 31 percent, respectively (ნულაძე, 2016).

It is also important to note that China Southern Airlines operates three flights a week to Urumchi-Tbilisi.

If the Silk Road passes through Georgia, this will guarantee both economic and political stability. Beijing has repeatedly reaffirmed its support for the territorial integrity of Georgia by participating in our country's new Silk

Road project, and China is in fact the guarantor of our security. Of course, it is impossible for Russia to marvel at China's growing influence in Russia's "near neighborhood" of "sphere of influence". However, in the context of international isolation and China-dependent energy agreements, it is unlikely that Moscow would dare to go against Beijing.

At the same time, it is important to note that the Silk Road project faces a number of challenges, including China's aggressive foreign policy image, the strengthening of the Islamic State in Central Asia, the Ukraine crisis (which makes the Chinese-Russian-European project less likely) and the slowdown in economic growth in China.

## VI. Basic principles of enacting the Free Trade Agreement with China

The free trade agreement with the second largest economy in the world entered into force on January 1, 2018. Despite high potential, according to 11 months, China's exports rose 0.9% – \$ 2 million – to \$ 190 million. The main reason for the slow growth is the scarcity of export products. From \$ 190 to \$ 151 million comes to copper ores, which are not re-tailed, and there are other factors affecting their demand. Exports to China have already doubled: first from 6 to 27 million in 2010, and then from 33 to 90 million in 2014. Growth is likely to continue in the future, but not at that pace. Unlike exports, over 11 months, imports grew by 21.4% to 777 million dollars. If the share of exports decreased from 7.4% to 6.3%, then imports increased from 9% to 9.4% (Media to Business, 2018).

However, local producers were not affected by the increase in imports, since similar goods: calculators, gas turbines ... are not produced in Georgia.

## Conclusion

Overall, of course, it is important to say that China unequivocally supports Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, while Georgia, for its part, remains committed to the principle of "one China." Further development of cooperation with the country, which represents the second economy in the world will be positively reflected on the national political and economic interests of Georgia in the future.

## References:

1. დანელია, ი., (2018). საქართველო-ჩინეთის თავისუფალი ვაჭრობა. *Forbes*. მასალა გამოყენებულია ვებგვერდიდან: <https://forbes.ge/news/2712/Tavisufali-vaWroba>
2. მედიაბიზნესისთვის, 2018 – მთავარი ეკონომიკური მოვლენების ჭრილში. მასალა გამოყენებულია ვებგვერდიდან: <https://m2b.ge/post/240158-2018-wlis-mnisvnelovani-ekonomikuri-movlenebi>
3. საქართველოს ეკონომიკის სამინისტრო (2017), საქართველოსა და ჩინეთს შორის თავისუფალი ვაჭრობის შესახებ ხელშეკრულება გაფორმდა, მასალა გამოყენებულია ვებგვერდიდან: <http://www.economy.ge/?page=news&nw=180&s=sqartvelosa-da-chinets-shoris-tavisufali-vachrobis-shesaxeb-xelshekruleba-gaformdeba>
4. ჩიტაძე, ნ., (2011). გეოპოლიტიკა. გამომც., „უნივერსალი“, თბ., საქართველო
5. წულაძე, ზ., (2016), ქართული ღვინო ახალი ბაზრების ძიებაში, ამერიკის ხმა, მასალა გამოყენებულია ვებგვერდიდან: <https://www.amerikishma.com/a/georgian-wine-looks-for-new-sales-markets/3662884.html>
6. BLOG (2018). ახალი აბრეშუმის გზა და საქართველო. მასალა გამოყენებულია შემდეგი ვებ-გვერდიდან: <http://blog.fclub.ge/2015/10/20/%E1%83%90%E1%83%AE%E1%83%90%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98-%E1%83%90%E1%83%91%E1%83%A0%E1%83%94%E1%83%A8%E1%83%A3%E1%83%9B%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%92%E1%83%96%E1%83%90-%E1%83%93%E1%83%90-%E1%83%A1%E1%83%90/>

## Georgia and the beginning of European integration

### Abstract

As you know, in 1999 Georgia became a full member of the Council of Europe, in 2014 the EU signed an Association Agreement with him, and since 2017 the visa liberalization has been launched, as a result of which Georgian citizens were allowed to travel to the EU without visa. It has not been a year since the start of visa liberalization that some EU countries (e.g. Germany) have been talking about stopping visa liberalization, as it turns out that some of Georgian citizens violate the schedule of returns and commit crimes in EU countries.

I would like to remind you, the respected Italian professors that Georgians have contributed significantly to the initiation of European integration and the creation of the EU, in particular, Strasbourg University Professor Mikheil Muskhelishvili (known him in Europe as Michel Mouskhely) and professor of the University of Munich Alexander Nikuradze.

**Keywords:** Georgia, Council of Europe, Michel Mouskhelishvili.

### I. Introduction

Today I mainly will talk about the great achievements of Mikheil Muskhelishvili (1903-1964) in the European integration process. Michel Muskheli (Mikheil Muskhelishvili) was a world-renowned professor, lawyer and political scientist, small nations and human rights activist, International Law Specialist, President of the European People's Congress, a member of the Central Committee of the Federal European Movement, Vice-President of the Bureau of the European Formation International Center, Founder and General Secretary of the European University Association, mountaineer, scientist and "Academic Palm" award winner, 5 language expert.

### II. Michelle Muskheli

In 1948-1949, Michelle Muskheli created the USSR and East European Scientific-Research Center, which was named "Center of Muskheli" and is still functioning in Strasbourg.

"Center of Muskheli" was one of the important centers of political science and international law, sociology in France and Europe, where the ideas of European integration, abolishment of European borders and visa free travel were worked out. He was the first Georgian and one of the first political figures in Europe, who put forward the idea of the European Union and abolishment of European borders (visa free travel) and defended its monograph "Structure of European Federalism".

In the "Center of Muskheli" he founded an international scientific collection which was actively collaborated with the world-famous scientists: Jorge Wall, Robert Mosse, Guy Ero, Henry Shambrick etc. In the name of the same center, Mikheil Muskheli has published two collections with an extensive preface, which has great international recognition.

French scientists and publishers Jean François Beyonne and Jean-Luc Prewell gathered together and published his works in 2012, which was written in the 1930-1950 years. These include the views of Mikheil Muskheli on the future form of the European Federation and its necessary union.



Professor Mikheil Muskhelishvili started working on the future European Union before Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann. In 1949 he co-wrote the European Federal Constitution Project with French like-minded Goton Stephan, whose many important provisions were reflected in the contemporary EU Constitution project.

On 6 August 1950, Mikheil Muskhelishvili delivered a speech, a historical word at the European Conference in Strasbourg, the essence of which was the following – there is a need to abolish borders between European countries and start visa free travel regime. Under his leadership 300 students from eight European countries and three professors symbolically broke the French-German border infrastructure on the eve of the opening of the conference and raised the flag of the United Nations. Thus was laid the foundation of the idea of visa-free travel in Europe, which is now known as the Schengen Visa Principle.

It is worth mentioning that Michel Mouskhely's speech in Brussels on 23-27th of April, 1958 at the next congress of the European Professors Association at the G.E.GAA – Pavilion of the World Exhibition. Professor Mouskhely presented a long report concerning the legal nature of European economic integrity and its psychological side, legal aspects of the creation and integration of the European common market. He considers that after the European Union, the European market must be integrated, which would facilitate trade links between countries and create a unified market system on the European continent.

In this speech, in Brussels, Michel Mouskeli also raised the issue of the formation of future common institutions of Europe, which was originally created in the form of the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Council.

Michel Mouskeli is the author of another interesting idea. 1948-51 year he was a president – founder of the Federation of Universities. From 1952 Mouskeli was a general secretary of the Association of European Professors. In September 1955, the Association invited the congress to Romania, Trieste, which was attended by 120 representatives of 18 countries.

Michel Mouskeli delivered the main report at the Trieste Congress, who noted that, the question of Europeans unification of the intellectual and cultural unity. The goal of the Trieste Congress was to establish and implement the unified methods of teaching, educational programs in European higher education institutions and its harmonization, approximation of professors and students of European higher education institutions. Thus laid the foundation of Bologna process in the higher education system aimed at closing and harmonizing the education systems of European countries, creating a common European space for higher education. At the Trieste Congress was elected the president of the European Professors' Association, Professor Aranjo- Raise-Linches the president of the National Academy of Lynch from Italy, Vice-President Professor S. Dmpf from Munich (Germany) and General Secretary Michel Mouskeli from France. Professor Aleksandre Nikuradze became the member of the Council.

Michel Mouskeli actively participated in the "United Europe" representative elections in France; he was the Member of the Editorial Board Committee of the journal "European Creation".

In November 1952, in Strasbourg was founded "European Georgian Movement" by Professor Michel Mouskeli, the aim of which was to preach European values among Georgians and Georgia's integration into Europe as a free country status.

## Conclusion

Michel Mouskeli was a founder of the International Society for Political Sciences, a member of the International Union of Scientific Press and other scientific community.

Michel Mouskeli was often invited to conduct lectures at leading universities in the USA and Europe. The theme of his reports was often a crisis of European civilization and the necessity of revival of European culture.

Mikheil Muskhelishvili's articles were often printed in French, German and English languages. Here are some of his work titled "Georgia and Europe", "Right to Self-Determination of Nations", "Russia is not Europe", "Dictatorship of the Proletariat in State Leviathan", "Soviet Federalism", "Legal Nature of the Soviet Union", "Nationalities and Linguistics" SSR Union "and others.

Michel Mouskeli was a famous mountaineer and alpinist. He had some peaks of the Alps. On July 11, 1964, he came to Italy and in the valley of Azosta he reached the peak and on his way back, he fell and died.

Thus, the representative of a small Georgian nation, Professor Mikheil Muskhelishvili has made a significant contribution to the start and deepening of the European integration process, which is truly worth marking and appreciating.

## References:

1. Georgia in the European space (2010), Collection, Georgian Technical University, Georgian Technical University Press.
2. Le Monde ( 1964, 14 July), 14.07.1964 <https://www.lemonde.fr/archives-du-monde/>
3. Mouskeli, M., (1948), Gaston stefani "Draft of a european federal constitution".
4. Mouskeli, M., (1960, July-August), Freedom and union, Michel Principals of federal institutions.
5. Relation of Georgia with European and American countries (1993), European and American Research Institute, v.1-2.1993. Figaro.
6. Sharadze, G., (1993), Under the Foreign Sky, book 3.

## Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners in the Occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region

### Abstract

The paper examines the process of borderization that has been proclaimed as occurring along the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Tskhinvali Region boundary. These boundaries are the ones that remain largely unrecognized, as the claims of the Georgian state to sovereignty over Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region are accepted by the majority of the international community. The crucial exception to this is Russia, under the aegis of which the process of borderization is occurring. The result is the creation of a physical barrier around the territory of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region, one that seeks to materialize what was previously an administrative fiction on the ground, halting the movement of people and goods across this border and dividing people from their livelihoods. The paper shall consider what meaning this fencing has within the context of Georgia's borders, and reflect upon the larger lessons that can be drawn for the concept of sovereignty and the status of borders in the contemporary world.

**Keywords:** Georgia; Occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region.

### I. Introduction

The tactic of Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners serves Russia's strategy of undermining Georgia's sovereignty, including its democratic development and independent domestic and foreign policies.

Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and the So-called Border Banners violates not only Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty but also undermines the wider European security order. By continuing its creeping occupation and annexation of Georgian territory, Russia is exposing the weakness of the Georgian state and sowing doubt about the credibility of Euro-Atlantic institutions.

In most cases, Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners has occurred along or near the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) demarcating Tskhinvali region, as most of Abkhazia is largely demarcated by the natural boundary of the Inguri river. Russia has undertaken the Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners of Tskhinvali region in waves.

In April 2009, the Russian government and the de facto authorities of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali signed respective agreements granting the Russian FSB border troops jurisdiction over the ABLs. The first reported incident of Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and the So-called Border Banners occurred roughly three months later, when local residents of the village of Kvishi on the central government-controlled side of the ABL reported that Russian border guards had put up border markers in the area.

The process picked up in intensity starting in 2013 when, in two separate incidences, Russian soldiers and Ossetian militia borderized the ABL near the villages of Ditsi and Khurvaleti on the central government-controlled



side of the ABL. In summer 2015, Russian soldiers installed border markers in the village of Tselubani near Tskhinvali region. That incident resulted in a portion of the BP-operated Baku-Supsa oil pipeline being included in the zone of Russian occupation.

Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners occurs along with the continued integration of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region into the Russian Federation – a policy referred to as “creeping annexation.” The Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners process is part of Russia’s campaign to undermine Georgia’s sovereignty as well as the wider European security order.

First, Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners has grave human costs for the local communities affected. The Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region deepens the respective territories’ isolation from the rest of Georgia.

This not only hampers the Georgian government’s attempts to regain control over the occupied territories, it also hinders the peace and reconciliation process by preventing residents of both territories from crossing the ABLs to enter central government controlled territory. This creates personal hardship and impedes people-to-people contact.

Since April 2016, three of five official crossing points between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia have been closed off. According to the resident coordinator of the United Nations in Georgia, the closures will affect hundreds of people each day. This creates hardship for the residents seeking to visit relatives or to partake in medical care, education, or economic opportunities on the other side of the ABL. Internal freedom of movement is also restricted. In Gali district – a majority-ethnic Georgian enclave of Abkhazia—residents must display a so-called Abkhaz passport or resident permit when commuting between villages.

Residents of Tskhinvali are adversely affected, as well. While the number of Tskhinvali residents crossing the ABL to access medical services increased precipitously from 2011 to 2016, the figure is likely to decrease year-on-year in 2017. Villages and land plots are divided, depriving some individuals of their homes and farmland. Local residents are regularly detained by guards encroaching onto territory controlled by central government.

Moreover, it is worth noting that Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners measures have also been taken around the city of Tskhinvali, well within the Russian-occupied side of the ABL. This restricts freedom of movement inside Tskhinvali region as well as across the ABL. According to the public defender of Georgia, this creates problems for some ethnic Ossetian farmers attempting to access their own croplands. The negative impacts of Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners are felt by local communities regardless of ethnicity and results in violations of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights in a number of areas, including freedom of movement and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention.

Borderization disrupts Georgia’s domestic political processes as well. The Georgian public responds with outrage each time new border installations are put up. This situation is damaging not only to domestic perceptions of the government’s effectiveness but also to the country’s external image. Given that incidents of Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners occur intermittently and are followed by public demonstrations of outrage, the process feeds the Kremlin-promoted perception that Georgia is an unstable, failed state.

Moreover, Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners casts doubt on NATO’s viability and Georgia’s potential for membership. By solidifying the separatist status of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region, Moscow presents territorial integrity and NATO integration as a false dilemma – with the prevailing Kremlin narrative being that Georgia must abandon NATO integration before it can regain sovereignty over its occupied territories – or vice versa, officially cede sovereignty over the territories in order to join NATO.

The process also erodes public confidence in the EU. European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) staff was deployed to Georgia in September 2008. The first priority of the monitors is “to ensure that there is no return to hostilities.” However, Russia has precluded monitors from entering Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region, thus monitors have no access to the Georgia-Russia border. For that reason, monitors are unable to fully monitor the security situation in the conflict zones as stipulated in the 2008 ceasefire agreement.

Additionally, the EUMM staff is unarmed monitors, not peacekeepers; their mandate only covers reporting on the situation along the ABLs. While nothing further can be done from the perspective of the EUMM – due to its limited mandate – its inability to prevent further instances of Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and the So-called Border Banners – damages the EU’s credibility in the eyes of some Georgian citizens.

In short, Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners also erodes public confidence in the viability and utility of NATO and EU integration. Each time Russia deepens its occupation and NATO and EU member states fail to deter such actions, it exposes the fact that the Western Alliance is largely unable to directly help Georgia defend its sovereignty. By exposing NATO’s and the EU’s weaknesses and shortcomings, Russia’s actions in Georgia are the localization of a broader campaign against the Western Alliance.

## II. Borderign sovereignty

Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners has negative implications for the broader European security order. It directly contradicts the principle of inviolability of borders, which is a cornerstone of contemporary European security recognized by the Helsinki Final Act. It also undermines fundamental principles of international law, including respect for sovereignty, non-use of force, and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.

At the most basic level, Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners increases the potential for renewed military conflict. By increasing its military presence and moving its forward positions deeper into Georgian territory, Russia and the separatist regimes increase the risks of further provocation. For example, the presence of Russian FSB border guards and Abkhaz and Ossetian militia along the ABLs increases the chances of conflict with local residents and anti-Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners demonstrators. A small-scale, local conflict could potentially spiral into shooting between the Georgian and Russian militaries, resulting in an international crisis.

Moreover, the occupation and creeping annexation of Abkhazia have given it a dominant position in the eastern Black Sea littoral. Control over Abkhazia’s 195-kilometer coastline complements Russia’s annexation of Crimea to expand its anti-access, area denial zone (A2/AD) in the Black Sea. Russia’s remilitarization of the Black Sea directly harms NATO and EU interests by disrupting access to Asia and the Middle East. Russia has already used its enhanced presence to deploy parts of the Black Sea Fleet to Syria, directly opposing NATO and EU interests there.

Furthermore, Russia’s occupation of Georgia threatens another key component of the European security order: energy security. As mentioned above, part of the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline is now under Russian occupation. A potential future outbreak of hostilities between Georgia and Russia could threaten the pipeline as well as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipelines running through southern Georgia.

By fomenting instability, Russia can also impede further development of the Southern Gas Corridor, an EU-led initiative to bring Caspian gas to EU markets. The route from Azerbaijan to Europe includes the South Caucasus Pipeline, which is currently being expanded to meet growing EU demand. Regional instability poses a direct threat to EU ambitions for more diverse sources of energy supply and its stabilizing efforts in general in the immediate neighborhood.

The Georgian government has few tools at its disposal to directly deter further incidents of Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners.

What can be more readily done is to mitigate the effects of Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners to such an extent that the process no longer serves Russian interests. Options are available to the Georgian government, although several major obstacles currently impede action: lack of interagency coordination within the government; lack of strategic communication to engage and inform the domestic public; and lack of cooperation among Georgia's political actors regarding Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners.

Russia's tactic of Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners threatens not only Georgian security but also the wider European security order, the latter by augmenting Russia's militarization of the wider Black Sea region and its ability to disrupt EU attempts at diversification of energy sources. The maintenance of unresolved conflicts enables Russia to remain the dominant regional actor not only in Georgia but in the wider Black Sea region. This weakens NATO's regional security position; it also increases the risk of a renewed outbreak of conflict, as Russian troops occupy forward military positions in a NATO- and EU-aspirant country.

Moreover, erecting barriers along the ABLs in Georgia's breakaway regions violates the human rights of local residents on both sides of the ABLs and leads to frustration among the Georgian public regarding the apparent inability of NATO and the EU to help Georgia solve one of its most pressing national problems. Moreover, by impeding freedom of movement across the ABLs and within the occupied territories, Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners hampers the peace and reconciliation process promoted by the international community.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that different governmental agencies have different understandings of the Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners process. Data collection and interagency cooperation are lacking. The Georgian government's toolkit for responding to these challenges is limited. However, it is still possible to bolster measures aimed at mitigating the negative effects of Illegal Installation Process of Wire Fences and So-called Border Banners on the local, national, and international levels. This can be done by adopting a range of recommendations, as provided below.

### III. "Europe starts here"

The theatrical nature of the fence and the characters involved in its construction has been demonstrated in reactions to it. Rather than as a result of the separation of political visions between Georgian and Tskhinvali Region leaderships, within Georgia the fence is presented as their cause, as when Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili notes that borderization is "definitely directly against the people—against those people who want to see and meet each other beyond barbed wire fences." While an emotionally powerful narrative, it flies in the face of the available evidence.

Even the proposals made during the Georgian election campaign by the victorious Bidzina Ivanishvili for the reopening of the Ergneti market have received no support on the Tskhinvali Region side of the border, with Boris Chochiyev, then Tskhinvali Region's de-facto prime minister, warning that resuming crossborder trade with Georgian-controlled territory would bring "great harm to the republic of South Ossetia". Given this situation, the prospects for any sort of reconciliation across the fence are bleak, despite the more conciliatory approach that the new government pledged to adopt. "

This presentation of the borderization process as fencing off both territory and flows, no matter how incomplete, is greatly at odds with recent understandings, which like to create a binary opposition between the fixity of ter-

ritory and the networks of flows often designated as more fundamental in a world characterized by globalization and time/space compression.

Events in Europe over the last few years have made it painfully clear that the dream of providing a model of governance that is at once both expanding and borderless remained dependent upon the sovereignty of the national states with which it was associated. Any expansion or contraction in this zone of governance, either out beyond the boundaries of the state or through returning to its limits, necessitates the representation of borders. These borders of the state remain bound up with the control of physical space and demarcation of its edges, which serves to both justify the state's claims and enable them to be enforced.

#### **IV. The annexation of Crimea. Ukraine example**

With the annexation of Crimea, Russia managed for the first time in decades to change European borders by force. Most of the United Nations members supported Ukraine's territorial integrity and recognised the 2014 "Crimean referendum" as invalid. The policy of non-recognition was introduced by the most advanced nations of the world. However, the expanded Russian military presence in Crimea means Ukraine is unlikely to regain control of the peninsula, even in the medium term.

Moreover, given Crimea's dependence on water and power supplies from mainland Ukraine, and the lack of land connection between Crimea and Russia, Ukraine faces the constant threat of Russian provocation under the pretext of "preventing humanitarian disaster" on the peninsula. There is also a risk that Russia will attempt to create a land corridor to Crimea.

Despite the 2015 Minsk Agreement, the situation in Donbas is also far from being settled, with the number of shellings having risen recently. Unless its attempt to federalise Ukraine is effective, it is in Russia's interest that the conflict remains unresolved. This is because Moscow believes that such a situation may prevent the EU and NATO from seeking closer ties with Ukraine.

However, full implementation of the Minsk Agreement would create serious risks for Ukraine, too. Although it provides for the eventual return of the border to Ukrainian control, it may open the door for Russian-backed "separatists" to form their own border guard service while posing as Ukrainian. This would further enable the movement of people and weapons across the border, and would mean a de facto legalisation of the occupation.

Consequently, because it is currently impossible to build the "European Wall" in Donbas, there is a need to continue the reinforcement of the border line with Russia along sections under Ukraine's control (in the Chernivtsi, Sumy and Kharkiv regions). At the same time cooperation between the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service and the Ukrainian armed forces should be strengthened, with the aim of securing both the contact line in Donbas and the administrative boundary line between Kherson Oblast and the occupied territory of Crimea.

Therefore, while Ukraine struggles with unilateral demarcation of the border with Russia, NATO and the European Union should offer additional financial aid and technical assistance so that work on building fortifications on the border can proceed in the aforementioned regions. The construction of such fortifications should be followed by the creation of a comprehensive border surveillance system, employing drones and satellite imagery. Ukraine and the French concern Airbus have already signed an agreement that provides for the reception of high resolution satellite images.

However, the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service still lacks modern, high precision equipment needed to control the situation at the border, and such equipment may well be provided by individual NATO members. NATO should support the creation of Ukrainian rapid reaction border guard units, and launch a tailored train and equip programme that will cover cooperation with territorial defence forces in the state border area and weapons supply.

The programme may build on the experience of the analogous initiatives for Georgia and Syria (led by the U.S.), operate at the Yavoriv International Peacekeeping and Security Centre, and be based on the already existing Joint Multinational Training Group – Ukraine. With a view to facilitating cooperation between the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service and the national guard and armed forces, as envisaged in Ukraine’s Security and Defence Sector Development Concept (2016), NATO support in the spheres of communication, command and control, and logistics and mobility, should be strengthened.

Finally, a dedicated trust fund needs to be set up for an integrated system of mine clearance in Donbas. Although both NATO and the EU have supported Ukraine in demining activities, the Ukrainian Defence Ministry says that mine clearance in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions will take at least another 10 years.

## Conclusion

The three-man TV crew that was seized at the boundary marking off Tskhinvali-controlled territory from that administered by Tbilisi claimed they had been trying to shoot footage of the border sign at Adzvi when they were seized by Russian border forces, while their captors insisted that they had “violated” the border. The absence of agreement between the two sides is indicative of the ambiguity that characterizes these border spaces, where many of those detained at the border claiming to have been seized a long way from the putative territory of Tskhinvali Region.

The fencing taking place as part of borderization means that this is a border at once able to represent the fixity of the notion of Tskhinvali Region while also capable of “advancing” into territory previously accessible by local villagers on the Georgian side, an advance which is then extended by the activities of the Russian and Tskhinvali Region authorities in the area. The results for those on the Georgian side have been catastrophic, with lost farmlands, abandoned orchards, inaccessible grazing areas and reduced supplies of irrigation water, together with the disruption of traditional activities like visiting graves at Easter or collecting jonjoli to pickle. The fence being erected along the border provides the illusion of linear predictability to what is a contested zone of authority involving a number of actors – Georgian, Tskhinvali Region, Russian and the EU.

While this contested zone is also present in Georgia’s other breakaway region of Abkhazia, where detentions and sporadic violence at the boundary similarly mar the daily lives of those resident in the region, its impact around Tskhinvali Region is arguably greater, because the effect of the 2008 war and its aftermath on both territory and population, the twin bases of sovereignty, was more significant.

While the Enguri River provides a natural boundary where the more populated parts of Abkhazia and Georgia rub up against one another, in the case of Tskhinvali Region this dividing line has to be written into the earth, where the inscription of the border and indeed the state requires the constant deployment of resources: the writing of the border, the state, and the world again and again.

While in recent years this border writing has been found both out away from and within the state’s borders, it also clearly occurs at the border itself, where the sovereignty-based territorial logic remains intact. Through this writing, Tskhinvali Region literally grounds its existence in opposition to Georgia, while Georgia in its turn opposes its European and Western identity to Russia’s support of its breakaway regions. Such geopolitical imaginings appear to operate at a level far removed from the “technical landscapes of control and surveillance” being utilized in the borderization process, but they are a part of the same border nevertheless.

## References:

1. Broers L., Iskandaryan Al., Minasyan S., (2015), The Unrecognized Politics of de facto States in the post-Soviet Space, *Caucasus Survey*, pp., 187-194, 189;
2. Brown W., (2010), *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*, New York, p., 25.
3. George J., (2010), *The Politics of Ethnic Separatism in Russia and Georgia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press.
4. Meeting of Georgian, Russian Diplomats in Prague, (2014, 16 April), *Civil.ge*, Accessed October 4, 2016: <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27143>;
5. Russia's Official Statement about Detention of Georgian Journalists, (2014, 16 April), *Georgian News TV*, Accessed October 4, 2016: <http://www.georgianews.ge/politics/26930-russias-official-statement-about-detention-of-Georgian-journalists.html>;
6. Russia's South Ossetia Fences Now Stretch 35 km, (2013, 10 October), *Democracy and Freedom Watch*, Accessed October 4, 2016: <http://dfwatch.net/russias-south-ossetia-fences-now-stretch-35-km-38895>.
7. Toft, M., (2003) *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
8. Jioev M., (2014, 16 April), *Georgian Journalists Are Detained for Border Violation*, *Pirveli TV*, Accessed October 4, 2016: <http://1tv.ge/en/news/view/67505.html>;
9. Harvey J., Stansfield G., (2011), *Theorizing Unrecognized States: Sovereignty, Secessionism and Political Economy*, in *Unrecognized States in the International System*, ed. Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield, London: Routledge, pp., 11-26.



## The causes and dynamics of conflict in Tskhinvali region (1989-2008)

### Abstract

In terms of ensuring regional security, resolving the existing conflicts in the South Caucasus and conducting researches on this direction are actual issues from the scientific and political aspects. Using several scientific methods this article investigates the causes and dynamics of conflict in Tskhinvali region (the territories of the former South Ossetian Autonomous region) from 1989 to 2008.

Ossetians' territorial claim to the historical Tskhinvali region of Georgia which is the main reason of the conflict, began when Georgia became an independent state after the Russian Empire collapsed. After the Red Army invasion of Georgia in 1921, although the territorial claims resulted with the creation of the Autonomous Region of South Ossetia in April, 1922, but the problem was not solved.

A new stage in the dynamics of the conflict began in the late 1980s when Georgian SSR was struggling both for liberation and prevention of internal conflicts. The declaration of the South Ossetian Democratic Soviet Republic which was contrary to the constitution of Georgian SSR, and a number of internal and external factors led to the armed conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia. At the result of the talks in Sochi on June 24, 1992, an agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict which was signed between Russia and Georgia brought a ceasefire.

On August 8, 2008, Georgian armed forces launched military operations in order to restore the constitutional order in South Ossetia. The Russian Federation launched military response to Georgian operations. After the war the Russian Federation recognized South Ossetia as an independent state. According to the law of Georgia "On Occupied Territories" Tskhinvali region (the territories of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region) is one of the occupied territories as a result of the military aggression of the Russian Federation.

The government of Georgia continues its efforts to settle the conflict peacefully. Tskhinvali region is officially part of Georgia. According to the principles of the international law the conflict in Tskhinvali region must be solved in the framework of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia.

**Keywords:** The Republic of Georgia, the conflict, Tskhinvali region (the territories of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region), Ossetians, Russian Federation

### I. Introduction

The Republic of Georgia, the South Caucasian country bordering Black Sea in the west, is a strategically important country in terms of its geographical location between Europe and Asia. Situated at the crossroads of cultures and civilizations, Georgia throughout history has been a home for people of different cultural, ethnics and religious features. Geographical location also makes Georgia being at the crossroads of the geopolitical and economic interests of a number of regional and global actors of international relations. Georgia as a dynamically developing

country supports cooperation among states and makes a great effort to the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in the region and in the world.

Over the years, conflicts remain at the root of threats to regional security in the South Caucasus. Intrastate and interstate conflicts are one of the main threats not only to regional security, but also to national security with damaging political stability and socio-economic development of the countries. Conflict resolution is the main factor contributing to regional peace and security by strengthening co-operation and mutual confidence in various fields between states. Urgent conflict resolution in the region is one of the priority issues for regional states. Unfortunately, Georgia experienced both kinds of conflicts: intrastate and interstate conflicts in 1992-1993 and in 2008. Nonetheless, Georgia then enjoyed a period of stability with sustainable economic and democratic development.

In the early 1990s Georgia suffered from political instability and economic hardship. One of the main causes of this instability was the conflict of Tskhinvali, the Former Autonomous Region of South Ossetia. Using several scientific methods this article investigates the causes and dynamics of conflict in Tskhinvali region (the territories of the former South Ossetian Autonomous region) from 1989 to 2008. The causes and dynamics of the conflict not only cover the period 1989-2008, but also have some historical reasons. The dynamics of the conflict of Tskhinvali region consist of several stages with specific causes.

Tskhinvali region, the former Autonomous Region of South Ossetia is situated on the southern side of the Central Caucasus and in the north of the Republic of Georgia. Tskhinvali region, the Former Autonomous Region of South Ossetia covers an area of 3800 square kilometers. According to 1989 All-Union population census, there were more than one hundred thousand inhabitants in the former Autonomous Region of South Ossetia. 66.2% and 29% people of total population were comprised of Ossetians and Georgians, relatively. Despite the distinction between the numbers of Georgians and Ossetians living in the former Autonomous Region of South Ossetia was almost twice, nearly half of the families consisted of mixed Georgian-Ossetian families. The remaining 4% people were made up of Russian, Armenian, and Jews. In Tskhinvali, the administrative center of the former Autonomous Region of South Ossetia, 74% of the total population consisted of Ossetians, 16% of Georgians, and 9% of other ethnic groups (Sammut, 1996). Despite the large number of Ossetians in the region, statistical indicators show that the relationship between Georgians and Ossetians was moderate. According to 2002 census, there were only 38,000 Ossetians. (except the estimates of the former autonomous district of South Ossetia).

## II. Latent conflict stage

Latent conflict stage is the first phase of the dynamic of conflict in which the parties with different needs, values and interests experience underlying tension and contradiction without realizing the impending conflict. Despite the fact that at this stage the differences are not enough, but there is potential for outbreak of the conflict.

Ossetians' territorial claim to the historical Tskhinvali region of Georgia is the main reason of the conflict. The Georgians and Ossetians' claims on the former Autonomous Region of South Ossetia are contradictory to each other. Ossetians state their roots are derived from the Alans who came to the both sides of Greater Caucasus Mountains in the ancient time, approximately III-IV or VI-VIII centuries and merged with the local population. According to Georgian position, the Alans', as the ancestors of Ossetians, historical lands are in the North Caucasus, not on the territory of Georgia and the Ossetians' had existed in Georgia for the last 2, 3 centuries. Georgian side does not deny the root affiliation of the Ossetians with the Alans, but indicates that this process happened in the North Caucasus. According to Georgian sources, the Ossetians' migration to Georgian territory over the Caucasus Mountains first started in the XVII and XVIII centuries. Some scientists relate the settlement of Ossetians in Georgia with Mongol invasions. After the Mongolian-Tatar invasion of the South Caucasus in the 13th century, relying on the support of the Mongols, Ossetians attempted to occupy the south part of the mountains, but unsuccessfully (Sammut, 1996).



Throughout the history, Caucasus was the battle ground between regional powers. With the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca between Russia and Ottoman Empire, Russian Empire annexed Kabarda. After this, many of the Ossetian communities willingly swore fealty to the Russian tsar and were integrated into Russian society (Roudik, 2008). Ossetians state that this treaty is a serious historical material in the conflict. Ossetians argue that according to this treaty territory of north and south Ossetia as one territory entered Russian Empire. Georgians claim that at the time of the treaty Ossetia did not exist as a territory. If Ossetia existed as a territory, so it would have political status, but it did not have any political status.

According to Georgian sources, the process of resettlement of Ossetians in Georgia took place in the estates of the feudal lords in the 1860s (Sammut, 1996). The family name of the Feudal Duke Machabeli was Samachablo, because of these areas were called Samachablo. Samachablo is a historical province in Georgia and is now known as Tskhinvali region. After abolition of serfdom in 1861, the Ossetians could not become landowners and began to move to Georgia (especially the Inner Kartli and Samachablo).

### III. Conflict emergence stage

In this period, conflict parties comprehend that they have different opinions and ideas on the same subject. In this stage the conflict has already developed. Unpredictability and uncertainty characteristic of this stage, in many cases, lead to costly decisions. Specific feature of this stage is low-level conflict causes of which are not only old problems, but also new ones. This stage is a pre-conflict period, in which a small spark is needed to escalate.

Ethno-political conflict is a particular form of socio-political conflicts with specific features. In some circumstances ethnic identification is only “camouflage” of political struggle. “Self-determination” of nations is an example for it. The conflict of Tskhinvali region, the former Autonomus Region of South Ossetia is one of such conflicts.

Nation states may consist of many different groups of people: for example, religious groups, and ethnic groups and soon. But this does not give them the right to separate from the existing state, because this act is violation of the principle of territorial integrity of the state. Russian Empire did not prevent its Great power status and collapsed in 1917 after revolution. New states formed in South Caucasus after its decolonization. One of them was The Democratic Republic of Georgia, but its independence did not last long. When Georgia proclaimed its independence on May 26 1918, Samachablo was one part of the Republic of Georgia. Ossetians did not accept the sovereignty of Georgia over Samachablo. Since that time, Ossetians’ territorial claims to this region began.

By this time, Ossetians in the North Caucasus were under the rule of Russia without possessing any political status. Ossetians who lived in Georgia demanded to unify with Ossetians in the North Caucasus. In these difficult circumstances Georgia could protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

W. Wilson’s fourteen-point programme in 1918 influenced the Paris Peace Conference after WWI. One of the points of the W. Wilson’s peace program was about general association of nations: “general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity of great and small nations alike” [13, p.33]. League of Nations that was created according to this point was the collective security organization of the states. In this difficult situation the Georgian government tried to gain support to its sovereignty and territorial integrity internationally. On November 15, 1920, the Democratic Republic of Georgia submitted a memorandum for the first meeting of the League of Nations about the accession to the League. Although the president of the Assembly Dr. Nansen, declared himself in favor of the appeal, but the representatives of England and France opposed the request because of the League’s inability to assist Georgia in any attack. In the voting process, while 15 states withdraw from the voting process, 10 states voted in favor of Georgia’s membership to the League, but 14 states including England and France were against (Monzie, 2017). League of Nation were aware of Russian power restoration in the South Caucasus after the April occupation of Azerbaijan.

The most influential process in the dynamics of the conflict began with the Soviet Russia's invasion of Georgia. On 20 April, 1922 Autonomous Region of South Ossetia was created within Georgia. On 7 July, 1924, North Ossetian Autonomous Region was created within Russia and then North Ossetia raised its status to Autonomous Republic on 5 December, 1936 (Hewitt, 2013). The establishment of the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within Russia also influenced the dynamics of the conflict in Tskhinvali region, the former Autonomous Region of South Ossetia.

In 1922, Ossetians was in fourth place in the number of total population in Tskhinvali. There were 1651 Jews, 1436 Georgians, 765 Armenians, and only 613 Ossetians in Tskhinvali (Memanishvili, 2011).

#### **IV. Conflict escalation stage**

In conflict escalation stage increased severity and intensity are observed in the conflict. When the conflict parties do not reach agreement peacefully, they are ready to use hostilities in a political and military context. The escalation of the conflict is characterized by the features of narrow cognitive sphere, growth of emotional stress, the loss of initial disagreement, extension of the boundaries of the conflict, an increase in the number of participants and soon.

Conflict escalation stage of the conflict in Tskhinvali region began in 1989 when various nations entering the USSR fought for their independence. These years were the last years of the existence of the USSR.

At this period Georgia fought for its independence, too. On April 9, 1989, Soviet troops moved to crush peaceful protestors in Tbilisi. At the same time, internal separatist activities created additional problems for Georgia. While Georgia fought to restore its independence from USSR, Abkhazians and Ossetians advocated the preservation of USSR.

In April 1978, thousands of Georgians protested the Soviet government's decision about to remove Georgian as the official state language of the republic. The Soviet government was forced to step back (Roudik, 2008). In August 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR put forward the Georgian language program. Adamon Nykhas, who was the leader of the South Ossetian Popular Front which was created in January 1989 (Grgić, 2017), addressed an appeal to the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Communist Part of Soviet Union Central Committee protesting that this program was undemocratic and unconstitutional. Although South Ossetia's Supreme Council made a decision requiring Ossetian be an official language in the Autonomous Region of South Ossetia, this was rejected by Tbilisi and Moscow.

On November 10, 1989, Autonomous Region of South Ossetia proclaimed itself an Autonomous Republic within Georgia. Leadership of Autonomous Region of South Ossetia stated if Georgia will remain one part of USSR they would not demand any territorial claim to Georgia, if not they will request to USSR to uphold constitutional right of South Ossetia to self-determination and allow joining Soviet Union. The aim of this act was to grant the region of Autonomous Republic by Georgian SSR. Georgia did not accept the request, because this demand was an illegitimate claim that threatened its territorial integrity. This requirement was contrary to Georgia's constitutional structure, and at the same time posed a threat to the political stability of the state in such an intense situation. After this, in November 1989, the Georgian Supreme Council declared that Georgian Supreme Council has the right to put veto against any Soviet law that is contrary to Georgia's interests (Sammut, 1996).

On September 20 1990, the South Ossetian Autonomous Region unilaterally declared independence from Georgian SSR and creation of "South Ossetian Soviet Democratic" within USSR. As this decision was illegal and unconstitutional, on September 21, the Supreme Council of Georgian SSR canceled the act. The Soviet central government also did not support this act (Gachechiladze, 2012).

The conflict affected most spheres of the society in the country. Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and Autonomous Region of South Ossetia supported communist party. 70% voters participated in the elections to the

Supreme Soviet of Georgia on October 28, 1990. Although a part of population of Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and Autonomous Region of South Ossetia attempted to boycott the elections in order to make changes to the existing autonomous structure, but they couldn't succeed. Z. Gamsakhurdia's Round table – Free Georgia Bloc with 54% of the total votes won the election to the Supreme Council of Georgia. The Communist Party of Georgia was defeated with 29.6% vote (Гачечиладзе, 1991).

On 9 December 1990, Autonomous Region of South Ossetia held elections to the parliament. On December 11, 1990, the Georgian Supreme Soviet rejected the results of the elections and voted to abolish the Autonomous Region of South Ossetia. Ethnic clashes occurred in Tskhinvali. The incident led to the introducing the state of emergency by Tbilisi in Tskhinvali and Dzhava district. Georgian National Guard was sent to Tskhinvali on 5-6 January 1991. On 7 January 1991, Gorbachev issued a "Degree on certain legislative acts passed in December 1990 in the Georgian SSR" which demanded removing all armed formations from South Ossetia, other than USSR Interior Ministry forces. Georgia's Supreme Soviet declared Gorbachov's Decree of 7 January "a gross interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Georgia" (Hewitt, 2013).

In a nationwide referendum on March 31 1991, 99.1 % voters supported the independence of Georgia (Gill, 2001). Republic of Georgia declared its independence by adopting a law on the Restoration of independence on 9 April, 1991.

On May 26, 1991 Z. Gamsakhurdia won the presidency against five opponents with 86.5% of the votes (Gill, 2001). In December 1991 – January 1992 the clashes between supporters and opponents of Z. Gamsakhurdia also affected the political and economic situation of the country.

## V. De-escalation stage

After the collapse of USSR, Russia as its successor was a mediator in the regulation of the conflict in Tskhinvali region. As a result of talks in Sochi on June 24, 1992, Russia and Georgia signed an agreement on principles of settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict that brought a ceasefire. Sochi agreement defined the zone of conflict and a security corridor, and set up the Joint Control Commission consisting of representatives from Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia and North Ossetia, and plus participation from OSCE. Working groups, ad-hoc committees, expert groups and other formations were created in the framework of JCC. JCC's work focused on three main issues, each with a working group: military and security matters, economic rehabilitation of the zone of conflict, and establish condition for the return of the refugees and IDPs. In 1992 trilateral Joint Peacekeeping Forces were created with Georgians, Russians and Ossetians in order to restore peace and maintain law and order in the zone of the conflict.

In the 1990s, no positive changes were observed towards the resolution of the conflict. In October 1993, Georgia joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and in 1994, Georgia joined the Collective Security Treaty.

Since the second half of 1990s Georgia has started to strengthen relations with West. Georgia left Collective Security Treaty and intensified efforts to join NATO. Georgia joined Council of Europe and started to integrate EU. On October 10, 2000, the Georgian government issued an official document "Georgia and the world: a vision and strategy for the future." The aim of the document was to form Georgia's point of view on problems in international relations and security (Государственность и безопасность: 2005). The document outlines basic principles and aspirations for the future, especially in relations with Europe and the United States. Section V about the Foreign Policy Objectives state that among all partner nations, Georgia has developed especially strong relations with the United States of America and key states of Europe. Since that time, Georgia attempted to deepen relations with the Western countries both in bilateral and multilateral levels.

At 1999 Istanbul Summit of the OSCE, Yeltsin government agreed to close Russian military bases in Vaziani and Gudauta by July 2001, and to start talks on the removal of two other military bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki. The military bases located in Vaziani and Gudauta were disbanded and withdrawn on July 1 2001, and on Novem-

ber 9, 2001, relatively. Vaziani military base was located near Tbilisi, and the Gudauta military base was located in the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia. According to the Georgian source in 2001, till that time 300 soldiers of the 1,100 Russian militaries were removed, and the other militaries and the physical infrastructure of the base were transferred to a Russian peacekeeping battalion. In June 2002, OSCE military experts completed the inspection at the base and confirmed the withdrawal of Russian weapons and personnel (Государственность и безопасность: 2005). Russia and Georgia reached an agreement in 2005 about the withdrawal of the other Russian military bases from Georgia. The process of the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia was finalized in 2007 (Кулагин, 2012). President Ed. Shevardnadze resigned and a new government was formed. In May 2004, President M. Saakashvili stated that: “we will return Abkhazia within my presidential term” (Tekushev, 2013). This meant the restoration of territorial integrity in order to the constitution of Georgia.

On January 2006, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili presented a peace plan for the resolution of the conflict to the Council of Europe. Although this plan was supported by USA and Europe, but South Ossetian leader, Eduard Kokoity rejected the plan claiming that the region was independent since the disintegration of USSR. This plan offered South Ossetia broad guarantees of autonomy. Ceasefire is a temporary agreement between the conflict parties about ending armed conflict and solving problem peacefully. Sochi agreement about ceasefire was not a resolution agreement between the conflicting parties and it did not mean independence for South Ossetia.

At the same time, Georgia was actively pursuing a policy of western integration. USA was the strongest supporter of Georgia’s NATO integration. At a NATO summit in Bucharest on April 3, 2008, NATO allies welcomed Georgia’s and Ukraine’s aspirations for membership and agreed that these countries will become members of NATO (NATO decisions, 2008). For this purpose territorial disputes must be quickly resolved by political and diplomatic means. Western countries, especially USA are also interested in peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Georgia. USA Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made a high-profile visit to Georgia on July 9 2008. She warned President M. Saakashvili not to get into a military conflict with Russia that Georgia could not win. This meant that USA did not commit itself to helping Georgia in a conflict with Russia.

On August 8, 2008, Georgian armed forces launched military operations in order to restore the constitutional order in South Ossetia. The Russian Federation launched military response to Georgian operations. After this war geopolitical situation in South Caucasus was changed. On August 15-16, 2008 a ceasefire agreement was signed between the conflicting parties. The agreement was mediated by French President N. Sarkozy. After reaching an agreement with Russia and then with Georgia, the agreement was signed on August 15 and on August 16 in Tbilisi and in Moscow, relatively. The six points of the agreement are: (a) the commitment to renounce the use of force; (b) the immediate and definitive cessation of hostilities; (c) free access to humanitarian aid; (d) the withdrawal of Georgian forces to their places of permanent deployment; (e) the withdrawal of Russian forces to their lines of deployment prior to 7 August 2008; and (f) the convening of international discussions on lasting security and stability arrangements for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Article VI has been revised with the consents of the Georgian and Russia sides: “Providing international guarantees for the security of South Ossetia and Abkhazia” (Кулагин, 2012).

In article V was also noted that before the establishment of international mechanisms, Russian peacekeepers take additional security measures. Cover letter made clear of the additional security measures in Article V: “security measures” may only be implemented inside a zone of depth a few kilometers from the administrative line between South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia; to ensure safely movement through all highways and railroads in Georgia; was stated that “these additional security measures” will be in the form of patrols of Russian peacekeepers, and the rest of the Russian forces return to their positions by August 7; these measures are temporary until the creation of emergency international mechanisms quickly, which features had already been discussing by OSCE, EU and, in particular the UN. On August 18, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees announced that 30,000 ethnic Ossetians moved and found asylum in the North Ossetia. 85,000 Georgians were displaced. 15,000 of them were from South Ossetia and 3,000 were from Abkhazia (Upper Kodori Valley). Many of the rest of the Georgians were displaced from Gori (45,000) and from Zugdidi (7,000).

South Ossetia and Abkhazia were recognized by Russia as independent and sovereign states on 26 August 2008. On 30 April 2009, Russia signed treaties with South Ossetia and Abkhazia about the protection of borders of these states until creating its own border troops (the treaty was envisaged for 5 years, but could be extended for another five years).

## Conclusion

International community supports the territorial integrity of Georgia. U.S. supports Georgia's territorial integrity. NATO condemned Russia for recognizing Georgia's South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions and called Russia to abolish this decision. In international organizations, Azerbaijan and Georgia support each other's territorial integrity and successfully cooperate within these organizations.

According to the law of Georgia on "On Occupied Territories" on 23 October 2008, the purpose of this Law is to define the status of the territories occupied as a result of the military aggression by the Russian Federation and to establish a special legal regime in the above territories. For the purpose of this Law "the occupied territories and territorial waters" (hereinafter "The Occupied Territories") shall mean:

- a) Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia;
- b) The Tskhinvali Region (territory of the former South Ossetia Autonomous Region);
- c) Waters in the Black Sea: territorial inland waters and sea waters of Georgia, their floor and resources, located in the aquatic territory of the Black Sea, along Georgia's state border with the Russian Federation, to the South of the Psou river, up to the administrative border at the estuary of the Engury River, to which the sovereign right of Georgia is extended; also the sea zones: the neighbouring zone, the special economic zone and the continental shelf where, according to the laws of Georgia and international law, namely the UN Convention on Maritime Law of 1982, Georgia is entitled to fiscal, sanitary, emigration and customs rights in the neighbouring zone and has the sovereign right and jurisdiction in the special economic zone and the continental shelf;
- d) The air space over the territories stipulated in Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of this Article.

Ethnic identity is not always the cause of ethnic conflicts. Economic interests, geopolitical factors, as well as, external influences are the main catalysts for the conflict. Independence of South Ossetia is hostile to the territorial integrity of Georgia according to the principles of international law. International society, such as, individual states and international organizations should intensify their mediation to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. This poses a threat not only to Georgia, but also to the other countries' independence and sovereignty of the world. All members of UN must respect to the principles of international law and support one another in the fight against separatism. According to international law, the conflict in Tskhinvali region, the former Autonomous Region of South Ossetia must find its resolution in the framework of the territorial integrity of Georgia.

## References:

1. After Mixed U.S. Messages, (2008, 11 August) A War Erupted in Georgia, By Helene Cooper and Thom Shankeraug, <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/washington/13diplo.html>
2. Arbatov, Al., (1997), Sean M Lynn-Jones, Karen Motley Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives, Cambridge, Mass.: MTT Press.
3. Anatole de Monzie, (2017, 30 June), New Russia, Translated by R.J.S Curtis. Routledge; 1 edition.
4. Gachechiladze, R., (2012), The New Georgia: Space, Society, Politics, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Georgia, Routledge. 5. Georgia: avoiding war in South Ossetia (2004, 26 November), Europe Report N°159, Tbilisi/Brussels.
6. Gill, G., (2001, 28 December), Democracy and Post-Communism: Political Change in the Post-Communist World



292 pages, Publisher: Routledge; 1 edition.

7. Gutmeyr, D., (2017, 2 April), *Borderlands Orientalism or How the Savage Lost his Nobility: The Russian Perception of the Caucasus between 1817 and 1878 (Studies on South East Europe)*, LIT Verlag.
8. Grgić, G., (2017, 4 January), *Ethnic Conflict in Asymmetric Federations: Comparative Experience of the Former Soviet and Yugoslav Regions*, Routledge; 1 edition.
9. Memanishvili, M., (2011), *National-democratic orientation newspaper "Sakartvelo" 1915-1921 (Problems of Abkhazia, Samachablo and Saingilo)*, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Faculty of social and political sciences, Dissertation submitted for obtaining an academic degree of the doctor of philosophy in journalism, Tbilisi.
10. NATO decisions on open-door policy (2008, 3 April), <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/04-april/e0403h.html>
11. Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen (2007), *Introduction to international relations, Theories and approaches*. Oxford Press.
12. Roudik, P., (2008, 30 November), *Culture and Customs of the Caucasus*, Greenwood Press.
13. Sammut, D., Cvetkovski, N., (1996, March), *Confidence-building matters. The Georgia—South Ossetia Conflict*, VERTIC. <http://www.vertic.org/media/Archived-Publications/Matters/Confidence-Building-Matters-No6.pdf>
14. Tekushev, L., Markedonov, S., Shevchenko, K., (2013), *Abkhazia: between the past and the future*. Prague Medium Orient.
15. The law of Georgia on occupied territories (2008, 23 October) <https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/download/19132/5/en/pdf>
16. Happold, M., (2013, 14 April), *International Law in a Multipolar World*. Routledge; 1 edition.
17. Hewitt, B., (2013), *Discordant Neighbours: A Reassessment of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Osetian conflicts*, BRILL.
18. Гачечиладзе, П., (1991), *Многопартийные выборы в Грузии*, Социс, № 5.
19. *Государственность и безопасность: Грузия после «революции роз»* (2005), Под редакцией Бруно Коппитерса и Роберта Легволда, Американская академия гуманитарных и точных наук, МТИ-пресс, Кембридж, штат Массачусетс, Лондон, Англия.
20. Кулагин, В., (2012), *Современная международная безопасность: учебное пособие для вузов / В. М. Кулагин*. Москва: КНОРУС.

## Aspects of Caucasian Policy during the Tenure of Aleksey Yermolov -Governor and Chief Administrator of Georgia: Georgia and Chechnya

### Abstract

Russia fervently started conquering the Caucasus in the eighties of the 18th century. The process was fostered by the idea of the so called “Greek Plan”, along with the acceleration of the eastern policy of the Empire. The Empire used a number of methods for the purpose of full assimilation of the indigenous peoples and depriving them of their national identity. These methods included bribery, cheating, ordered killings of national leaders, religious sentiments, etc. Russian authorities would sign contracts promising protection and military cooperation with all the nations and countries asking for Russia’s protection, and, those nations and countries would eventually find themselves annexed by the Empire. Resettlement of the population, stirring up manufactured controversies and ethnic and religious hatred, settling sects or hostile groups in an ethnic region, in an attempt to spur rivalry between indigenous people and migrants, used to be routinely practised in the Caucasus occupied by the Empire.

Initially, Russia tried to subdue the Caucasian states through bribery and promises. The rulers of the Empire were trying to win favour with former noble officials: they were granted so-called “privileged pensions” and titles, at the initiative of local authorities. Occasionally, in order to placate local people and outsmart them, the authorities would even punish their own officials by withdrawing them back into the metropolis. During the tenures of Tsitsianov and Yermolov, the methods that prevailed were the use of force and intimidation policy. Inhuman and degrading methods applied by the conqueror to the Caucasian peoples striving and fighting for freedom can be found described in foreign sources, including Russian sources: imprisoning and killing national leaders, disseminating rumours and false information with the intent to mislead people, etc. (Филипсон, 1885).

The article discusses the Caucasian policy of Aleksey Petrovich Yermolov-Governor and Chief Administrator of Georgia, and two major aspects of this policy: fight against the newly conquered population of Western Georgia and fight against disobedient Chechens.

**Keywords:** Aleksey Yermolov, the Caucasus, the Russian Empire, Georgia, Chechnya.

### Introduction

The article describes the Russia’s Caucasian policy in the late 10s of the 19th century under the rule of Aleksey Yermolov-Governor and Chief Administrator of Georgia. It describes the inhuman methods used by him in an attempt to subdue the Caucasian peoples. The Empire tried to justify this policy by the wish to counter the aggression of the Muslim population displayed towards their Christian neighbours, but the methods used by them with relation to their Christian neighbours were as cruel as the ones used with relation to the Muslims. The latter was demonstrated by the fight led by General Aleksey Yermolov against the Chechens and insurgents in Georgia, and by the cruel methods of punishment used by him against co-religionist peoples as well as against the peoples of different religions.

## I. Russia's rigid colonial policy in the Caucasus and the beginning of Aleksey Yermolov's career

Aleksey Petrovich Yermolov (1777-1861) was born in Moscow to a Russian noble family and, following the tradition of that period, he started to pursue a successful military career from his early years. His strong character, stamina, and outstanding military achievements gave the Russian imperial society hope that General Aleksey Yermolov would prove to be the one who could manage to establish perfect order in the Caucasus, to suppress anti-Russian protests, among which the uprisings of Georgians (1804, 1812-1813) were of certain significance. In their view, the cruelty of Yermolov would relieve the popular anger in the region and, eventually, would manage to subdue the Caucasus region to Russia. Aleksey Yermolov tried to make their "hopes" come true, starting from his very first steps.

On 22nd August, 1816, Aleksey Yermolov, while travelling from Georgievsk to Tbilisi, paid attention to an event which could not be at all considered *raison d'état*, though General Aleksey Yermolov attached to it a specific context: on 6 February, 1816, while passing through Kizlyar, Pavel Shvetsov-Major of the Grenadier Regiment stationed at Kaziurt, Georgia, and Kotlyarevsky's distinguished disciple – was taken captive. Capturing Russian soldiers and demanding ransom was a common practice in the relations between Russian and Caucasian peoples, especially in the early 19th century. Aleksey Yermolov knew that impunity and the failure to prevent such cases would harm the reputation of the Russian army in the Caucasus and break the myth of them being strong and powerful. Therefore, he would investigate any case thoroughly and would react severely. In this particular case, he proved to stay firmly committed to his stance and managed to set Pavel Shvetsov free without paying any ransom, and furthermore, he invited the council of elders and warned them that in case of similar developments, he would take revenge on and punish their people severely.

Aleksey Yermolov, together with his escort quietly entered Tbilisi, while he was officially expected to enter Tbilisi through the road on the right bank. The new Governor and Chief Administrator of Georgia was mistaken for an ordinary official travelling to Georgia. In doing so, he demonstrated his character: independence and a reluctance to consider others' opinions.

Aleksey Yermolov rejected the method used by his predecessors in the Caucasus – buying off and bribing the local authorities of the Caucasian peoples and began to accomplish his goal by force of arms (the method which Tsitsianov failed to establish). He started abolishing khanates one after another and launched a war to subdue the North Caucasus. He wrote to Mikhail Vorontsov: "These people do not deserve Alexander I's soft power; He needs an iron rod ... One needs to be a hero to serve the people whose peculiarity is a lack of gratitude, and who do not appear to be happy with Russia, who have repeatedly betrayed him and are ready to betray him again" (Погодин, 1864).

## II. Aleksey Yermolov's first conflict with the geopolitical interests of Persia: establishing borders with Persia

As soon as he arrived in Tbilisi, Aleksey Yermolov started to get ready for his visit in Persia. He planned everything beforehand and met with the khans of Shirvani and Shaki, as he was sure that the topic of their discussion during his meeting with the Khan of Persia would be ceding a part of the Karabakh khanate to Persia. Aleksey Yermolov arrived in Tabriz on 19 April, 1817. The Shah did not display much enthusiasm for meeting him and sent his minister Mirza Abdul Wahab to meet Aleksey Yermolov in person. Aleksey Yermolov refused to communicate with the mediator, because he considered that discussing a state secret with him did not comply with diplomatic norms. But the minister insisted on talks with Aleksey Yermolov and tried to methodically explain to him how powerful and strong Persia was and that Georgia fell strictly within the sphere of their interest, which, according to Russian historians, greatly surprised Aleksey Yermolov, as Russia planned to cede only a part of the empire's borderline and Georgia was not at all included in this plan.



The dispute between Aleksey Yermolov and Mirza Abdul Wahab closed not in favour of the latter, as at the end, exhausted minister was only demanding the return of the part of the Talysh Khanate which remained within the territory owned by Russia. But the Russian diplomat refused to cede that territory either, and remained strictly committed to his principles.

Aleksey Yermolov first met Fath 'Ali Shah on 31 July, 1817. He had been warned that promises verbally made by representatives of Persia meant nothing and, therefore, he decided to make records of each meeting in a written form. Aleksey Yermolov had meetings with a number of Persian officials, Abbas Mirza and others. Eventually, Aleksey Yermolov refused to cede any territories falling within the borders of Russia and the borders between Russian and Persian empires were officially demarcated.

Aleksey Yermolov was granted a military rank of General of the Infantry on his return from Persia.

### III. Fights with the Shamkhalate of Tarki and Dagestan

In October, 1818, following the order issued by General Aleksey Yermolov, Major-General Andrei Pestel led an attack on the town of Batley in the Karakayt region and took control of the town. On 13 October, 1818, Lieutenant General reported that majority of the population of the Shamkhalate of Tarki rose up and took the side of highlanders. The Russian troops led by General Aleksey Yermolov set off for Dagestan and on 31 October they crossed the River Koysu. The troops entered the town of Tarki on 3 November to find Russian detachments destroyed. The number of insurgent highlanders was reported to exceed 20,000 and the uprising of highlanders was led by Major-General Sultan Ahmed Khan of Avaristan and his brother Hasan Khan Beg of Jangutai.

On November 12-15, 1818, General Aleksey Yermolov led an expedition to Jangutai, conquered it soon, and set fire to the village of small Jangutai. The Khan of Avaristan and the Akushans fled to the mountains. This is how the order was restored in the Shamkhalate of Tarki. On 19 November, instigators of the uprising were executed. General Aleksey Yermolov returned to Tbilisi.

From January to March, 1819, unrest and uprisings prevailed in Dagestan. Surkhay Khan was encouraging the highlanders, including the population of Akusha, who were known as being best warriors, to resist Russia's attempts to subdue them.

Surkhay Khan was one of the outstanding figures among the commanders and leaders of the Caucasus, who fought against Russia's occupation policy in the Caucasus and dedicated their lives to the cause of maintaining independence. During his reign KaziKumukh actively resisted Russia's occupation policy in the Caucasus.

According to Ali Kaiaev, a historian from Dagestan, Surkhay Khan was a Qur'an expert and a restorer-builder of mosques and he had a great influence on his people (Каяев, 1990).

His daughters married the Khan of Shirvan and the Sultan of Elisu, which strengthened his political influence even further (Ахвердов, 1804). During the tenure of Aleksey Yermolov, owing to intensified attacks against the Caucasian peoples carried out by Russia, the influence of Surkhay Khan was further strengthened. Surkhay Khan proved to be able to mobilize the people of Dagestan and neighbouring highlanders and to temporarily resist the attacks carried out by powerful Russian troops.

#### **IV. The Anti-Russian coalition and the beginning of the Caucasian war in 1818, Kazi Kumukh, Dagestan, Mekhtupa, Tabasaran and Akusha signed an agreement against Russia**

In August, 1819, General Aleksey Yermolov managed to resist the attack of highlanders from Dagestan. On 15 September, the attack of the highlanders was repelled and he started a counterattack. On 15 September, the village of Dadiani-Yurt was taken by storm by the Don regiment led by Major-General Vasily Alekseevich Sysoev. The village population – not only men but also women and children-continued struggling until the last drop of blood. On 1 December, heavy snowfall in Tarki made it impossible for the Russian troops to use artillery cannons. The Russian troops stationed in the mountains came together and on 19 December they began to repel the attacks of the highlanders. Russian artillery easily destroyed the army of the Caucasian highlanders. The fleeing warriors were chased after by the Cossack cavalry and on 20 December the town of Akusha was captured. On 21 December, General Aleksey Yermolov invited the council of elders and made them take the oath of allegiance to Russia, he also made Qadi of the town a public servant and started paying him salary. Though, this was not the end of the Caucasian war. On 23 March, 1820, Aleksey Yermolov returned to Tbilisi.

#### **V. Aleksey Yermolov and uprising in Western Georgia**

On his return from Dagestan, General Aleksey Yermolov had to face a new wave of uprising in Imereti. The Exarch of Georgia-Theophilactos, who was preoccupied with the census of church property, had to flee Imereti. Representatives of the nobility circles also participated in the uprising.

The uprising was a continuation of the large-scale anti-Russian campaign, which had started with the occupation of Georgia by Russia.

The Georgian people could not get used to the loss of independence or Russian rule. The biggest concern for the Georgian people was that in 1811 the autocephalous status of the Georgian Orthodox Church was abolished. The first Exarch of Georgia-Varlam Eristavi, who was a Georgian by origin, was called to Russia in 1818 and Archbishop Theophilactos Rusanov from Ryazan was appointed as the Exarch of Georgia.

The Exarch of Georgia – Theophilactos attempted to reform the management of the Georgian church; he decided to hand over the property owned by the church to the exchequer, to reduce the number of eparchies; the Georgian liturgy was replaced with Russian one, which was followed by an outrage among the Georgian population. Out of twelve eparchies, only three were maintained in Imereti (Western Georgia): the first-in Imereti, the second- in Guria and the third-in Samegrelo. The new ecclesiastical policy was fiercely opposed by both clergy and secular population of Western Georgia.

Dissatisfaction which started in Imereti escalated into a full-scale public uprising. Russian officials and church leaders were convinced that by using force they had already subdued and intimidated the Georgian population to an extent that would ensure all Russian “reforms” to be painlessly carried out. The Exarch of Georgia-Theophilactos (Rusanov) was encouraged by this belief, when he started to reform the Orthodox Church of Western Georgia and introduce the Russian model. This arbitrary “reform” caused widespread discontent first in Imereti, then in Racha and Guria. The Exarch of Georgia-Theophilactos would not step back as he could not have imagined that a small nation like Georgia could dare to go against the will of the huge empire. Discontent and dissatisfaction was gradually more and more aggravated and eventually escalated into a full-scale uprising. Besides the population of Imereti, the population of Racha and Guria, and a part of the population of Samegrelo joined the uprising. All strata of the population were united against “ecclesiastical violence”; they used to gather in different locations. According to some sources, they sent a letter to Prince Aleksandre of Georgia (Ali Mirza of Kakheti) asking him to become their leader, but he either could not move to Imereti or refused to become the leader.

The rebels then declared Ivane Abashidze, matrilineally the grandson of Solomon I, as their king (Махарадзе, 1942).

Ivane Abashidze failed to take a strong stance and just like Zurab Tsereteli, he maintained some relations with the Russians authorities in the form of written correspondence. The imperial regime took advantage of confrontation among Georgian noblemen and their lack of acting decisively, but most of the people fought hard to defend their national interests (დუმბაძე, 1953).

That was what scared the Exarch of Georgia-Theophilactos and he left Kutaisi and set out for Tbilisi. During his journey he was escorted by 300 soldiers, dozens of officers and two cannons. The initial turmoil seemed to subside, but large numbers of Russian troops gathered in Imereti, and the fact that the elderly governor of Imereti-General Kurnatovski was replaced by Colonel Puzirevski (February 1820) aggravated the situation. This was the time when the Russian military machine had to be put in action. As the first step, it was decided to arrest Prince IvaneAbashidze and two high ranking members of the clergy: Dositheos-metropolitan bishop of Kutaisi (in fact, performing the duty of Catholicos of Abkhazia and Imereti) and Ekvtime -metropolitan bishop of Gaenati; the latter, as Aleksey Yermolov-Governor and Chief Administrator of Georgia later wrote in his memoirs, was arrested and sent to exile for “not respecting properly” the “arrogant clergy” Theophilactos (დუმბაძე, 1874).

The Deputy Governor Veliaminov serving during the tenure of Aleksey Yermolov-Governor and Chief Administrator of Georgia, in his letter to General Puzirevski-the governor of Imereti, wrote the following: “They say that the most difficult task will be to capture the metropolitan bishop of Kutaisi and Prince IvaneAbashidze; do something not to let these two men escape. If it proves impossible to capture them alive, then kill them” (Акты, 1874).

## **VI. Fight against rebellious clergy and against rebels striving for the restoration of statehood**

On 4 March, 1820, all the leaders of the uprising (except Prince Ivane Abashidze) were arrested. Besides, as I. Dubetski – a Russian officer involved in the operation, wrote later: “while being arrested, one of them (the elderly metropolitan bishop of Kutaisi) displayed resistance and the use of butts and spears became necessary, at the end, the bleeding and beaten up bishop was made to mount his horse” (Дубецкий, 1896). As if it was not enough, the Russian military hooded both high priests and tied them on their horses with ropes. They intended to make them ride like this via the military road to Russia, all the way through. But the elderly metropolitan bishop Dositheos, who was ruthlessly beaten, failed to endure such inhuman treatment and died on the way near Surami. But they made his corpse ride further and he was buried only after they reached Ananuri (????????, 1973).

As for Ekvtime-metropolitan bishop of Gaenati, he was taken to Russia and locked in the Svirsky Monastery, several hundred kilometres away from Petersburg, where he died in April 1822 (Потто, 1899).

After that, the uprising showed some signs of slowing down, but the government made a mistake, demanding that people “repent” of the sin and swear allegiance to the emperor. This angered the population and the uprising resumed. The rebels attempted to capture the city of Kutaisi, but the Russian army blocked all the entrances to the city. That was followed by a new outbreak of the rebellion in Racha, Guria and part of Samegrelo.

A large-scale public congress was convened in Racha and they adopted a special appeal: they demanded from the authority of Russia the abolishment of Theophilactos Rusanov’s resolution and their demand also included showing respect for the church traditions of the Georgian people.

Russian officials, who were sent to Racha to carry out church reform, were banned from entering the territory, the roads were blocked, and rebels demanded the expulsion of Exarch Theophilactos Rusanov from Imereti. The Head of the Okrug of Racha-Mayor Tsatska together with his military squad locked himself up in the Fortress of Kvaraand would not dare to go outside.

Rebels swore to take joint and agreed actions. The turmoil spread to Guria and to a part of Samegrelo.

The resistance of the peasants in Guria was led by Ivane Abashidze, a person who was declared as king. He was married to Mamia Gurieli's daughter, but he did not stay with him (as he was a devotee of Russia) but instead he stayed with his wife's uncle-Kaikhosro Gurieli. Kaikhosro Gurieli sympathized with and supported the rebels. General Puzirevski, who was notorious for his aggression and love for use of brute force, felt complacent when he headed to Guria to arrest the leaders of national movement there (including Kaikhosro Gurieli). He gave a stroke of his whip to the first man he met on his way-nobleman Bolkvadze and cursing and insulting the man demanded the information about the whereabouts of Kaikhosro Gureli. The nobleman, who had no experience of being treated like that, killed General Puzirevski on the spot (Акты, 1874).

The rebellious Gurians exterminated Lieutenant Colonel Zgorelsky's squad stationed by the River Bzhuzhi and completely destroyed the troops stationed in Chokhatauri. Meanwhile, the situation in Imereti escalated again. Prince Vakhtang-Almaskhan of Georgia-son of Prince Rostom, who was an illegitimate son of the King of Imereti David II – was declared the new king, replacing Ivane Abashidze. Head of Samegrelo, who was a devoted servant of Russia blocked the Imereti border to prevent rebels from entering the territory.

At the time, General Aleksey Yermolov raised the question of abolishing the principalities and khanates. He considered the contracts promising protection and military cooperation, previously signed between Russia and some of the Caucasian nations, a concession made on the part of Russia and a weakness displayed by the Empire. General Aleksey Yermolov substantiated the necessity of abolishing Georgian principalities (Акты, 1874).

In his letter addressed to the minister of foreign affairs of Russia-Nesselrode, General Aleksey Yermolov referred to the heads of Western Georgia as "offspring of Feudalperversion", whose arbitrary deeds were being retained by Russia (Акты, 1874).

General Aleksey Yermolov-aninsidious man-managed to deceive his supporters-Georgian noblemen and used them for the purpose of implementing Russian imperial policy.

## **VII. Revenge on the leaders and participants of the uprising taken by General Aleksey Yermolov and his army**

Russian authorities sent a new governor of Imereti-Colonel Gorchakov from Tbilisi. Along with a new military regiment, the Kutaisi governor marched for the first time to Racha, where they crushed there rebels by fire and sword.

The fighting in Guria and Samegrelo gave rise to a new wave of uprisings in Imereti. In the summer of 1820, Ivane Abashidze moved from Guria to Imereti to lead the fights there. At the Cholaburi River, he completely destroyed the Cossack outpost and deprived Russian troops of the access to Eastern Georgia. Nevertheless, General Veliaminov was still able to deploy large numbers of troops in Western Georgia and carry out brutal repression against the population. After that, he sent 2,000 well-armed troops to Racha. The rebellious Rachvelians, led by Iashvili, resisted strongly at the Fortress of Kvara, but eventually they had to retreat.

One of the leaders of the uprising-Lomkats Lezhava, who was arrested by the Russians and sentenced to death by hanging in the name of General Aleksey Yermolov, disclosed the plan of the rebellion and named the leaders of the uprising to save his life. He told the Russian side that the charter of rebellion was stored in the estate belonging to Giorgi Tsulukidze. The Russians seized this document. It became clear that the purpose of the rebellion was to expel the Russians from Georgia. The charter of rebellion is the first charter in the history of Georgian national liberation movement (სომეტი, 2012).

Russian generals, under the leadership of the governor of Imereti-Gorchakov, brutally assaulted a large part of the population of Western Georgia: they raided Racha, set fire to villages, destroyed fortresses, arrested many people, and disarmed them.

In the battle at the River Khanistskali, the Russians tried to capture Ivane Abashidze, a declared king of Imereti. After several clashes, Ivan Abashidze retreated and managed to move to Akhaltsikhe, where the Russians sent a killer and Ivan Abashidze was killed there. As for Guria, General Veliaminov attacked the Shemokmedi monastery with 3,200-strong troops, where most of the rebellious Gurians were stationed. The Georgians fought despite knowing that it was an absolutely unequal battle, in which they were destined to lose and, eventually, they were defeated. When the Russians entered the monastery, they found there only five Georgian warriors, who were not dead, and they killed them immediately by piercing their chests with the blades of spears. Later, General Aleksey Yermolov described in details and in an artistic style the Russian repressions carried out in Guria in his memoirs. The noblemen: G. Tsulukidze, the Eristavis, two representatives of the Abashidze family and all the Iashvilis, participating in the uprising, were exiled to Siberia.

Gorchakov moved to Guria after having put down the rebellion and after having devastated Racha. In Guria, the Russians destroyed the village of Shemokmedi, the Russian army hewed down vineyards, cut down gardens and burned houses. Many villages were burned down to ashes so that these places could not be revived for decades. "We have destroyed and ravaged the rebellious villages, hewed down the gardens and vineyards, and even after many years the traitors will not be able to restore their places", General Aleksey Yermolov wrote in his records of Russian repression in Guria (Записки, 1863).

The uprising was suppressed. The leaders as well as ordinary participants of the uprising were sentenced to exile and were sent to Siberia or to some provinces in Russia. Most of them were not able to return to their homeland. Whereas, traitors were given rewards (საქმე 4089).

On March 12, 1821, Gorchakov, the governor of Imereti, issued a proclamation on the Imeretians who were referred to as "traitors of their homeland", with a list of those who should be expelled from the empire. If anyone in the country saw any of them, they would have to bring them alive or dead to the authorities for which they would receive some remuneration. The list included a total of 27 men, all of whom were either noblemen and prominent princes or members of the Imereti royal family (საქმე 1119). In April 1820, during the Imereti uprising, the governor of Imereti, Colonel Puzirevski, who was on his way to Guria to arrest the leaders of the uprising there, was killed in the village of Shemokmedi. Following this fact, on July 24 of the same year, under the command of General Alexei Veliaminov, the Russian army raided and destroyed the Shemokmedi monastery and the village of Shemokmedi. Kaikhosro IV Gurieli, who was charged with organizing the murder of Puzirevski, managed to flee to Ottoman land; as for the killer of Colonel Puzirevski, he was executed.

## Conclusion

On April 17, 1820, the "Black Sea Cossack Host" joined the troops of the "Separate Georgia Corps", and on October 11, 1818, the "Separate Georgia Corps" was renamed the "Separate Caucasus Corps." Therefore, on 11 October, Aleksey Yermolov became the commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps.

During the period of the uprising in Imereti, Aleksey Yermolov decided to arrest Surkhay Khan, who was the organizer of numerous rebellions against the Russians in Dagestan. Surkhay Khan fled and Kazi Kumukh Khanate was given to Aslan Khan.

On 26 September 1820, Mostafa Khan of Shirvan, who had close ties with Surkhay Khan, fled to Persia. Aleksey Yermolov abolished the Shirvan Khanate and subjected it to the Treasury management.

In 1823 Aleksey Yermolov led a military mission in Dagestan, and in 1825 fought with the Chechens. In these battles, Aleksey Yermolov did not achieve much success. So, Aleksey Yermolov, the cruel governor sent to the Caucasus, failed to justify the expectations and admiration of Pushkin or the Russian society of that period. Eventually, Aleksey Yermolov's career came to an abrupt end when he was summoned from the Caucasus by the Emperor as an accomplice of Decembrists, and the traitor of state interests.

## References:

1. გოგოლაძე, დ., (1973), ბრძოლა ცარიზმის ბატონობის წინააღმდეგ XIX საუკუნის პირველ ოცეულში, საქართველოს ისტორიის ნარკვევები, IV, გვ. 930-934.
2. დუმბაძე, მ., (1957), დასავლეთ საქართველო XIX საუკუნის I ნახევარში, თბილისი.
3. ხომერიკი, მ., (2012), 1819-1820 წლების აჯანყება და იმერეთის ბაგრატიონები, გამომც. „უნივერსალი“, თბილისი.
4. საქართველოს ცენტრალური სახელმწიფო საისტორიო არქივი, ფონდი 2, 1, საქმე 4089.
5. საქართველოს ცენტრალური სახელმწიფო საისტორიო არქივი, ფონდი 2, 1, საქმე 1119.
6. Акты собранные Кавказскою Археографическою Коммиссиею, (1874), Тифлиς, т.VI, ч. I, с. 576.
7. Ахвердов, А., (1804), Описание Дагестана, Москва.
8. Берже, А., (2001), Чечня и Чеченцы, Тифлис, 1859: Лаудаев У. Чеченская племя, Сборник сведений о кавказских горцах, Тифлис б 1872б вып. 6: Анчабадзе Г. З., Вайнахи.
9. Каяев, А., (1990), Шамхалы, Советский Дагестан. Махаккала: Дагкнигоиздат.
10. Махарадзе, Н., (1942), Восстание в Имеретии 1819-1820 гг.; კრებულში: მასალები საქართველოსა და კავკასიის ისტორიისათვის, თბილისი.
11. Погодин, М., (1864), «Алексей Петрович Ермолов», Москва.
12. Потто, В., (1899), Поход в Казии-Кумык в 1820 году. С.-Петербург.
13. Филипсон, Г., (1885), Воспоминания, Москва.



## A Georgian minority in Iran

### Will the Fereydan Georgians manage to maintain their ethnic identity?

#### Abstract

This article deals with Georgians living in Iran. For centuries Eastern part of Georgia remained under the Persian influence. After Persian military campaigns and invasions, a large number of Georgians were displaced to Iran. The largest mass deportation of Georgians to Iran took place during the reign of Shah Abbas I in 1614-1617. The population of kingdom of Kakheti was forcibly resettled to various provinces of Iran. They were scattered across different provinces of Persia. Only Fereydan Georgians managed to preserve their ethnic identity and culture. Compact settlement in the isolated mountains of Iran enabled them to keep their Georgian identity. Unfortunately, the number of Georgian language speakers in Fereydan is gradually diminishing. This article explains problems that Fereydan Georgians are facing in Iran.

**Keywords:** Fereydan, Fereydan Georgians, Mass deportation, assimilation.

#### I. Introduction-The mass deportation of Georgians to Iran

When people think about Georgians living in Iran, everyone has Fereydan in mind. However, it should be noted that Fereydan represents only a small part of hundreds of thousands of Georgians resettled in Iran, who are scattered across different provinces of the country. Georgians live in Hamadan, Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan, Najafabad, Mazandaran and Fereydan. Most of them, for logical reasons, were unable to maintain their national identity, assimilated into Iranian society and mixed with the local population. It is difficult to determine the exact number of Georgians living in Iran for the reasons outlined above. According to unofficial data, there are about 70,000 Georgians living in Iran, but if we take into account historical events and facts, then the number of Georgians in Iran should be much higher. Fereydan is the only region where resettled Georgians have preserved their Georgian identity, language, culture and customs for 4 centuries.

Eastern part of Georgia for a long time was under the Persian sphere of influence, that is why large numbers of Georgians were taken voluntarily or by force to Iran.

Georgian kings and feudal-lords often served in the Persian army and participated in the military campaigns of Iranian Shahs. A large number of Georgians also served in the Shah's Guard, which was composed mainly of captives and slaves. Most of them could not return to their homeland and remained in the "Shah's service" for the rest of their lives (Chelidze, 1951). Regular raids of Dagestani people and the "slave trade" also caused the outflow of Georgians to Iran. As a result, the number of Georgians in Iran increased greatly after these raids and invasions. The number of Georgians in Iran grew significantly since the establishment of the Safavid dynasty, when Persian raids in different Georgian kingdoms became more frequent. Shah Tamaz I invaded Georgia four times in 1541-1554 and took a large number of captives to Iran. Only during one invasion (the fourth invasion), Shah Tamaz I took 30,000 captives from Georgia to Iran. The largest mass deportation of Georgians to Iran took place during the reign of Shah Abbas I. In 1614-1617 Shah Abbas took about 200,000 captives from Kakheti-Hereti and forcibly resettled them in various provinces of Iran (Khorasan, Mazandaran, Kurdistan, Luristan.) The traces of exiled Georgians can still be found in many provinces of Iran and are reflected mainly in country's toponyms.

## II. Motivations for deportation

One might well ask, what were the motivations of Iranian Shahs? Why did they resettle so many Georgians forcibly to Iran?

There were several reasons:

1. King of Persia, Shah Abbas aimed primarily at enhancing Iran's military potential. He wanted to fill with Georgian warriors the newly formed regular army. Georgians were good warriors and they could significantly increase the fighting potential of the Persian army and strengthen Iran's security. Due to the frequent wars with the Ottoman Empire, the Shah of Iran attached great importance to military matters and to the defense of his country. Shah Abbas launched a reform of the army in order to increase the fighting ability of the Persian army and began its reorganization. As a result of the new reform, a regular army was created, consisting of the Rifle Corps and the Ghulam Army. The prisoners of war from Georgia and the Caucasus were serving in the Ghulam army. The Ghulam army was made up of Islamized Georgians and Caucasians, who were taken prisoners in the course of Persian military campaigns. According to Persian rules and traditions the commander of the army, also known as Kular-Aghas, was always an ethnic Georgian. The first commander of the Ghulam army was Alaverdi-Khan Undiladze. Thanks to his talents and abilities, he rose to high office in the Safavid state and became a celebrated commander and statesman in Iran. Thus, after the modernization of the Persian army, the role and importance of the Georgian element in the Shah's army increased. Representatives of the Shah's Guard gained a great deal of influence and authority over the Persian royal court.

The Ghulam army was a reliable stronghold of the Safavid dynasty and played a major role in breaking the monopoly of the Kizilbash military force. From the middle of the XVI century to the beginning of the XVIII century, the Ghulam army was an important and distinguished force on the Iranian political arena (Maeda, 2011). Georgians held high and responsible positions in Persia. Georgians were often appointed as commanders and generals of the Safavid state. An Italian traveler, Pietro Della Valle (1586-1652), who travelled to Iran, met Georgians and admired their bravery and courage, wrote: "Today the power of the Persian Army rests on the Georgian fighters who make up the best part of it" (Valle, 1755).

Historical sources prove that the Georgians were enlisted not only in the Ghulam army but also in the cavalry. During the 17th century, the number of Georgian cavalry in the Persian army ranged from 8,000 to 40,000 (Tabaghua, 1982).

2. The second motivation for the resettlement of Georgians to Iran is often associated with Shah's economic interests. In 1598 Shah Abbas declared Isfahan as the capital of Persia. He wanted to accelerate the development of the central areas of Iran. The Georgians, especially the Kakhetians, were excellent farmers, and their relocation to Iran would certainly contribute to the development of agriculture. In the central areas of Iran, the Shah of Persia settled a large number of Georgian peasants and Armenian merchant-craftsmen in Iran to develop trade, crafts and agriculture.

3. The third reason is linked with Iran's stability and security: The Shah of Iran wanted to use the resettled Georgians to subdue the disobedient, nomadic tribes that greatly harmed the Iranian population through frequent raids and attacks. The Shah of Iran resettled Georgians to those areas where the invasions of nomadic tribes were more widespread. According to Shah Abbas, by resettling Georgians to Fereydan the capital of Safavid Persia – Isfahan was to be better protected from frequent attacks of Bakhtiaris, Lurs and Kurds. These tribes often carried out joint attacks on both Isfahan and nearby Persian villages and greatly damaged country's stability, security and economic development. It was for this purpose that the Georgians were deployed compactly in Fereydan, in the Bakhtiari Mountains, in order to protect the Iranian capital from attacks of nomadic tribes. For centuries, the resettled Georgians contained the nomadic tribes and supported the stable development of Persia.



### III. Fereydan Georgians in Iran

Fereydan is located in the central mountains of Iran, in the Bakhtiari Mountains. It is about seven hundred kilometers away from the present capital of Iran, Tehran, and eighty kilometers away from Isfahan. Unlike other provinces of Iran, Georgians in Fereydan were compactly settled, which allowed them to preserve Georgian culture and traditions. As Ambako Chelidze states in his book "Fereydan Georgians", there are 15-16 Georgian villages in Fereydan. However, there are also some villages where residents do not speak Georgian anymore. Next to Georgians live also Lurs, Bakhtiaris, Kurds and Armenians. Living next to nomadic tribes has never been easy for Fereydan Georgians. The main activity of Bakhtiaris and Kurds for centuries was cattle-droving. They used to move livestock over long distances in Southern Iran and when they found a favorable moment, they attacked and pillaged villages, and after that, disappeared quickly in high mountains. Georgians often had to fight with these ferocious nomadic tribes. The attacks of nomadic tribes occurred unexpectedly, so they could always inflict great material and moral damage on Georgians. The attacks of the nomadic Kurds and Bakhtiaris were systematic and the Fereydan Georgians were forced to fight constantly and repel aggression from these tribes. Georgians have been a deterrent force for centuries, successfully protecting the Iranian population from banditry and gang attacks of nomadic tribes (Chelidze, 1951).

Georgian society started to show some interest towards Fereydan too late, only in the late nineteenth century. Before that, Georgians had no contact with Fereydan at all. In the XVII – XVIII centuries, Georgian, European or Russian travelers never visited Fereydan and knew nothing about this province. It was only in 1840 that the 23-year-old English traveller Sir Austen Henry Layard visited the area. He met many Georgians in Fereydan and admired their hard work. Henry Layard was in Upper Martkopi, where he saw Georgian settlements surrounded by orchards. As he writes in his book, high-quality fruits were produced in Georgian villages, which Fereydan Georgians used to sell in Isfahan and other provinces of Iran. Henry Layard published a book in London with the title "Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana, and Babylonia," in which he shares his impressions on Fereydan to readers. In the above-mentioned book, he writes about Martkopi: "There are some hundred houses in this village. Shah Abbas founded a large Georgian colony here. These Christians maintained their native language and religion. They are capable, diligent and hard-working people. Hardworking men take care of the gardens and arable lands, which are planted around their villages. Georgian villages are clearly distinguished from other settlements which are located nearby. Cold water flows from mountain springs and underground tunnels. Georgians produce excellent, aromatic fruits that they send abundantly to Isfahan and elsewhere" (Chipashvili, 1990). It is clear from Henry Layard's words that through hard work and dedication Georgians transformed Fereydan into a small paradise and a distinguished place in Iran.

The first Georgian to travel to Fereydan was Lado Aghniashvili. He was in Fereydan in 1894. Lado Aghniashvili studied the rules and habits of Fereydan Georgians and published a book in 1896 known as "Persia and Iranian Georgians" [7]. In this book, Lado Aghniashvili provides many interesting accounts of nineteenth-century Fereydan. According to him, Fereydan Georgians adhered to the rule of ethnic endogamy and for a long time the marriage was mainly within the community of Georgians, but by the end of the 19th century this tradition had gradually died away. As he points out in his book, this is precisely the reason why many Iranian Georgians were assimilated into Iranian Society and lost Georgian customs and traditions. Lado Aghniashvili notes in his work that many villages no longer speak Georgian and that Georgian customs are gradually disappearing (Aghniashvili, 1896).

In 1927 Ambako Chelidze, a Georgian writer, translator and public figure, traveled to Fereydan. He thoroughly studied the language, history and customs of the Fereydan Georgians. He also highlighted the fact that the number of Georgian language speakers in Fereydan was gradually diminishing. According to him the reason for this was the lack of Georgian language teachers. Although Fereydan Georgians were eager to learn their mother tongue, no one in Fereydan at that time was literate enough to teach mother tongue.

In 1920s, when Ambako Chelidze visited Iran, there was no school in Fereydan, and it is therefore, not surprising that the overwhelming majority of Fereydan Georgians did not know how to read and write in Georgian at that

time. The study of Georgian language was mainly carried out in families, by parents and Georgian language was passed down from generation to generation verbally.

In the XXI century, compared to the previous centuries, the living conditions of Fereydan Georgians improved greatly and they had better access to educational facilities. The globalization of the media, the invention of the Internet, the development of transport and communication systems has enabled Fereydan Georgians to establish closer contact with their homeland and keep an eye on the political events in Georgia. The collapse of the Soviet Union also facilitated the deepening of contacts with Fereydan Georgians. Thanks to the internet and satellite broadcasting, Fereydan Georgians are better informed about Georgia. Georgian schools have been established in recent decades, which has greatly increased the number of literacy in Fereydan.

In the twentieth century, when the process of urbanization began at an accelerated pace, many young people from Fereydan moved to big Persian cities to find jobs. The lack of jobs in Fereydan is forcing many young people to work in other provinces of Iran and to mix with the Persian-speaking population. Due to the intensification of migration processes from the Georgian villages of Fereydan, the demographic situation in this area is gradually changing. Maintaining Georgian identity will be one of the major problems for the younger generations who have left Fereydan and started working in different provinces of Iran.

## Conclusion

Fereydan Georgians are facing a large number of problems and they may lose their Georgian identity in future, if special measures will not be taken by the Georgian society. Georgian society should pay more attention to the Iranian Georgian community and should develop special educational programs for those Iranian Georgians, who want to learn Georgian language, traditions and customs. Also, Georgian government should grant Georgian citizenship to those Iranian Georgians, who want to return to their motherland.

## References:

1. Aghniashvili, L., (1896), Persia and Iranian Georgians, Tiflis.
2. Chelidze, A., (1951) Fereydan Georgians, Tbilisi.
3. Chipashvili, G., (1990), Georgian population of Iran, Tbilisi.
4. Sharashenidze, D., (1979), Fereidan „Gurjies“, Tbilisi.
5. Tabaghua, I., (1982), Materials for the History of Georgia in the First Quarter of the XVIII Century, Tbilisi.
6. Hirotake Maeda, (2011), Georgians in Safavid Iran, Tbilisi.
7. Pietro della Valle, (1745), Voyages dans Turquie, Rouen, t. IV.

# არჩილ სიხარულიძე

საქართველოს საზოგადოებრივ საქმეთა ინსტიტუტი

## პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცეში ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციების წარმატების შაბლონი

### შესავალი

ხავერდოვანმა რევოლუციებმა მნიშვნელოვნად შეცვალეს პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცეში არსებული პოლიტიკური რეალობა. სომხეთში დატრიალებულმა მოვლენებმა კი ნათელყო, რომ მექანიზმს ჯერ კიდევ შეუძლია ფუნდამენტურად შეძრას რეგიონი. მეტიც, შეგვიძლია, დავასკვნათ, რომ გამოვლინდა ამ არეალში ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციების შესაძლო წარმატების რამდენიმე საჭირო წინაპირობა, როგორცაა საზოგადოების კონსოლიდაცია, გარე მოთამაშეების მხარდაჭერა ან ჩაურევლობა (ინერტულობა) და ძალაუფლების მშვიდობიანი გადაცემა. წარმატება გააზრებულია, როგორც რევოლუციური ძალის უნარი, აიძულოს არსებული რეჟიმი, გადადგეს, უნარი, თვითონ შეინარჩუნოს ძალაუფლება და, ამასთან, სახელმწიფოში შეინარჩუნდეს წესრიგი და თავიდან აცილებულ იქნას დაპირისპირება (ძალადობა). სწორედ ეს იყო და დღესაც ეს წარმოადგენს ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციის უდიდეს უპირატესობას – რეჟიმის მშვიდობიანი გზითა და სახელმწიფოსთვის ნაკლები დანახარჯებით ცვლილება. საქართველოში, უკრაინაში, ყირგიზეთსა და სომხეთში მომხდარი რევოლუციების შედარებითი ანალიზი ცხადყოფს, რომ იმ შემთხვევებში, როდესაც ზემოთ ხსენებული სამივე ცვლადი დაკმაყოფილებულია, ხდება ძველი ხელისუფლების ცვლილება და ახლის გამყარება; სხვა შემთხვევაში სახეზეა არსებული ხელისუფალის გადაგდება სახელმწიფოსთვის დიდი ზიანის მიყენების გზით, ან არსებული მთავრობა ინარჩუნებს ძალაუფლებას, ან კიდევ, როგორც ყირგიზეთში, ხდება პოსტრევოლუციური მთავრობის ჩამოგდება და ძველი წესრიგის დაბრუნება.

**საკვანძო სიტყვები:** რევოლუცია, რეჟიმის ცვლილება, პოლიტიკა, უსაფრთხოება, პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცე.

### საკითხის აქტუალობა

ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციის ძირითადი აზრი და სახელმწიფოებრივი სარგებელი მისი მშვიდობიანი და არაძალადობრივი ბუნებაა. კონკრეტულად კი, ამა თუ იმ სახელმწიფოს მოსახლეობას შეუძლია, საკუთარი ქვეყნისთვის მნიშვნელოვანი ზიანის მიყენების გარეშე, შეცვალოს არსებული რეჟიმი, რაც ქმნის რეფორმებისა და განვითარებისთვის ხელსაყრელ ნიადაგს. ასეთი შედეგებით უმტკივნეულო მოდელი დღესაც ძალიან მიმზიდველია არადემოკრატიული სახელმწიფოების საზოგადოებებისთვის, რომლებიც მონმენი არიან სახელმწიფო მიტაცების, კორუფციისა და სხვა ანტისახელმწიფოებრივი გამოვლინებების.

ბოლო წლებში სამეცნიერო წრეებში ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციების (ზოგადად, რევოლუციების) საკითხი შეისწავლებოდა ძირითადად ე.წ. არაბული გაზაფხულის ფარგლებში, რაც განპირობებული იყო არა მხოლოდ აქტუალობით, არამედ ამ რეგიონის პოლიტიკური და ეკონომიკური მნიშვნელობითაც. შესაბამისად, პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცეში მსგავსი პროცესების კვლევა დაკნინდა. რა თქმა უნდა, გამონაკლისად შეიძლება ჩაითვალოს უკრაინის მაგალითი, სადაც რევოლუციური სცენარი ორჯერ განვითარდა და ე.წ. ევრომაიდნის შემდეგ სახელმწიფო რუსეთის მიერ მხარდაჭერილ (ნა-

ქეზებულ) შიდა სამხედრო დაპირისპირებაში ჩაება. მოსკოვთან დაპირისპირებით გამყარებული დაუსრულებელი უკრაინული რევოლუცია დღესაც კვლევის საგანია, თუმცა, აღსანიშნავია, რომ ეს შემთხვევა ზოგადად პოსტსაბჭოთა კონტექსტში ნაკლებად შეისწავლება და მიმოიხილება. 2018 წელს სომხეთში სრულიად მოულოდნელმა განვითარებულმა პოლიტიკურმა პროცესებმა ცხადყვეს, რომ ამ ბერკეტის გამოყენების პერიოდი რეგიონში ჯერ კიდევ არ დასრულებულა და მას შეუძლია მნიშვნელოვნად შეცვალოს პოლიტიკური რეალობა. შესაბამისად, სასურველია უკვე არსებული შემთხვევების შესწავლა და იმის გაანალიზება, თუ რა ტენდენციები შეინიშნება.

ნაშრომში ხდება საქართველოში, უკრაინაში, ყირგიზეთსა და სომხეთში სხვადასხვა დროს მომხდარი ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციების შედარება, ამ გზით საერთო ტენდენციების გამოვლენა და ანალიზი. კერძოდ, შეიძლება ითქვას, რომ სახეზეა ერთგვარი სისტემა, რომლის მიხედვითაც ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციის წარმატებას აქვს რამდენიმე მნიშვნელოვანი წინაპირობა, რომელთა შორისაც არის საზოგადოებრივი კონსოლიდაცია, გარე მოთამაშეების მხარდაჭერა ან ჩაურევლობა (ინერტულობა) და ძალაუფლების მშვიდობიანი გადაცემა. ეს ცვლადები წარმოადგენს ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციის წარმატების ერთგვარ შაბლონს, ხელსაყრელი წინაპირობის ფორმულას.

წარმატება გააზრებულია, როგორც რევოლუციური ძალის უნარი, აიძულოს არსებული პოლიტიკური რეჟიმი, გადადგეს, უშუალოდ შეინარჩუნოს ძალაუფლება და არ მოხდეს ქვეყანაში არეულობა და დაპირისპირება.

### მთავარი საკვლევი საკითხი

რატომ არის პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცეში ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციური მოძრაობა ერთ შემთხვევაში წარმატებული, ხოლო მეორეში – წარუმატებელი?

ეს კითხვა სამეცნიერო ლიტერატურის ერთ-ერთი ძირითადი კვლევის საგანია, რადგან მასზე პასუხი იძლევა პროცესების უკეთ გაგების შესაძლებლობას, ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციების წარმატების განჭვრეტას.

### ჰიპოთეზა

ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციის წარმატების შესაძლო ხელსაყრელი წინაპირობა მთავრობის პოლიტიკის წინააღმდეგ საზოგადოების მნიშვნელოვანი ნაწილის კონსოლიდაცია და ამ პროცესში გარე მოთამაშეების მხარდაჭერა ან ჩაურევლობაა (ინერტულობა), რაც უნდა დაგვირგვინდეს ძალაუფლების მშვიდობიანი გადაცემით ანუ მასშტაბური ძალადობის თავიდან აცილებით. გარდა ამისა, ახალი პოსტრევოლუციური მთავრობის მიერ მეტ-ნაკლებად წარმატებული რეფორმების გატარება, რაც განაპირობებს ახალი წყობის სტაბილურობას.

გარე მოთამაშეების, ძირითადად ე.წ. დასავლური სამყაროს მიერ ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციების მხარდაჭერა განპირობებული იყო შეხედულებით, რომ ამ გზით შესაძლოა მომხდარიყო სახელმწიფოს სწრაფი დემოკრატიული ტრანსფორმაცია.

### თეორიული ჩარჩო

კვლევაში გამოყენებულია ე.წ. კოლექტიური ქმედების პრობლემა/ჩარჩო (collective action problem/framework), რომლის თანახმადაც, იმ ქვეყნებში, რომლებიც განიცდიან მთავრობის მხრიდან სახელმწიფო მიტაცებას, მოსახლეობა ინერტულია დაგროვილი უკმაყოფილების გამოხატვის მიმართ. ეს განპირობებულია ყოველდღიურობაში არსებული მრავალი გამოწვევით და, შესაბამისად, საფასურით, რომლის გადახდაც საზოგადოების წარმომადგენელს უწევს; ანუ, თითოეული მოქალაქე განსაზღვრავს იმ დანაკარგს და სარგებელს, რომელსაც ის მიიღებს საპროტესტო აქციებში ჩართვისას და მთავრობის წინააღმდეგ გალაშქრის შემთხვევაში. ნესისამებრ, დანაკარგი დიდია,



ხოლო სარგებელი რთულად მისაღწევი, ამიტომ მოქალაქეები ირჩევენ თმენის პოლიტიკას. თუმცა, არსებული რეჟიმის მიერ არჩევნების გაყალბებამ და ჩანყობამ შეიძლება უზიძგოს მოსახლეობას კოლექტიური ქმედებებისკენ და გახდეს ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციის დასაწყისი. კერძოდ, ხდება მოსახლეობის კონსოლიდაცია უაღრესად მნიშვნელოვანი შიდა გამონვევის ირგვლივ – სახელმწიფოს მიტაცება სამართლიანი არჩევნების წართმევის გზით, რაც აერთიანებს მოსახლეობის დიდ ნაწილს და წარმატებული პროტესტის შედეგად მიღებული სარგებელი აჭარბებს თმენის პოლიტიკის მოგებას. კოლექტიური ქმედების ჩარჩოსთვის ძალიან მნიშვნელოვანია, მაგალითად, არჩევნების გაყალბება, რადგან ის წინა პლანზე აყენებს მთელი საზოგადოებისთვის უმნიშვნელოვანეს საკითხს, რომელიც ახლოსაა ქვეყნის თითოეული მოქალაქისთვის და, როგორც წესი, საზოგადოებრივი ერთობის წინაპირობაა. არჩევნების გაყალბებასთან დაკავშირებულია, ასევე, მეორე მნიშვნელოვანი ცვლადი, როგორცაა საერთაშორისო გამომხაურება და ჩარევა. არჩევნები არა მხოლოდ შიდა, არამედ ხშირად საერთაშორისო განსჯის საგანი ხდება. საერთაშორისო საზოგადოების წარმომადგენლები (მედია, საერთაშორისო ორგანიზაციები) და ქვეყნის სტრატეგიული მოკავშირეები (გლობალური და რეგიონალური მოთამაშეები) აქტიურად აკვირდებიან ამ პროცესს და საჭიროების შემთხვევაში შეუძლიათ მნიშვნელოვანი როლი შეასრულონ საპროტესტო მუხტის აგორებაში. კონკრეტულად კი, თეორიის მიხედვით, საზოგადოებისთვის მნიშვნელოვანია იმის განცდა, რომ მათ გააჩნიათ მხარდაჭერა წონიანი საერთაშორისო ძალებისგან. შესაბამისად, მათი მხრიდან ნაქეზება ან, პირიქით, ხელის შეშლა დამატებითი ფაქტორია (Wiengast, 1997); Tucker, 2007).

სწორედ რომ ამ ფორმულით ხსნის ჯოშუა ტუკერი (ibid) რევოლუციების ტალღას პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცეში, კერძოდ კი, საქართველოში (2003), უკრაინასა (2004) და ყირგიზეთში (2005). მისი აზრით, არჩევნების მორიგმა გაყალბებამ მოახდინა საზოგადოებაში არსებული დაგროვილი უკმაყოფილების აკუმულირება და აფეთქება.

## მეთოდოლოგია

კვლევისას გამოყენებულ იქნა დედუქციური მიდგომა, ანუ გამოითქვა ჰიპოთეზა, რომლის გადამონება და გამყარება განხორციელდა არსებული ხელმისაწვდომი მონაცემებით. ნაშრომში გამოთქმული დასკვნები ეყრდნობა საქართველოში, უკრაინაში, ყირგიზეთსა და სომხეთში მომხდარი რევოლუციური პროცესების შედარებით ანალიზს. კერძოდ, მოხდა სამეცნიერო ლიტერატურის, მეორადი წყაროების და ე.წ. კონტენტანალიზი (content analysis); დამატებით, სხვადასხვა სახის სტატისტიკური მონაცემების ჩართვა, როგორცაა არჩევნების შედეგები, მოსახლეობის გამოკითხვები და სხვა. შესაბამისად, კვლევაში გამოთქმული მოსაზრებები ძირითადად გამყარებულია კვლევის თვისებრივი მეთოდების მეშვეობით; ხოლო რაოდენობრივი მონაცემებით მოხდა მათი დამატებითი გამყარება.

## თავი I. საკითხის თეორიული მიმოხილვა

ზოგადად, სამეცნიერო ლიტერატურაში მიმდინარეობს დიდი დებატი იმასთან დაკავშირებით, თუ რა განაპირობებს რევოლუციას და მის წარმატებას. დავის საგანია არა მხოლოდ ის, შეიძლება თუ არა რეჟიმის ცვლილებას ეწოდოს რევოლუცია, არამედ ისიც, თუ როგორ უნდა გაიზომოს წარმატების ცნება. თუმცა, ეს საკითხი სცდება ჩვენი კვლევის საგანს და ყურადღება უნდა მივაქციოთ იმას, რომ პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცეში მომხდარ რევოლუციებს, როგორც წესი, უწოდებენ ხავერდოვანს ან ფერადს. აკადემიურ ნაშრომებში ხავერდოვანი რევოლუცია გააზრებულია, როგორც დემოკრატიზაციაზე სწრაფი გადასვლის (democratic transition) მცდელობა. ხანდახან ამ პროცესს დემოკრატიზაციის მეოთხე ტალღასაც უწოდებენ. თუმცა, მაიკლ მაკფოლი (2005, გვ. 8) მიიჩნევს, რომ რეგიონში მომხდარი რევოლუციები წარმოადგენენ პოსტსაბჭოთა სამყაროში დემოკრატიზაციის მეორე ტალღას, ხოლო სილიტსკი (2005) უწოდებს „პოსტსაბჭოთა საარჩევნო რევოლუციას“, რადგანაც მოსახლეობის აჯანყება სწორედ რომ გაყალბებულ წინასაარჩევნო გარემოსა და უშუალოდ არჩევნებს მოსდევდა.

პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცეში მომხდარი ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციების მიზეზების შეფასებისას ორი ძირითადი მიდგომა გამოირჩევა.

პირველი ანალიზებს პროცესებს გლობალურ ქრილში – დასავლეთისა და აღმოსავლეთის დაპირისპირების ფარგლებში. კერძოდ, ოპოზიციური ძალების დასავლური სიკეთეებისადმი ლტოლვა და შიში, რომ არსებული კორუმპირებული მთავრობის პოლიტიკა აშორებს სახელმწიფოს ცივილიზებული სამყაროსგან, როგორცაა „ევროპა“ და, კონკრეტულად კი, ევროკავშირისგან; ზოგადად კი, ევროპული ინსტიტუტებისგან. ამავე ჩარჩოში არსებობს მეორე ხედვა, რომელიც განსაკუთრებით გავრცელებულია რუსეთში მოღვაწე მეცნიერებს შორის. ხშირად მათთვის ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციები დასავლეთსა და აღმოსავლეთს შორის გეოპოლიტიკური დაპირისპირების განზომილებაა. ამ მოსაზრებას ამყარებენ იმ ფაქტებით, რომ პროდასავლურმა არასამთავრობო და სხვა ინსტიტუტებმა (მაგალითად, სოროსის ფონდი) ხელი შეუწყო სამოქალაქო საზოგადოების განვითარებას და მათთვის არაძალადობრივი პროტესტის საფუძვლების შესწავლას. ამის საუკეთესო მაგალითია კავშირი სერბულ მოძრაობას „ოტპორსა“ (OTPOR) და საქართველოში „კმარასა“ და უკრაინაში „პორას“ (PORA!) შორის. საქართველოში, უკრაინაში და ყირგიზეთში პოლიტიკურმა ცვლილებებმა სერიოზული ეჭვები გააჩინა რუსულ პოლიტიკურ და აკადემიურ ელიტებში, რომ ეს აშშ-ს სადაზვერვო სამსახურების მიერ ბრწყინვალედ ორგანიზებული ოპერაციაა, რომლის მიზანი იყო მსგავსი ცვლილებების განხორციელება რუსეთში და ამით მთელ რეგიონში გეოპოლიტიკური ზეგავლენის მოპოვება (Estebo, 2015).

მეორე ზოგადი მოდელი კონცენტრირდება სამოქალაქო მუხტის მიზეზებსა და წარმოშობაზე, გაერთიანებისა და მართვის საკითხებზე. აქ განსაკუთრებული როლი ენიჭება სამოქალაქო საზოგადოების ეფექტურობის ამაღლებას და საპროტესტო მუხტის აკუმულირებისა და მართვის უნარებს. მაგალითად, სერბეთში მომხდარი რევოლუციის ანალიზისას ბიბერი (2003) ყურადღებას ამახვილებს სწორედ სამოქალაქო საზოგადოების ერთობის მნიშვნელობაზე, ხოლო მაკფოლი (2005) უკვე ოპოზიციური ძალების ფართო კოალიციაზე. თავის მხრივ, ბისინგერი (2007) იყენებს ე.წ. მოდულარული დემოკრატიული რევოლუციის ჩარჩოს, რომლის მიხედვითაც წარმატებული მაგალითი შეიძლება იყოს „შაბლონი“ სხვა საზოგადოებებისთვის; გარდა ამისა, ყურადღება ეთმობა ქვეყნის შიგნით არსებულ სოციალურ მოძრაობებს და მათ ფორმირებაში სამოქალაქო სექტორის როლს.

ცალკე, მესამე მიდგომად შეიძლება ჩაითვალოს ლუკან ვეის (2005) მიერ გამოთქმული მოსაზრება ე.წ. „არაკონსოლიდირებული ავტორიტარული რეჟიმების“ შესახებ. ვეის აზრით, ნარინჯისფერი რევოლუციის წარმატება განპირობებული იყო ლეონიდ კუჩმას უუნარობით, მოხდინა ხელთ არსებული რესურსების კონსოლიდაცია და მათი გამოყენებით საპროტესტო მუხტის ჩახშობა. ამ თეორიულ ჩარჩოში ყურადღება ეთმობა უშუალოდ მთავრობის მიერ კრიზისის მენეჯმენტს და არა საერთაშორისო მოთამაშეებისა და ოპოზიციური ძალების ქმედებებს/შესაძლებლობებს (Kuzio, 2016).


თუმცა, ჯოშუა ტუკის (2007) აზრით, ყველა ზემოთ ხსენებული თეორიული მიდგომა საბოლოოდ ეყრდნობა ელიტების ანალიზს (elite-based analysis). შესაბამისად, მან საკუთარ ნაშრომში ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციების გასაანალიზებლად გამოიყენა ე.წ. კოლექტიური ქმედების პრობლემა.

## თავი II. ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციები პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცეში: წარმატების წინაპირობის შაბლონი

პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცეში ხავერდოვანი რევოლუცია, როგორც პოლიტიკური ბერკეტი, სერბეთიდან იყო გადმოტანილი, სადაც 2000 წელს მშვიდობიანი პროტესტის გზით (ბულდოზერის რევოლუცია) მოხდა სლობოდან მილოშევიჩის მთავრობის დამხობა (Pejic, 2008). ამ მოდელის მთავარი იდეაა არადემოკრატიული რეჟიმების მშვიდობიანი პროტესტის მეშვეობით გადაყენება და ამ გზით სახელმწიფოსთვის ნაკლები ზიანის მიყენება, რაც, როგორც წესი, ისტორიულად ახასიათებს

რევოლუციურ მოძრაობებს. ქართულმა სამოქალაქო სექტორის აქტივისტებმა ეს პრეცედენტი შაბლონად გადმოიღეს და უკვე 2003 წლის ნოემბერში აიძულეს იმდროინდელი ქართული მთავრობა, ედუარდ შევარდნაძის მეთაურობით გადამდგარიყო და დაეთმო ძალაუფლება ახალი პოლიტიკური ძალებისთვის (ვარდების რევოლუცია) (How the Rose revolution happened, 2005; Kandelaki, 2006). ქართულმა გამოცდილებამ, რომელიც პირველი იყო პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცეში, პროცესები წაახალისა უკრაინაში, სადაც, თავის მხრივ, 2004 წელს მოხდა ე.წ. ნარინჯისფერი რევოლუცია და დაკავებული თანამდებობიდან პრეზიდენტ ლეონიდ კუჩმას გადაყენება (DW staff, 2007). ქართული მხარის აქტიური მხარდაჭერით, რაც გამოიხატებოდა გამოცდილების გაზიარებაში, მსგავსი მოძრაობა დაფუძნდა ყირგიზეთში (Anjaparidze, 2005). როზა ოტუნბაევას ხელმძღვანელობით ოპოზიციურმა ძალებმა შეძლეს ამ ცენტრალურ აზიურ სახელმწიფოშიც 2005 წელს ე.წ. ტიტების რევოლუციის დატრიალება და პრეზიდენტ ასკარ აკაევის გადაყენება (Pannier, 2009). ამის შემდეგ, ბევრს მიაჩნდა, რომ ტალღა არ შენელებოდა და მსგავსი პროცესები განმეორდებოდა, უპირველესად, სომხეთსა და აზერბაიჯანში, განსაკუთრებით, რუსეთში (Olcott, 2005; Walsh, 2005; Ambrosio, 2007). თუმცა, ეს არ მოხდა, პროცესი შეფერხდა. მხოლოდ 2013-2014 წლებში უკრაინაში მომხდარმა საპროტესტო აქციებმა, რომლებიც ვიქტორ იანუკოვიჩის მთავრობის დამხობით დასრულდა (ევრომაიდანნი), მისცეს ადგილობრივ და საერთაშორისო ანალიტიკოსებს მსჯელობის საბაზი, რომ რეგიონში ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციების პერიოდი ჯერ არ დასრულებულა. ზოგიერთს მიაჩნია, რომ სწორედ ევრომაიდანნი იყო უკრაინული დაუსრულებელი ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციის ნამდვილი დასასრული (Reznik, 2016). ნიკოლა პაშინიანის მიერ 2018 წელს სომხეთში წარმატებულად წარმოებულმა მშვიდობიანმა პროტესტებმა (RFE/RL's Armenian Service, 2018) კიდევ ერთხელ განამტკიცეს ზემოთ ხსენებული მოსაზრება და ხავერდოვანი რევოლუცია ისევ აქტუალური გახდა რეგიონისთვის. ქვემოთ მოყვანილ გრაფიკში მოცემულია პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცეში მომხდარი რევოლუციების ისტორიული რეტროსპექტივა.

**გრაფიკი 1. ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციები პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცეში**



დღეს ჩვენ შეგვიძლია თამამად განვაცხადოთ, რომ ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციის მთავარი პრინციპებიდან გამომდინარე, ვარდების, ნარინჯისფერი და ტიტების რევოლუციები წარმატებული იყო, ისევე, როგორც სომხეთის შემთხვევა. თუმცა, წარუმატებელია უკრაინული ევრომაიდანნი. კერძოდ კი, საქართველოს (2003), უკრაინის (2004), ყირგიზეთისა (2005) და სომხეთის (2018) რევოლუციურმა მოძრაობებმა შეძლეს არა მხოლოდ მეტწილად მშვიდობიანი გზით მთავრობის გადაყენება, არამედ საკუთარი ძალაუფლების განმტკიცება და ახალი პოლიტიკური პროცესის წამოწყება; ხოლო, უკრაინულმა ევრომაიდანმა მოახერხა ვიქტორ იანუკოვიჩის მთავრობის დამხობა, მაგრამ ეს განხორციელდა ძალიან დიდი მსხვერპლის ხარჯზე; მეტიც, გამოვლინდა სისხლიანი დაპირისპირება, უცხო ქვეყნების მხრიდან შიდა საქმეებში პირდაპირი უხეში ჩარევა და ქვეყანაში რუსეთის მიერ მხარდაჭერილი სეპარატიზმის აღზევა (Russia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine, 2016).

**თავი 2.1. წარმატების წინაპირობის სამი ცვლადი**

ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციის ხუთი შემთხვევის შედარებითი ანალიზი უფლებას გვაძლევს, ვამტკიცოთ, რომ მკაფიოა ერთგვარი ტენდენცია, რომელიც განაპირობებს წარმატებას ან წარუმატებლობას. ეს ცვლადებია საზოგადოებრივი კონსოლიდაცია, გარე მოთამაშეების მხარდაჭერა ან ჩაურევლობა (ინერტულობა) და ძალაუფლების მშვიდობიანი გზით გადაცემა. ქვემოთ მოყვანილ ტაბულაში მითითებულია თითოეული შემთხვევისთვის ამ ცვლადებთან შესატყვისობა.

**ტაბულა 1:** ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციების შედარებითი ანალიზი

ცვლადი	საქართველო 2003	უკრაინა 2004	ყირგიზეთი 2005	უკრაინა 2013-14	სომხეთი 2018
საზოგადოებრივი კონსოლიდაცია	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓
გარე მხარდაჭერა ან ჩაურევლობა (ინერტულობა)	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓
ძალაუფლების მშვიდობიანი გადაცემა	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓

ყველა წარმატებულ შემთხვევაში სახეზეა საზოგადოების მნიშვნელოვანი ნაწილის კონსოლიდაცია სასიცოცხლო შიდა გამონვების წინაშე – სახელმწიფოს მიტაცება (მიტაცების მცდელობა) არჩევნების გაყალბების გზით. ჯომუა ტუკის (2007) თანახმად, ამ უმნიშვნელოვანესმა შიდა სახელმწიფოებრივმა გამონვებამ აიძულა მოსახლეობა, უარი ეთქვა თემის პოლიტიკაზე და ჩართულიყო მასშტაბურ ანტისამთავრობო გამოსვლებში; ანუ, კოლექტიური ქმედების პრობლემის/ჩარჩოს თანახმად, წარმატების შემთხვევაში თითოეული მოქალაქის მოგება აღემატებოდა თემის პოლიტიკის შედეგად მიღებულ სარგებელს. ის ფაქტი, რომ თითოეულ შემთხვევაში სწორედ არჩევნები იყო აჯანყების წინაპირობა, გვაძლევს უფლებას, ვამტკიცოთ, რომ შიდა სახელმწიფოებრივი ფაქტორი უმნიშვნელოვანესია საერთო საზოგადოებრივი კონსოლიდაციისთვის. მეორე საერთო ტენდენცია არის საგარეო მოთამაშეების მხარდაჭერა ან ჩაურევლობა (ინერტულობა). აქ იგულისხმება პირდაპირი უხეში მოქმედება, როდესაც მკაფიოა, რომ ერთი ან მეორე მხარე სარგებლობს გარედან მონოდებული რესურსებით და ზეგავლენებით. უდავოა, რომ საქართველოს, უკრაინის და ყირგიზეთის შემთხვევებში ე.წ. პროდასავლური ფონდებისა და სხვა სააგენტოების ფინანსურმა და სხვა სახის დახმარებამ მნიშვნელოვანი როლი შეასრულა მშვიდობიანი პროტესტის პრინციპების, მასების კონტროლის მექანიზმებისა და კრიზისული მენეჯმენტის შესწავლაში (Rosenberg, 2011). თუმცა, არც ერთ შემთხვევაში არც აშშ-ს, არც ევროკავშირის და არც რუსეთის მხრიდან არ ყოფილა პირდაპირი უხეში ჩარევა. სამივე შემთხვევაში გამოყენებული იყო ხელშეწყობისა და/ან ჩაურევლობის პოლიტიკა. თბილისში რევოლუციების დროს კრემლმა ანარმია საკმაოდ აქტიური და დახვეწილი საგარეო პოლიტიკა, რომელიც ორიენტირებული იყო საქართველოსთან პოზიტიური ურთიერთობების შენარჩუნებაზე. სწორედ ამიტომ ჩამოვიდა რუსეთის იმდროინდელი საგარეო საქმეთა მინისტრი იგორ ივანოვი თბილისში, დაესწრო საპროტესტო აქციას, ხოლო შემდეგში განმუხტა ვითარება აჭარის ავტონომიურ რესპუბლიკაში იმით, რომ პირადი თვითმფრინავით ჩაფრინდა ბათუმში და რუსეთში გაამგზავრა ცენტრის წინააღმდეგ აჯანყებული ასლან აბაშიძე (Peuch, 2004; Тбилиси аплодирует Иванову, 2003). თუ დავესესხებით რუს მეცნიერს ნიკოლაი სილაევის, კრემლის პოლიტიკა ვარდების რევოლუციისას იყო არა მხარდაჭერა, არამედ დინებას გაყოლა (სილაევი, 2017). აღსანიშნია ისიც, რომ ყირგიზეთის გადამდგარი პრეზიდენტი ასკარ აკაევი რუსეთში გაიქცა და მოსკოვში, საკუთარი სახელმწიფოს საელჩოში ოფიციალურად მოაწერა ხელი საბუთს გადადგო-



მის შესახებ (REFL, 2005). ამ ცვლადის მნიშვნელობა განსაკუთრებით ნათელი გახდა სომხეთში აგორებული პროტესტის დროს, როდესაც ბევრს მიაჩნდა, რომ სერჟ სარქისიანის ე.წ. პრორუსული მთავრობის გადარჩენა შეეძლო მხოლოდ რუსეთს, თუ ჩაერეოდა, რაც არ მოხდა (Demytrie, 2018; Bayev, 2018). მესამე ტენდენცია და ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციის უმნიშვნელოვანესი ელემენტი არის არაძალადობრივი გზით ძალაუფლების გადაცემა. ოპოზიციურმა ძალებმა თბილისში, კიევსა და ერევანში მშვიდობიანი პროტესტების და პიკეტირების გზით შეძლეს სახელმწიფო ინსტიტუტების ფაქტობრივი პარალიზება. იმდროინდელ მთავრობებს უბრალოდ არ შეეძლოთ ასეთ ვითარებაში მოღვაწეობის გაგრძელება. საზოგადოებრივმა კონსოლიდაციამ და გარე მოთამაშეების თავშეკავებულობამ საბოლოოდ აიძულეს ედუარდ შევარდნაძე, ლეონიდ კუჩმა და სერჟ სარქისიანი, გადამდგარიყვნენ. ცოტაოდენ განსხვავებული სცენარით დატრიალდა მოვლენები ყირგიზეთში, სადაც მომიტინგეებმა შტურმით აიღეს სახელმწიფო დანესებულებები და ასკარ აკაევი აქტიურად იყენებდა საპოლიციო და სხვა დანაყოფებს აჯანყების ჩასახშობად. თუმცა, ამ შემთხვევაშიც პრეზიდენტის გადაყენება რაიმე სერიოზული სისხლისღვრის გარეშე მოხდა (Kimmage, 2005).

სრულიად განსხვავებული სცენარით დატრიალდა მოვლენები უკრაინაში 2013-2014 წლებში: ვიქტორ იანუკოვიჩის წინააღმდეგ საპროტესტო ტალღა აგორდა არა შიდა სახელმწიფოებრივი მოტივით (არჩევნების გაყალბება და კორუფცია), არამედ უპირველეს ყოვლისა საგარეო ფაქტორის გამო – ევროკავშირთან ასოცირების ხელშეკრულებაზე ხელმოწერაზე უარით (Ukraine protests after Yanukovich EU deal rejection, 2013); დამატებით ამაზე უშუალოდ რევოლუციის სახელიც მეტყველებს – ევრომაიდანის ანუ ევროპისთვის შემდგარი მაიდანის. საშინაო ფაქტორი, როგორცაა კორუფცია, უკვე შემდეგში გახდა დღის განრიგის ნაწილი (Aslund, 2014). გარდა ამისა, უნდა აღინიშნოს, რომ წარმატებულ შემთხვევებში პროტესტები მოსდევდა გაყალბებულ არჩევნებს, რაც სადავოს ხდიდა ზოგადად ახლად არჩეული მთავრობის ლეგიტიმაციას. ეს პრობლემა არ იდგა ვიქტორ იანუკოვიჩის შემთხვევაში, რადგან მან გაიმარჯვა საერთაშორისოდ აღიარებულ ლეგიტიმურ არჩევნებში (Caryl, 2010; Harding, 2014). ამ ფაქტებმა განაპირობეს ის, რომ ვერ შედგა ფართომასშტაბიანი საზოგადოებრივი კონსოლიდაცია. უკრაინული საზოგადოება, რომელიც ისტორიულად დაყოფილია განზოგადებულ დასავლეთსა და აღმოსავლეთზე, განსხვავებულად უყურებდა ქვეყნის მომავალს. თუ დასავლეთ უკრაინაში მცხოვრები ეთნიკურად უკრაინელებისთვის ევროპული არჩევანი იყო უმნიშვნელოვანესი გეოპოლიტიკური ნაბიჯი (საქართველოში ამას ცივილურ არჩევანს უწოდებენ), აღმოსავლეთ უკრაინაში მცხოვრები მოსახლეობისთვის ე.წ. რუსული სამყარო მაინც უფრო მიმზიდველი იყო. ეს არ გამორიცხავს იმას, რომ მეორე ბანაკში ინტერესით არ უყურებდნენ უკრაინის ევროკავშირთან, მის ინსტიტუტებთან და სტანდარტებთან დაახლოებას, თუმცა ეს საგარეო ფაქტორი არ იყო ისეთი მნიშვნელობის, როგორც სახელმწიფოს მიტაცება (მიტაცების მცდელობა) არჩევნების გაყალბების გზით, კორუფცია და/ან რომელიმე სხვა შიდა ანტისახელმწიფოებრივი გამოვლინება. ვითარებას ისიც ართულებდა, რომ ვიქტორ იანუკოვიჩი, რომელიც ითვლებოდა პრორუსულ პოლიტიკოსად, სწორედ რომ აღმოსავლეთ უკრაინაში მოპოვებული ხმების ნყალობით გახდა ქვეყნის პრეზიდენტი. ქვემოთ მოცემულ რუკებზე გამოსახულია ხმების განაწილება რეგიონების მიხედვით.

მის წინააღმდეგ კი ე.წ. პროდასავლური ორიენტაციის პოლიტიკოსებისა და სამოქალაქო აქტივისტების გალაშქრა დამატებითი ბზარი აღმოჩნდა უკრაინული საზოგადოების კონსოლიდაციის პროცესში. ევრომაიდანის წარუმატებელი აღმოჩნდა არა მხოლოდ პირველი, არამედ მეორე წინაპირობის დაკმაყოფილების მხრიდანაც. სახეზე იყო არა მხოლოდ რუსეთის მხრიდან იანუკოვიჩის ხელისუფლებაში დარჩენის მცდელობა, არამედ ამერიკის შეერთებული შტატებისა და ევროკავშირის უმაღლესი პოლიტიკური ელიტების წარმომადგენლების პირდაპირ უხეში ჩარევა (Nodia, 2014). ამერიკელმა კონგრესმენმა ჯონ მაკკეინმა, ამერიკის შეერთებული შტატების სახელმწიფო მდივნის მოადგილემ ვიქტორია ნულანდმა, ევროკავშირის უმაღლესმა წარმომადგენელმა საგარეო საქმეთა და უსაფრთხოების პოლიტიკის საკითხებში ქეთრინ ეშტონმა და სხვა ცნობილმა დასავლელმა პოლიტიკოსებმა ღია მხარდაჭერა გამოუცხადეს მომიტინგეებს, დაესწრნენ პროტესტის აქციებს და დაუპირისპირდნენ იანუკოვიჩის მთავრობას (Walsh&Capelouto, 2013; Rosenberg, 2013; Weir, 2013; 'Muddling and meddling'? US, EU politicians plunge deeper into Kiev protest, 2013). მეტიც, მიტინგებზე გაჩნდნენ ცნობილი ქართველი რევოლუციონერები და ვარდების რევოლუციის ორ-

განიზატორები, როგორცაა საქართველოს უკვე ყოფილი პრეზიდენტი მიხეილ სააკაშვილი და მისი თანაგუნდელები საერთო ნაციონალური მოძრაობიდან (How Ukrainian protesters met Mikheil Saakashvili, 2013). ნათელი გახდა, რომ უკრაინა გახდა ორი გლობალური პოლიტიკის გიგანტის დაპირისპირების არენა – ერთი მხრივ, ამერიკის შეერთებული შტატები და ევროკავშირი, ხოლო, მეორე მხრივ, რუსეთის ფედერაცია. შედეგად, დასავლეთმა მიიღო ე.წ. პროდასავლური მთავრობა პეტრო პოროშენკოს მეთაურობით (Balmforth & Heritage, 2014), ხოლო რუსეთმა მოახდინა ყირიმის ანექსია და ნააქება სეპარატიზმი ეთნიკურად რუსების მიერ დასახლებულ დონეცკსა და ლუგანსკში (Pifer, 2019; Kofman&others, 2017). და ბოლოს, აგრეთვე ვერ მოხდა ხელისუფლების მშვიდობიანად გადაბარების პროცესი. ვიქტორ იანუკოვიჩის მიერ საპროტესტო აქციების ძალადობრივი გზით აღკვეთის მცდელობამ საპირისპირო შედეგი გამოიღო, მაგალითად, სტუდენტების დარბევა (Oliynyk, 2018). მომიტინგეებმა შტურმით აიღეს სახელმწიფო დანესებულებები და ქალაქის ცენტრი ბრძოლის ველად გადააქციეს. დაპირისპირება გადაიქცა სისხლისღვრაში და ძალაუფლების მშვიდობიანი გადაცემის ნაცვლად, ადგილი ჰქონდა საერთო უკრაინულ ტრაგედიას, რომელმაც ასზე მეტი სიცოცხლე იმსხვერპლა (Traynor, 2014; Amos & Salem, 2014). ვიქტორ იანუკოვიჩი ქვეყნიდან გაიქცა, თუმცა სხვა შემთხვევებისგან განსხვავებით, საკუთარი ნებით არ შეუწყვეტია უფლება-მოვალეობები. მან და მისი კაბინეტიდან რუსეთში გაქცეულმა სხვა მაღალი თანამდებობის პირებმა ევრომაიდან დასავლეთის მიერ ინსპირირებულ გადატრიალებად გამოაცხადეს (Putin: Russia helped Yanukovich to flee Ukraine, 2014). ქვემოთ მოცემულია მეორე ტაბულა, რომელიც პოსტ-საბჭოთა სივრცეში მომხდარი რევოლუციების მოკლე ანატომიას წარმოადგენს.

**ტაბულა 2:** ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციების ანატომია

ცვლადი	საქართველო 2003	უკრაინა 2004	ყირგიზეთი 2005	უკრაინა 2013-14	სომხეთი 2018
საზოგადოებრივი კონსოლიდაცია	საშინაო მნიშვნელოვანი (არის)	არის	არის	საგარეო საშინაო ნაწილობრივი	არის
გარე მხარდაჭერა ან ჩაურევლობა (ინერტულობა)	მხარდაჭერა ჩაურევლობა (არის)	არის	არის	აშშ vs. რუსეთი	არის
ძალაუფლების მშვიდობიანი გადაცემა	მშვიდობიანი (არის)	არის	მინიმალური ძალადობრივი	ძალადობრივი	არის

**თავი 2.2. ევრომაიდნის ანატომია**

2014 წელს დემოკრატიული ინიციატივის ფონდმა ჩაატარა კვლევა მაიდანის 2013: ვინ დგას, რატომ და რისთვის? (Майдан-2013: хто стоїть, чому і за що? 2014). ამ გამოკითხვის თანახმად, ევრომაიდანში მონაწილეთა 53.3% შეუერთდა პროტესტს მთავრობის მიერ ევროკავშირთან ასოცირების ხელშეკრულებაზე უარის გამო; აბსოლუტური უმრავლესობა 70% – მთავრობის მიერ სტუდენტების წინააღმდეგ განხორციელებული ძალადობის გამო, 50% – საკუთარი ცხოვრების უკეთესობისადმი ცვლილებისთვის და 39% იმდროინდელი მთავრობის გადაყენებისთვის.

2018 წლის მიწურულს უკრაინაში ჩატარდა საყოველთაო გამოკითხვა, რომლის მიზანი იყო ევრომაიდნის ხუთი წლის თავზე ქვეყანაში ამ მოვლენასთან დაკავშირებული განწყობების გაგება (What Ukrainians think about Euromaidan five years on: survey, 2019). ამ კვლევის თანახმად, მოსახლეობის 52% მხარს უჭერდა ევრომაიდანს, 6% იმდროინდელ მთავრობას, 25% არც ერთ მხარეს, 10%-ს ეს პროცესი საერთოდ არ ადარდებდა.

საინტერესოა, რომ უკრაინის დასავლეთ და ცენტრალურ ნაწილში ყველაზე პოპულარული პასუხი იყო გააზრებული ბრძოლა საკუთარი უფლებებისთვის – 68% და ბრძოლა უკრაინის დამოუკიდებლობისთვის – 56%; ხოლო ქვეყნის აღმოსავლეთ და სამხრეთში კი დასავლეთის მიერ ორკესტრირებული გადატრიალება – 29% და პოლიტიკური ძალების (ოპოზიციის, მთავრობის ოპონენტების) მიერ განხორციელებული გადატრიალება – 30%.

აქაც ნათელია განხეთქილება. უკრაინის სამხრეთ რეგიონებში გამოკითხულთა 56%-სდა აღმოსავლეთში 44%-ს მიაჩნიათ, რომ ევრომაიდანმა ქვეყანაში და საზოგადოებაში განხეთქილება შეიტანა; სრულიად საპირისპირო სურათია ქვეყნის დასავლეთ და ცენტრალურ რეგიონებში, სადაც 69% და 53% ემხრობა მოსაზრებას, რომ მოხდა ქვეყნის კონსოლიდაცია.

საინტერესოა ის ფაქტი, რომ ევრომაიდნის პროტესტის მიმართ პოზიტიური განწყობები ყველა რეგიონში შეიმჩნეოდა. თუმცა, ყველაზე დიდი და უპირობო მხარდაჭერა ისევ ქვეყნის დასავლეთ და ცენტრალური ნაწილიდან ჰქონდა, იმ დროს, როდესაც სამხრეთ და აღმოსავლეთ რეგიონებში ჭარბობდა ნეიტრალური დამოკიდებულება. აქვე, დასავლეთის ქვეყნებისადმი და ევრომაიდნის თავდაცვის ძალებისადმი დადებითი დამოკიდებულება იყო მხოლოდ ქვეყნის დასავლეთსა და ცენტრში, უარყოფითი განწყობა კი ისევ აღმოსავლეთ და სამხრეთ უკრაინაში.

და ბოლოს, ქვემოთ მოყვანილია ევრომაიდნის სოციოლოგიური რუკა, რომლის თანახმად, დამსწრეთა აბსოლუტური უმრავლესობა უკრაინულად საუბრობდა, ხოლო უმცირესობა რუსულად.

სტატისტიკური მონაცემები ცხადყოფს, რომ ზოგადად ვიქტორ იანუკოვიჩის დროს არსებობდა პროტესტის დიდი მუხტი და ქვეყანაში არსებული მძიმე ვითარებით უკმაყოფილება. თუმცა, ევრომაიდანის ვერ გახდა საზოგადოების მნიშვნელოვანი კონსოლიდაციის წყარო. ამის ერთ-ერთი უმნიშვნელოვანესი მიზეზი სწორედ რომ მისი საგარეო განზომილება იყო და, რა თქმა უნდა, შემდეგში უკვე აშშ-ს, ევროკავშირის და რუსეთის ჩარევით გამო პროცესის დამატებითი პოლიტიზება. ვერც შედგა იმ დონის საზოგადოებრივი კონსოლიდაცია, რომელიც იყო ნარინჯისფერი თუ სხვა წარმატებული რევოლუციის დროს.

## დასკვნა

ხავერდოვანმა რევოლუციებმა მნიშვნელოვნად შეცვალეს პოსტსაბჭოთა რეგიონის პოლიტიკური რუკა. მეტიც, ბევრს მიაჩნია, რომ ამ პოლიტიკური ბერკეტის გამოყენების დრო ჯერ წარსულს არ ჩაბარდა და ჩვენ შეიძლება კიდევ ვიხილოთ მსგავსი პროცესები რეგიონის სხვა ქვეყნებში. სომხეთის შემთხვევამ კვლავ გააღვივა ინტერესი პოსტსაბჭოთა სივრცეში დემოკრატიზაციის პროცესებისა და მათში რევოლუციის როლისადმი.

ამ კუთხით უკვე მომხდარ რევოლუციებს შეუძლიათ საინტერესო ტენდენციები გვიჩვენონ. კერძოდ, ნათელია კანონზომიერება, რომელიც განაპირობებს ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციის წარმატებულობას და წარუმატებლობას. ჩამოყალიბდა ერთგვარი წინაპირობების შაბლონი, რომლის დაკმაყოფილების შემთხვევაში რევოლუციური მოძრაობა არა მხოლოდ ახერხებს არსებული მთავრობის გადაყენებას, არამედ საკუთარი ძალაუფლების განმტკიცებას სახელმწიფოში საგრძნობი არეულობის, დესტაბილიზაციისა და ძალადობის გარეშე. სწორედ ეს არის ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციის ყველაზე მიმზიდველი ასპექტი – არადემოკრატიული მთავრობის სახელმწიფოსთვის ნაკლები და ნახარჯებით თავიდან მოშორება. საქართველოს, უკრაინის, ყირგიზეთისა და სომხეთის შემთხვევების შედარებითი ანალიზის მიხედვით, სახარბიელო წინაპირობების სიაში შედის საზოგადოების კონსოლიდაცია, გარე მოთამაშეების მხარდაჭერა ან ჩაურევლობა (ინერტულობა) და ძალაუფლების მშვიდობიანი გადაცემა. ამ მოთხოვნებს აკმაყოფილებს ვარდების, ნარინჯისფერი და ტიტების რევოლუციები; აგრეთვე, სომხეთში მომხდარი სამთავრობო ცვლილება. თუმცა, 2013-2014 წლებში ევრომაიდნის სახელით ცნობილი მოვლენები ხავერდოვანი რევოლუციის წარუმატებლობის ნათელი მაგალითია. ქვეყანაში ვერ მოხერხდა არა მხოლოდ საზოგადოების მნიშვნელოვანი კონსოლი-

დაცია, არამედ პროცესში ჩაებნენ გლობალური პოლიტიკური ძალები, რაც დასრულდა სავალალო შედეგით უკრაინისთვის; ასევე, არ მოხდა მთავრობის მშვიდობიანი გადაცემა.

კვლევისას მიღებული შედეგების ანალიზისთვის გამოყენებული იყო ჯოშუა ტუკერის მიერ პოსტ-საბჭოთა სივრცეში მომხდარი რევოლუციების გასააზრებლად შემოთავაზებული ე.წ. კოლექტიური ქმედების პრობლემა/ჩარჩო (collective action problem/framework). ამ ხედვის თანახმად, საქართველოში (2003), უკრაინაში (2004) და ყირგიზეთში (2005) მომხდარი მასობრივი პროტესტები განპირობებული იყო იმდროინდელი მთავრობების მიერ სახელმწიფოს მიტაცების მცდელობას არჩევნების გაყალბების გზით. ეს უმნიშვნელოვანესმა შიდა სახელმწიფოებრივმა გამოწვევამ აიძულა მოსახლეობის თითოეული წევრი გაერთიანებისკენ. უკრაინული ევრომაიდნის შემთხვევაში ასეთ ფაქტი არ გამოვლენილა მისი, ძირითადად/უპირველესად, საგარეო პოლიტიკური ვექტორის გამო. გარდა ამისა, მნიშვნელოვანი როლი შეასრულეს გარე ძალებმა, რომლებიც წარმატებულ შემთხვევებში ან ხელს უწყობდნენ მთავრობის ცვლილებას ან, სულ ცოტა, დინებას გააყენენ. ევრომაიდანამ კუთხითაც აღმოჩნდა გლობალური დაპირისპირების საგანი.

## References:

- Abdyrazakov, S. (2005). "Boiling Over." Transitions Online.
- Ambrosio, T. (2007). Insulating Russia from a Colour Revolution: How the Kremlin Resists Regional Democratic Trends. *Democratization / Volume 14, 2007 – Issue 2: Democracy and Security: Process versus Outcome in Assistance Policy?*
- Amos, H., Salem, H. (2014). Ukraine clashes: dozens dead after Odessa building fire. *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/02/ukraine-dead-odessa-building-fire>
- Balmforth, R., Heritage, T. (2014). U.S. and EU hail pro-West election outcome in Ukraine, Russia guarded. *Reuters*. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-election/u-s-and-eu-hail-pro-west-election-outcome-in-ukraine-russia-guarded-idUSKCN01F00R20141027>
- Baev, P. (2018). What explains Russia's uncharacteristic indifference to the revolution in Armenia? *Brookings*. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/07/what-explains-russias-uncharacteristic-indifference-to-the-revolution-in-armenia/>
- Beissinger, M. (2007). Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions. *Volume 5, Issue 2, Cambridge University Press; pp. 259-276*
- Bojic, S. (2005). Serbian group exports protest know-how. *Civil Society [Rule of Law Foundation]*.
- Demytrie, R. (2018). Why Armenia 'Velvet Revolution' won without a bullet fired. *BBC*.
- Estebo, S. (2015). Russian Foreign Policy and Putin's Fear of Revolution. *The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy—Tufts University*.
- Fairbanks, C. (2004). Georgia's Rose Revolution. *Journal of Democracy 15 (2): 110–24*.
- Harding, L. (2010). Yanukovich set to become president as observers say Ukraine election was fair. *The Guardian*.
- Karumidze, Z., Wertsch, J. (2005). *Enough: The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia 2003*. New York: Nova Science Publishers.
- Khamidov, A. (2002). "Kyrgyzstan's Unrest Linked to Clan Rivalries." *EurasiaNet*.
- Kuzio, T. (2005). "Did Ukraine's Security Service Really Prevent Bloodshed During the Orange Revolution?" *Eurasia Daily Monitor*.
- Kuzio, T. (2016). The Orange and Euromaidan Revolutions: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives. *Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal*, no. 2: Legal and political dimensions of contemporary conflicts in Europe; pp. 91-115.
- MacWilliam, I. (2005). "Kyrgyzstan's Friendly Revolution." *BBC News*.
- Marples, D. (2017). Comparing Ukraine's Maidan 2004 with Euromaidan 2014. *E-International Relations*. Accessible



at: <https://www.e-ir.info/2017/07/14/comparing-ukraines-maidan-2004-with-euromaidan-2014>

- Pala, C. (2004). "Ukraine's Election Crisis Has Had Dim Mirror Images in Other Former Soviet Republics." New York Times.
- Pannier, B. (2009). Rethinking Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution. REFL.
- Pejic, N. (2008). Serbia: The First Colored Revolution? REFL.
- Reznik, O. (2016). From the Orange Revolution to the Revolution of Dignity: Dynamics of the Protest Actions in Ukraine. East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures.
- Saryusz-Wolski, J. (2014). Euromaidan: time to draw conclusions. Wilfred Martens Centre for European Studies.
- Thompson, M. (2004). Democratic Revolutions: Asia and Eastern Europe. London: Routledge.
- Tucker, J. (2007). Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions. Vol. 5/No. 3, Cambridge University Press; pp. 535-551.
- Walsh, N. (2005). Pink revolution rumbles on in blood and fury. The Guardian.
- Weingast, B. (1997). The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law. The American Political Science Review. Vol. 91, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 245-263.
- Weir, F. (2013). Russia cries foul over Western embrace of Ukraine's demonstrators. The Christian Science Monitor.
- Zelinska, O. (2017). Ukrainian Euromaidan protest: Dynamics, causes, and aftermath. Sociology Compass / Volume 11, Issue 9.
- How Ukrainian protesters met Mikheil Saakashvili (2013). Georgian Journal. Available at: <https://www.georgianjournal.ge/politics/25603-how-ukrainian-protesters-met-mikheil-saakashvili.html>
- Interfax-Ukraine (2019). Poll: Half of Ukrainians regard Revolution of Dignity as fight for rights. Kyiv Post.
- Top U.S. official visits protesters in Kiev as Obama admin. ups pressure on Ukraine president Yanukovich (2013). CBS News. Available at: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-victoria-nuland-wades-into-ukraine-turmoil-over-yanukovich/>
- Ukraine crisis: Catherine Ashton welcomed by protesters (2013). BBC News. Accessible at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-25328292/ukraine-crisis-catherine-ashton-welcomed-by-protesters>
- Ukrainian crisis: timeline (2014). BBC News.

## Deformation of perception of geography of the complex system of the Abkhazian conflict

### Abstract

The article describes the problem of perceiving the geography of the Abkhazian conflict, as a fundamental factor in the incorrect perception of the structure of the conflict and, as a consequence, a complication of the process of positive transformation of the conflict. Different ways of using the term “geography of conflict” are described in scientific and political discourse. The problem is presented in the context of political psychology. Particular attention is paid to the cognitive aspects related to the predominance of the reductionist style of thinking.

**Keywords:** reductionism, mixed conflict, apsuology (Apsua Studies), abkhazology (Abkhaz Studies), abkhaziology (Abkhazian Studies).

The problem of non-resolution of military-political conflicts in society is associated with the problem of incorrect diagnosis, which, in turn, is associated with deformation of the perception of the structure of the conflict. This deformation of perception may have cognitive causes, in particular, the dominance of reductionist way of thinking. Meaning, if we do not see the general structure of the conflict, namely, by whom and how it is presented, then we either seek to redefine it by ourselves, or are satisfied with a fragment and call it the whole picture of the conflict.

One of the most important subsystems of the conflict structure is the parties to the conflict. Parties to the conflict – direct or indirect participants of the process, which have their own specific interests. Parties to the conflict can be represented by various actors (subsystems of a lower level), among which there can also be conflict relations.

There are several types of determination of conflict-definition by object, by parties to the conflict, as well as conditional definition. For example, if the object of the conflict is a territory, then we call it a territorial conflict. Of course, the territory of Abkhazia is the object of a clash both at the local and international levels.

However, the participants of this clash cannot be limited to only two parties to the conflict. Although, reductionist-minded experts and scientists are stubbornly trying to reduce it to one of the conflicting pairs.

That is why it is not correct to call this conflict, for example, “the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict”. It is also incorrect to call this conflict the “Georgian-Russian conflict”, because, despite the fact that this component is present in the conflict system, it is not the only one. There also exists a conflict between the Abkhaz separatists and the Russian Federation, despite the fact that today the Russian Federation positions itself as an ally of Abkhazia. However, the concept of “conflict between Abkhazia and Russia” is not presented neither in scientific nor in political discourse.

For propaganda purposes, some call the conflict local, others – international. A similar problem exists also in relation to other post-Soviet conflicts. However, this is just a manipulation that sets a goal – the promotion of their interests. In fact, this is a conflict of a mixed-type that has local and international components.

Thus, the Abkhazian conflict represents a complex conflict and in the context of the theory of complex systems can be called – “The complex system of the Abkhazian conflict.” In practice, this name consisting of 4 words is difficult to use, therefore, we propose to agree on the use of a conditional name – “Abkhazian conflict”.

The term “geography of conflict” can be used by us in the following dimensions.

1. Under “geography of the conflict”, here we mean the level of integration of local and international participants into the conflict. The geography of international participants of the process has regional (Caucasian), regional (Black Sea), continental and transcontinental character. An active regional participant in this conflict is Turkey. An active participant in the continental dimension is the EU and other European organizations or individual countries. One of the participants in the transcontinental dimension is the strategic ally of Georgia – the United States of America. On the other hand, we can represent the United States of America not as a strategic ally of Georgia, but as a party to the geopolitical conflict with Russia in the struggle for influence in the Caspian-Black Sea area. In this case, the Georgian authorities are supporters of the USA, and the de facto authorities of Abkhazia are supporters of the Russian Federation. In the process of modeling, it is necessary to introduce also the other side of the internal (local) conflict in Abkhazia, this is the Supreme Council of Abkhazia in exile.
2. The second dimension of the geography of the conflict is related to the fact that complex conflicts are represented by several types of conflicts at the same time and the geographical boundaries of these conflicts do not always coincide. For example, such terms as:
  - • Zone of ethnic conflict
  - • Zone of political conflict
  - • Zone of armed conflict

These terms are not identical. The zone of armed conflict may be local, and the zone of political conflict may be international. Or the zone of ethnic conflict (as in the case of the Georgian-Ossetian ethnic confrontation) does not coincide with the zone of armed conflict. Therefore, using the term “conflict zone” or “geography of the conflict”, it is desirable to clarify which component of the conflict we have in mind.

3. The third dimension of the use of the term “geography of conflict” can be defined in relation to the geography of Abkhazia itself. The borders of Abkhazia itself during the IXX-XXI centuries, have changed significantly. On this map, indicated in brown, is part of the territory of Western Abkhazia, which was annexed in 1918-1921, first by the Volunteer Army of General Denikin, and then by the Red Army. These territories today are part of the Krasnodar Krai of the Russian Federation.

#### Map of the Democratic Republic of Georgia 1918-1921

An interesting fact is that the Russian Federation today claims a part of the Gagra region. This issue has become the core of the conflict between the Russian Federation and the Secessionists of Abkhazia, who, in the opinion of Russian academician Andrei Piontkovskiy, really believe that they are independent, including from the Russian Federation.

In 2011, in the process of negotiations on the issue of delimitation and demarcation of the so-called border between Abkhazia and the Russian Federation, they were able to partially protect 160 square kilometers of the Gagra region. However, the claims of the Russian Federation to these territories are traditional. It must be remembered that after the occupation of Abkhazia by the Red Army of Abkhazia on March 4, 1921, the Gagra region was transferred to the Russian Federation and only in 1929 was returned to Abkhazia, Georgia as a result of lobbying for this issue by Tbilisi. Based on the foregoing, the agenda includes not only the issue of territorial integrity of Georgia, but also the territorial integrity of Abkhazia.

The territory of modern Abkhazia can be divided into several zones.

- • Territories that became part of Russia as a result of the annexation of 1921 (Sochi region).
- • Territories that the Russian Federation wants to annex at this stage (Gagra district).
- • Territories of Central Abkhazia in which secessionists feel more or less calm.
- • The territories of Eastern Abkhazia, which, despite ethnic cleansing, political, economic and cultural discrimination, are still inhabited by Georgian ethnic groups.
- • The territory of the Kodori (Dali) Gorge, which until 2008 was under the control of the central authorities of Georgia.

Another interesting issue is the expulsion of local residents from Abkhazia. They have been expelled over the



past 200 years and today inhabit not only Georgia, but also other countries of the world.

4. The fourth dimension shows the problem of the perception of the geography of Abkhazia by different groups of the population. One of the most important issues of Abkhazian studies is the problem of perceiving the geographical borders of Abkhazia. Based on this, ambiguities and scientifically unfounded interpretations of the geography of Abkhazia arise. For the Abkhazian separatists, Abkhazia, it is Apsny (and this is affixed in the constitution). For Abkhazian pro-Russian irredentists, it is most likely part of the Krasnodar Krai. For Abkhazian pro-Turkish irredentists, Abkhazia is part of the pan-Ottoman area, and Sukhum/i is the capital of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples. For Abkhazian Armenians – Abkhazia is part of the Pan-Armenian Black Sea area. For many Abkhazian Georgians, it is the integral part of the Georgian political area...

The western borders of Abkhazia determine the western borders of the Caucasus in the geographical and political sense of the word. Consequently, its movement to the east also changes the borders of the Caucasus, in particular, the South Caucasus. The earlier occupied territories of Western Abkhazia (including Adler, Sochi, etc.) today are not considered as South Caucasian. In the strategic future, in the event of the current accession of Abkhazia to the Russian Federation, this can shift the borders of the Caucasus to the East to the Enguri (Inguri) River. Moreover, further advance to the East may include the entire territory of Western Georgia. As actual experience shows, such “advancements” are accompanied by total squeezing of the local population, which represents a threat of strategic character.

Methodological problems and issues of the studies of Abkhazian conflict – apsuology, abkhazology and abkhaziology:

Abkhaziology (Studies of Abkhazia), a science that studies everything around Abkhazia – is a subsystem of the Caucasian studies (Studies of Caucasus). Consequently, the “Abkhazian conflict” is an object of Caucasian studies. For Georgian scholars, Abkhazian studies are a subsystem of “Georgian Studies” (Studies of Georgia). It would also be true to consider these studies as a subsystem of the Black Sea Studies, since Abkhazia is an important part of the Black Sea coast and the area as a whole.

In scientific discourse, “Abkhazology” is reduced to “Apsuology”, which studies only the “Apsua” culture.

This discrepancy is determined by the reductionist approach and has its historical roots. The multi-ethnic society of Abkhazia, through various political technologies, boils down to one ethnos – “Apsua”. This artificially



legitimizes the special rights of this one group and provokes conflicts with other groups.

“Apsualogy,” as a term in scientific discourse, is not yet present. However, besides Apsua, many ethnographic groups live on the territory of Abkhazia. Therefore, from a civil and scientific point of view, the study of the specifics of ethno-social groups of Abkhazia should be defined by the term “Abkhazology”. Thus, Apsualogy is a subsystem of Abkhazology, and Abkhazology, in turn, is a subsystem of Abkhaziology.

The confusion in methodological research that exists at this point comes mainly from the work of the famous scientist Nicholas Marr, who set the erroneous pseudoscientific cognitive paradigm, which is in effect till today. An example of his research can be the work “Abkhazs and Abkhazology.”

## References:

1. Kharadze, N., (2011, 31 marti), Aibga Village Issue Postponed for the Future, Radio Liberty (Georgian Edition) – ნინო ხარაძე, სოფელ აიბგას საკითხი სამომავლოდ გადაიდო, რადიო თავისუფლება (ქართული რედაქცია) <https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/3542934.html>
2. Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia / აფხაზეთის ავტონომიური რესპუბლიკის უმაღლესი საბჭო, <http://scara.gov.ge/ka/2011-09-08-07-44-18/327-2012-10-26-12-30-39.html>
3. Sylvain, Vite, (2009), Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual situations, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 91 Number 873 March, p. 69-94. <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc-873-vite.pdf>
4. Songulashvili, A., (2019), Political Status of Abkhazia in Georgia (1921-1931), Iv. Javakhishvili Institute of History and Ethnology/სონღლაშვილი ა., აფხაზეთის პოლიტიკური სტატუსი საქართველოს შემადგენლობაში (1921-1931 წწ.), ივ. ჯავახიშვილის სახ. ისტორიისა და ეთნოლოგიის ინსტიტუტი, <http://institutehist.ucoz.net/publ/apkhazeti/st39at39iebi/apkhazetis-politikuri-statusi-sakartvelos-shemadgenlobashi-1921-1931-tsts/11-1-0-130>
5. Papaskiri, Z., (2010), Abkhazia – History without Forgery, Sukhumi State University, Ekvtime Takaishvili All-Georgian Historic Society, Abkhazian Organization, Second Edition, Corrected and Ammended, Tbilisi – 2010. p.595 / Папаскири З., Абхазия – история без фальсификации, Сухумский государственный университет, Всегрузинское исторические общество им. Эквтиме Такашвили, Абхазская организация, издание второе, исправленное и дополненное, Тбилиси.
6. Thurner S., ect., (2018), Introduction to the Theory of Complex Systems, Oxford University Press.
7. Harutyunyan, Arus, (2009), Contesting National Identities in an Ethnically Homogeneous State: The Case of Armenian Democratization. Kalamazoo, Michigan: Western Michigan University, p. 424, <http://docplayer.net/23327571-Contesting-national-identities-in-an-ethnically-homogeneous-state-the-case-of-armenian-democratization.html>
8. What Areas Georgia Really Owned in 1918-21 and How We Lost Ancient Georgian Lands (2019, 9 მარტი) რატერიტორიებს ფლობდა სინამდვილეში საქართველო 1918-21 წლებში და როგორ დავკარგეთ უძველესი ქართული მიწები <https://www.flickr.com/photos/national-archives-of-georgia/15887551124/>
9. რუსეცკი ა., ო. დოროხინა, (2006), „სეცესიონიზმი და უნიონიზმი საქართველოში“ (დანის დეენილთა საბჭოს დაკვეთით) – Rusetsky A., Dorokhina O., ”Secessionist and Unionists of Georgia: the way from intercommunity dialog to nationwide consent”.

## Anaklia Peace Zone and the New Silk Road

### Abstract

Since 1992, five versions of the New Silk Road have been developed. The first of them (TRACECA) was the project launched by the European Union. The New Silk Road Initiative (2011), initiated by the United States, was followed by its Japan, South Korean and Chinese variations in 2013, among which the most impressive was Xi Jinping's proposal, OBOR. We believe that the comparative analysis of all five projects and their exploration from the perspective of peace studies is timely and important. Recently, there has been a proliferation of discussions about the connection of the New Silk Road and peace among experts in different fields around the world. This is an interesting and effective vision to rework a constructive model, which will be targeted to improve current international relations. In the context of the New Silk Road, the small, but extremely important geostrategic country, Georgia is considered as an alternative and certainly the shortest bridge connecting Europe and Asia.

The reasonable use of this "middle corridor" route depends on the implementation of those global infrastructure projects, which will increase the usefulness of the Caucasian region to take the development of international relations to a higher level. With the creative approach and well-thought-out vision, the construction of the Anaklia city-port and the economic zone is more than possible to serve that purpose. For this reason, we see the concept of the "Anaklia Peace Zone" as a unique and distinct paradigm in the projects of the New Silk Road, which is not only the multiplicity of generalized conversations about peace, but the deep, concrete and systematic vision of how to implement the model developed in this direction and gradually carry out the corresponding activities. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the new Anaklia can have all the conditions to become, on the one hand, an economic and logistical hub and on the other, the zone of peace, where the West and the East not only meet each other but through dialogue will be able to transform peacefully the conflictive paradigm, which began and continues between Europe and Asia since the time of Troy.

**Keywords:** Anaklia, Peace Zone, New Silk Road, OBOR, Georgia, Peace studies, Caucasia, West and East

In today's world, perspectives of the new Silk Road and Anaklia city-port are on top of the agenda. Both of them present the opportunity of channeling the international relations and development in peaceful direction. In recent years a lot of meetings were held on various levels, where together with discussing the innovative programs, the discussion often focuses on their effect on peace processes, but the realization of all this is impossible without the scientifically substantiated, concrete, systematic and methodological vision.

It should be noted that since 1990, with the initiative of UNESCO, the interest in the potential of the New Silk Road has been revived. The European Union created the first version of the new Silk Road (TRACECA) in 1992; in the following 21 years this initiative was followed first by the American, then the Japanese, South Korean and most recently by the Chinese versions. As you can see, the role and interest of the Western countries or its allies in restoring this project of century-old tradition was and is proactive.

From ancient times, the Silk Road was the most important channel of not only commercial relations, but of communication, sharing information and education between civilizations and different people. Together with the economic development and common logistical system, we can view the initiatives of the modern Silk Road

as a comprehensive mechanism of advancing its participants and regions from negative to positive peace or as a complex network of peace zones.

In order to analyze the new Silk Road in the context of peace studies, we have to make a brief definition of a peace zone. It is a private, public, educational, working or religious space, which is free from violence, animosity, which promotes principles of inclusivity, cooperation and human dignity and living, working, learning and communicating in which provides the opportunity of individual and social development.

According to the scientific literature, there are three different gradations of peace zones:

1. **Negative, precarious peace** – Peace is maintained for a certain period based on a lack of sufficient commitment or will to start the conflict. Escalation of violence, civil war, internal or external conflicts is possible. In this type of region member states are satisfied with the status quo.
2. **Stable peace** -The expectation of violence is excluded and the maintenance of peace is achieved on a consensual basis. In the present region, the possibility of war is so small that the participants have no interest in it because territorial changes are not the national priorities except in cases where this is not the subject of the common agreement. Instead of the heroic or romantic attitude, the states in the area choose economic development to solve regional problems. And finally, because peace is a priority at the international and internal level, the subjects of this region represent a commonwealth, satisfied with the status quo.
3. **Pluralistic security community** – The member states of the society share common values, political institutions, and standards and are closely interlinked. The foundation of their cooperation is integration, which is successfully achieved when the individual actors stop preparing for war with each other. And this happens during common identity and shared economic gains .

There are the following factors to keep peace in the region:

- a) Peaceful regional order maintained from the regional hegemon
- b) The regional balance of power, developed by its states
- c) Confrontation in the face of common threat
- d) Isolation by geographical and natural factors
- e) Common liberal-democratic regimes of the states in the region
- f) Economic development
- g) Economic interconnection between the states of the region
- h) Normative consensus regarding the rules of international law and the management and resolution of conflicts. Facilitated by a common cultural framework
- i) Territorial status quo between the states of the region.

We can list the most famous/successful peace zones in modern and contemporary history:

1. Nepal, which became a zone of peace in 1975
2. The Ecuador-Peru Peace Process
3. European Union

Because Anaklia is located near the conflict zone, it will be useful to consider the experience of creating the phases of the peace zone:

1. **Initiation phase** (Understand the assumptions and the historical-political dynamics of the conflict, where the interests, demands, and alliances of the participants have been defined. Evaluation of the results must be carried out in the context of ethnic, gender, economic groups, etc. vision and planning, where it is essential to identify the cession of hostility and the promoters of the peace dialogue, to mobilize society in peace-building.

For this, it is necessary to support the financing plan, human resources, stakeholders through facilitation and logistics; the participation of stakeholders in conflict resolution and management of the peace zone for which it is important to initiate and simplify the process of negotiation and consensus building).

2. **Declaration phase** (To ensure increased responsibility in the drafting and implementation of agreements and resolutions, where the objectives, conditions, political agendas, responsibilities, and commitments are clearly defined. The process of conscripting the documentation is relevant and will involve the development of relationships between the participating organizations, as well as further knowledge between them. Periodically, in the case of variations in actors and context, revision/renewal of agreements-resolutions is necessary. The Peace Zone Declaration is an important document drawn up and signed by the concerned parties and must be implemented by the parties involved. This is a solemn event and its celebration will be beneficial for peace as a symbolic act, which connects participants. On a personal and informal level, ideas are shared between them, which increases mutual respect and understanding.)
3. **Maintaining phase** (The development of appropriate skills, knowledge, and attitudes among local leaders is crucial, as it is an essential part of maintaining the peace zone process unceasingly. This, on the other hand, considers the creation-dissemination of a support network, which guarantees the strengthening of peace-building mechanisms. Participation in the indicated process, leadership and representation of interests is established according to ethnic groups, economic status, gender, which is the consequence of the creation of skills and possibilities; to effectively implement peace zone agreements, the leaders of the society must transform themselves from peace “agents” to peace “managers” and they use such organizational structures, such as peace or tribal council, operational unit, local coalition, or special commission, or combination of certain groups. Such structures may be local government institutions, such as regional councils, or religious organizations. In the case of inter-religious or inter-ethnic conflicts, each party must be represented at least by a suggestion in the peace body. Among the latter, everyone participates with resources or funding through support groups: NGOs, religious or popular organizations. Besides, the policies and regulations foreseen by the Declaration of the Peace Zone are implemented and applied; at this point, it is very important to spread peace education and the formation of peace volunteers, which will always be used to strengthen the peace zone. To improve the organizational structure, committees with special responsibilities and functions (management, finance, training, peace-building, etc.) can be formed; the creation of the monitoring system will contribute to the correct evaluation of the correctly applied declarations and peace-resolution agreements’ requirements. Since this is an ongoing process, it must be undertaken from the beginning. To establish violations, the minimum requirements and parameters, with which it is oriented, must be edited. The state must participate in monitoring both at a central and local level and its policies and legislation regarding the functioning of the peace zone, must be controlled).
4. **Sustaining phase** (The aims of the declaration, the functions of the support groups, the attempts to enlarge the peace zone, the application of the mechanisms to overcome difficulties, the impact on the population of the peace and conflict zone, so that society and leadership are informed, how to act for the further enlargement of the project; based on the experience received from the evaluation, the establishment of the next steps and sharing of recommendations to other conflict situations, so that others can create their peace zones. This, on the other hand, contributes to the formation of peace zone networks. The sharing of experience is possible through publications, films, press material, and other means).

From this perspective, we see Anaklia city-port as one of the peace zones, which will have better opportunity to become an important element of the new Silk Road that will help Georgia in ascending from the status of the “middle corridor” to the level of the main and the shortest route of the above global initiative. In parallel with the free economic zone and logistic hub of Anaklia, establishing and developing it as a peace zone would set an example for advancing the country, as well as the region in this direction, which may become an excellent way of integration into the lines of United Nations Peace Messenger Cities via a Georgian model. For this purpose, we consider Anaklia project as one complex system, which consists of the following components:

- a) The city of peace
- b) Peace zone
- c) Peace system for the development of the state and region

- d) An effective and alternative model to the neutrality
- e) Peace paradigm, situated on the New Silk Road

The main operative directions of the Anaklia Peace Zone:

### 1. Institutional-administrative

- The peace zone under the patronage of the European Union, where and with the coordination of which meetings will be organized between Georgians and representatives of the conflict zones at juvenile and elder level;
- Through the concentration of international organizations, the transformation of the peace zone into the cluster, which will help to deepen the international society's relations with Georgia and increase the country's notoriety;
- Alternative format to the Geneva Process on the level of public diplomacy.

### 2. Economic

- The concentration of the leading corporations, which will contribute to strengthening the security of the country and increasing investments in Georgia;
- Production of the goods, oriented to premium quality according to the principles of a peace economy, where this area will be both the beginning and the end of the logistic, tourist, productive infrastructure and where the support of small-medium enterprises will be oriented to promote joint activities with the other side of the conflict; It will be possible to present the production received from these activities at high-level peace meetings and appropriate international exhibitions;
- Social responsibility of corporations.

### 3. Cultural

- Foundation of the International Peace Festival, which will accumulate the best aspects of local and international experiences;
- Place of meetings between the youth from the conflict zones.

### 4. Educational

Silk Road University

- Transformation of the university into the center of the "New Silk Road" university network;
- Consulting and research activity;
- International center of the university diplomacy
- With the patronage of the UN and OSCE, the creation of the alternative to the University of Peace of Costa Rica and Schleining (ASPR), where together with Abkhasian and Ossetian students, it will be possible to invite young people from different conflict areas;
- Cooperation with The Silk Road Universities Network (Hankuk, Seoul, South Korea) and The University Alliance of the Silk Road (Xi'an, China);
- Preparation of competent and qualified peace ambassadors based on programs of Peace and Security Studies.

### 5. Ecologic

- The gradual transformation of the Anaklia Peace Zone into an ecological zone;
- "Vancouverization"

**Levels of Anaklia Peace Zone:****Local**

- a) The development model for the country and the region.
- b) Accelerator of the conflict transformation

**Global**

- a) Linker between the West and the East (The North and the South?)
- b) Mediator between the West and the East

In the present work, we have tried to present the best old and new aspects of the “New Silk Road”, as well as the experience of the Peace Studies in the context of Anaklia Peace Zone, so that the latter would receive a more systematic profile and have a character of recommendation in the process of realization of the similar project(s).

**References:**

1. Integral study of The Silk Roads: Roads of Dialogue, (2008), A UNESCO Intercultural Project 1988-1997. <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001591/159189E.pdf>
2. Kacowicz ArieM, (1998), Zones Of Peace In The Third World, State University of New York Press.
3. Peace Zones, (2009), MethodFinder’s Practitioner’s Guide. <http://www.methodfinder.net/briefdescription88.html>

# Lasha Bazhunaishvili Irakli Gorgiladze

Batumi Shota Rustaveli State University

## Asymmetric Strategies and New Balance of Power in the Black Sea

### Abstract

Globalization and integration are accompanied by not only homogeneous structures, but fragmentation and localization as well. Spaces, which do not enter the synthesis, create uncertainty and infinite zones. One such zone, formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is the new geopolitical area – the Black Sea and its adjacent (so called “Wider Black Sea Region”).

The following paper will focus on the several issues:

- Determination and specification of new foreign policy vectors and Security Strategies of Black Sea Basin Countries;
- Modelling of prospects of various scenarios of Balance of Power in the Black Sea;
- Prospect of transformation of internationally established Status of Sea and its straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles) as well as issue of new maritime and navigation order in the Black Sea.

**Methodology:** In order to complete main research goals there was used basic approaches empirical methods. There was collected and studied various official materials, doctrines and strategies, official and public statements of military and political figures. All these materials was giving possibility to portray objective geopolitical reality one of the contested region of world and gives opportunity to make analyze correctly. During analyzing these materials there were used method of comparative, interdisciplinary and content analyze as well.

**Literature Review:** We researched, studied and analyzed the security and defense strategies of Black Sea littorals states. We also reviewed scientific literature using international scientific databases. In addition, we reviewed policy papers of best known think tanks, press materials and information published on official web pages of the relevant authorities.

**Keywords:** Black Sea naval Strategies, Balance of Power, geopolitics of Black Sea.

### Introduction

Geopolitical architecture of Black Sea (BS) basin, its straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles) and its adjacent mainly Southern Caucasus (SC) Region presents itself complex geopolitical environment and one of the cornerstones of the world politics, as well as one of the contested region and the subject of intense debates between great powers. These three geographical Components are link to each other and create geopolitically important space, essential for those who fighting to take control over the Broaden Black Sea, Middle East and Central Asia. Southern Caucasus situated between two seas and connected to the world trade lines through the Black Sea and its canals. Thus, it means that seaway and land-bridge creates one whole geopolitical unity connecting all parties – East-West and North-South.



## Power in the Black Sea Region

Historically, BC and SC region unlimited has capacity to connect **Central Asia to Europe and Vice-versa (East-West)** and it is also a land bridge for **Russia to Middle East** (North-South). Besides of Geo-strategic option Caucasus and its Caspian part rich with energy Sources. Caucasus presents crossroad of Christian and Muslim Civilization, European and Asian Cultures, here is interrelated local Caucasian, Turkish, Persian and Slavic cultures. On the other side Geopolitical significance of region, their colorful ethno-linguistic and cultural structures were causes of conflicts and intervention from outside. In the more wide Geopolitical aspect (in the present Global political, Economic and strategic vision) South Caucasus Regions present itself as an important part of the “**Strategic Ellipse Between 5 Seas**” (Black Sea, Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf, Red Sea and Mediterranean) where during the several millennia were raised and existed ancient civilizations and now presents one of the most important geopolitical, strategic and Geo-economic area of the world.

During centuries Black Sea Basin and its East-West littoral South Caucasus and Balkans were area of clashes between Eastern and Western Civilizations. During the 17th-19th centuries Ottomans and Russian Empires fighting for hegemony over the region and consequently it was divided between two empires as a spheres of influence. During the Cold war era Black Sea was an area of mutual deterrence. Generally, sea was closed (“Mare Clausum”) and straits serves security interests only for regional powers USSR and Turkey. 1936 Monteux Regime (Bosporus and Dardanelles) was acceptable for both parties and both of them supported Status quo.

After the 1991 Black Sea Basin became diverse. New regional players embarked independent foreign policy which often was (and still is) inconsistent with old players, especially for Russia. Black Sea and its natural sources and transit capacity became essential for security, economic development and communications for newly emerged states. Moreover, Region’s transit capacity and geopolitical importance also attracted interests of Western and Eastern powers. In 2004 western littoral states (former communist countries – Bulgaria and Romania) of Black Sea became NATO members and in 2007 EU members as well, another former soviet countries Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova expressed its willingness to join Euro-Atlantic Organizations and built strong ties with western allies. Changing order in the region became most disputed issue between East and West. During his speech at Munich Security Conference (MSC) in 2007 Russia’s President Vladimir Putin blamed Western powers in attempts to establish Unipolar World Order. He also clearly expressed that post-cold war liberal global order under the US leadership was principally unacceptable for Moscow. Since MSC-2007 Russia became one of the **offensive revisionist power** of global politics. Consequently, Moscow’s attitude regarding to the “near abroad” countries also radically changed. It became more aggressive, destructive and offensive. This circumstance determines the high sensitivity of the domestic and foreign policy of the Black Sea countries, which at various stages are revealed with different forms.

Thus, since dismantle of Soviet Union, before existed order in the strategically important Black Sea region was collapsed. “Old Hegemons” of the regions lost theirs exclusive positions. Newly independent countries and non-regional global actors attracted by region’s strategic capacity, created diverse but contested political conjuncture.

Considering the existed reality, acting powers in the Black Sea Region (BSR) can be divided into several groups:

1. **Global Powers** (Actors): the US/NATO, European Union, Russia and China with its new Global Economic Initiative – “New Silk Road”. They are fighting to create themselves profitable geopolitical configuration in the Black Sea Region, over the canals and South Caucasus Region.
2. **Regional Powers** (actors): Turkey, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria;
3. **Small**, but geopolitically important Frontline Countries: Georgia and Moldavia
4. **Adjacent and Non-regional Powers** – Azerbaijan, Iran, Armenia, Kazakhstan

## Russia

Since 18th century Black Sea has been an important area for Russian security, commerce, and other interests. Moreover, Trans-Caucasia presents a Gateway for “Soft Penetration” in the above mentioned **“Strategic Ellipse between 5 Seas”** from the North. Through South Caucasus region Russia tries to establish its influence over the Middle East and become key actor in the Energy trading and transit capacity. What the Black Sea offers **geopolitically** is traditionally are Russia’s closest access point to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, the Middle East (mainly coastline through straits), and the world oceans at large. These are all areas of strategic importance to Russia where it seeks to expand its presence and activity, or to build upon current security and energy partnerships. In 2014 The U.S. Department of Energy has highlighted the importance of Russia’s energy exports. Russian port Novorossiysk is Russia’s main oil terminal on the Black Sea coast. Its load capacity is more than 1 million barrels per day (b/d). ... Oil and natural gas revenues accounted for 50% of Russia’s federal budget revenues and 68% of total exports in 2013. Port also administrated 117 million tons of cargo, which is twice the amount of traffic received by the St. Petersburg or even Primorsk ports located in the north of Russia on the Baltic Sea.

More than a decade has passed since President Putin made a pair of declarations within a single two-day span. The first was that **“the Azov-Black Sea region is a Russian strategic interest zone.”** The second was that adjacent Krasnodar – **“Russia’s southern outpost”** – is **“our most important region, a strategic interest zone, where we have our only warm water sea lines of communication with our main European partners. The Black Sea gives Russia direct access to the most important global transportation routes, including for energy.”** Both are reflected in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation published in December 2014.

Since 2007 Russia under the V. Putins’s leadership became one of the revisionist forces of post-bipolar global order. Putin blamed US in attempts to establish unipolar world order and forecast establishment of multipolar world not only in the global politics but in the global economic relations as well. Also Putin blamed West, especially NATO about violation of Treaty on Restriction of Conventional Armed forces in Europe (1999) and deploying antimissile systems in Central Europe. Moreover, as Putin stated NATO deployed additional armed forces in Bulgaria and Romania. All these facts was perceived as national threat for Russia and once again condemn that NATO’s enlargement in the West and its defense strategy does not had any relations with the modernizations of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. Consequently, Russia started to respond in cold war manner to defending its national interest became and sphere of influence especially in the “near abroad” covering Black Sea as well. Few month after Munich speech Russian Air Force decided to resume long-distance flights by its strategic bombers covering also the Black Sea space. In the fall of 2008, the Russian Admiralty announced ambitious plans for the expansion of the Black Sea Fleet, including its ability to “show the flag” in the Mediterranean. It was also decided to accelerate the development of the military port of Novorossiysk. Besides of enforcement its conventional forces in the region Russia successfully activated its traditional hard power tools and via heating so called “frozen” conflicts invaded in Georgia (August War), annexed Crimea (2014) and provoke separatist conflict in the Eastern regions of Ukraine.

In order to strengthen Russia’s position in the “Near Abroad” and in the Black Sea region as well **Russia successfully move its illegal activities from shores to offshores** and seized Ukrainian Maritime assets (Kerch strait incident). Nowadays particularly Russia illegally controlling seaways in the North of Black Sea and Sea of Azov, challenging security of Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Seaways and creates so called “Anaconda Circle” (a maritime strategy for victory based on coastal blockades) around them. It means that simultaneously with land-based conflicts gradually appearing sea-based conflicts which changing nature of rivalries between acting powers of region. Moreover, in the near future Russia would support separatist regimes (DPR and Abkhazia) to building its own maritime capabilities armed with large caliber weapons and antitank cruise missiles. A report by a pro-Russian newspaper in May 2015 claimed that an “Azov Flotilla”, with a maritime Special Forces element, had been set up in the Donetsk People’s Republic. These forces would have ability to conduct raids or sabotage missions which is clearly a serious threat to maritime security in the Black Sea. Consequently, Georgia’s and Ukraine’s

coastline would be under increased risks and resulted with diminish their economic and transit capacity. Thus, by using hard power, Russia has seized the initiative on land, and is doing so at sea. In the words of the Warsaw Summit communiqué, “Russia’s recent activities and policies have reduced stability and security, increased unpredictability, and changed the security environment.” The most principal strategic objectives of Russia in the region is to returning and keep countries of so called “near abroad” under the Traditional (mean 19th century stile) Russian Sphere of Influence.

Moreover, Russia has increased its capabilities and operations of air, sea, and land forces in the region. The Black Sea Fleet currently consists of 47 warships and 5 submarines stationed primarily out of Sevastopol, located on the west side of the Crimea, and Novorossiysk, located on the west bank of Russia proper. The fleet’s warships constitute 22 percent of total Russian naval warships in service from all fleets, and seven percent of the total submarine force. In 2015-2016, the Black Sea Fleet took delivery of the first of six planned improved KIL0-class submarines and the first of six planned Admiral Grigorivich class frigates systems. Russia’s 2020 State Armament Program prioritized the Black Sea Fleet for significant capability upgrades, also deployed Intermediate-range (1500 km.) missiles, Surface-to-Air (S-400 Triumph) missiles, mobile short-range (500 km) ballistic missile system Iskander, anti-ship cruise missiles and etc. It continues large military infrastructure build-up in Crimea, Enhanced air defense, communications and surveillance systems, as well as cyber war. Consequently in the Black Sea Russia created so called **Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)** Systems which is most essential features of reshaping not only Black Sea regions but Security of Europe in general (Surface to Air Missile Systems S-300 presents threats to the Air-corridor from Eastern Europe to Afghanistan. These systems could interrupt NATO and US flight from Europe to Afghanistan). In fact, Russia seems to have acquired a strategic place d’armes for further incursions in its ‘near abroad’, seen this time in a broader sense to include the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant. Available evidence suggests, in addition to threatening the sovereignty of Ukraine, Georgia and Republic of Moldova, intent to control navigation in the Black Sea maritime space, to protect Russia’s communication lines and energy transportation routes, to intimidate NATO members Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, and to interdict the access of NATO forces to the Black Sea.

Thus, reinforcement of positions on Black Sea gives opportunity to Moscow to build a platform for denying NATO access to that region mainly in Ukraine and the South Caucasus and to serve as a platform for **power projection** into the Mediterranean and Middle East as well as. Argument for these can be served Russia’s military move to Syria and enforcement of its presence on the Eastern cost of Mediterranean. Moreover, Russian long term strategy goes beyond of Black Sea and Mediterranean and mainly focuses od Atlantic Ocean as it was during the Cold War. **“The Atlantic Ocean** is a main focus of the new maritime doctrine, underlying which is the suggestion that it is the most likely venue for a maritime conflict between Russia and NATO in the next five years. One significant change is that the **Black and the Mediterranean** Seas are now contextually (and doctrinally) part of the **Atlantic Geostrategic Theatre which are linked with plans for the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. With the “return back”** (paradox but Russians calling annexation of Crimea as “return back of lost Russian Lands”) of Crimea and Sevastopol, Russia must take all necessary measures to ensure their rapid integration into the national economy. “Furthermore, Russia should strengthen its naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea, which is part of the Atlantic region.”

But, it should be clearly delivered that Black Sea is not only exclusive interests zone of Russia, part of Sea called Especial Economic Zone (EEZ) and its international seaways equally belongs to the other littoral states. But Russia actually did not recognize their right and their sovereignty, their independent foreign policy and freedom of choice (these attitudes visible in the statements of Russian top officials and experts). All external links of former Soviet States with Western organizations perceive Moscow as national threat and try to deter it using aggressive methods. Russia regards the increased U.S. and NATO naval activity in the Black Sea as a threat to Russian interests in the region, and an example of NATO expansion and interference in its immediate sphere of influence. Russian policy makers and experts asserting that if Georgia and Ukraine become NATO member states Black Sea would be a “Lake of NATO” and in the region there would be only two powerful and rival forces. Explaining existed situation in the Black Sea and South Caucasus region is better to recall story about Pirate and Emperor quoted by Saint Augustine in his book “The City of God”. A captured pirate was brought before Alexander the Great.

“How dare you molest the sea?” asked Alexander. “How dare you molest the whole world?” the pirate replied boldly, and continued: “Because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a thief; you, doing it with a great navy and are called an emperor.” The same can be said about the case of the Black Sea and Southern Caucasus region, where the force gives absolutely different status to the interests and actions of Russia and Small Countries. As long as there is the different interpretation of existed problems (liberal or 19th century order of sphere of influence), there will be permanent base of confrontation as well, which will keep the new geopolitical horizons under the increasing risks and will be a sense of contested area in general.

## Pragmatic and Normative Power in Region – Euro-Atlantic Community

### (NATO, EU and US)

#### The US

During Cold war Black Sea was one of the closed but sensitive area of Global Politics. Here was reciprocal deterrence keeping region under the “Forced Peace”. After the collapse of Soviet Union US started to enhance its relations with newly emerged post-soviet independent states helping them to overcome economic problems, state-building, conflict resolution issues and democratic transitions. Svante Cornell describes US strategic interests in the region with 3 words: “Sovereignty, Energy and Security”. The strategic significance of the Black Sea region moved up on Washington’s agenda in connection with the logistical and other requirements of the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. That was also an object test for the reliability and effectiveness of the new allies. According to the United States National Security Council Strategy of 2002, Black and Caspian Sea Regions are considered as important regions not only for its oil and Natural gas deposits, but for its transit capacity, which gives opportunities to connect through trade routes Europe-Black Sea-Transcaucasia Corridor to the Central and South-East Asian markets. The United States military presence from Black Sea coasts to Afghanistan increases Washington influence over the region.

The U.S. and NATO naval presence in the Black Sea prior to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was mostly designed for small-scale peacekeeping exercises with select NATO Black Sea members and partners, and only increased after the mid-2000s. The first large-scale NATO exercises in the Black Sea were held in 1995. From 2000s NATO naval forces including US Vessels, started implementation of annual military and rescue operations under the Turkey’s initiatives.

After the Crimea annexation, Russia’s military build-up in the Black Sea region and Moscow’s activities in the East of Mediterranean challenged US positions not only in Black Sea, but in South Europe and Middle East as well. The challenges to security in the Black Sea region are all interconnected and inextricably intertwined in the wider context of Euro-Atlantic security. Therefore, in order to deter Russia’s increased military activities in the region, US tries to maintain part of 6th fleet in the Black Sea to deter Russia and provide NATO Allies and partners in the region with security assurances against Moscow. But Montreux Convention doesn’t allow non-Black Sea powers to keep its fleet permanently. That is why Washington tries to use tools of “soft penetration” using NATO members (Romania and Bulgaria) and aspirant countries of NATO membership (Georgia and Ukraine). “Despite increasing Russian presence in the region, EUCOM has increased U.S. [and NATO] maritime presence in the Black Sea through Passing Exercises (PASSEXes) **and other bilateral and multinational exercises**. Since April 2014, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) has maintained a **monthly periodic presence** in the Black Sea.”

Speaking in September 2015 **Vice Admiral James Foggo**, deputy commander of US Naval Forces Europe, stated that the United States was making its **“presence in the region ‘normal,’ and we are conducting regular and frequent exercises and engagements with navies in the area.”** As part of its commitment to the Black Sea, the United States also increased the number of troops and aircraft in Romania. More recently, it has expanded its capabilities to perform further presence-based operations in the port of Constanta, in its training hubs in the

Romanian base, and in the Novo Selo Training Area in Bulgaria. In 2016 US navy secretary **Ray Maybus** stated that the United States would continue to operate in the Black Sea, because its aim was **“to deter aggression and keep sea lines open”** Considering these commitments and US maritime presence, tension between Russia and the Atlantic Community in the Black Sea has increased significantly.

## NATO

Since The Black Sea region has become Europe’s outer periphery, with much of what is regarded as Eastern Europe joining the European Union and the Alliance in recent years, NATO has an interest in stabilizing the area by encouraging democratic regime transitions. Nevertheless, NATO’s interests are often perceived by Russia to be in direct opposition to its own interests in the region. In response to the NATO Russia’s increasingly aggressive behavior, including the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and the 2014 annexation of Crimea, along with its naval buildup in the Black Sea, has triggered an increase in NATO naval presence within and around the Black Sea. Led by the U.S. Navy, NATO nations have increased their patrols in the Black Sea as a deterrent to Russia.

In 2014 NATO Wales Summit adopt new approach called collective defense and deterrence including on Seas. Summit declaration clearly underlines that *“NATO would provide a coherent and comprehensive package of necessary measures to respond to the changes in the security environment on Alliance’s borders and further afield that are of concern to Allies. It responds to the challenges posed by Russia and their strategic implications... The Plan strengthens NATO’s collective defense. It also strengthens our crisis management capability. The Plan will contribute to ensuring that NATO remains a strong, ready, robust, and responsive Alliance capable of meeting current and future challenges from wherever they may arise.”*

After 2016 Warsaw Summit NATO started updating its Maritime Strategy in the European area touching issues like activating maritime strategy in the Mediterranean, Black and Baltic Seas, called “Security of Three Seas”. NATO becoming more active to strengthen its position on seas which are most important security area for Eastern European partners and simultaneously is one of the effective tool to deterring Russia. “Russia’s recent activities and policies have reduced stability and security, increased unpredictability, and changed the security environment... We will also deepen our focus on security in the Black Sea region.” Moreover, enhancing its position in the Black Sea NATO would strengthen Its Southern Flank.

## European Union

The Black Sea region (BSR) is of crucial significance for European security, as it is a major crossroads of East-West and South-North corridors, including for the transit of energy resources, bearing unavoidable political implications. Many experts believe that whoever controls the BSR can easily project power to the European continent, mainly in the Balkans and Central Europe, but also to the other adjacent regions – Mediterranean Sea, South Caucasus or Middle East.

Thus, considering given circumstances in the Black Sea region it can be concluded that BSR actually bipolarized between two poles Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Poles.

### 1 – Eurasian Pole – Under the influence of “pseudo-democratic conditionality”, which is also characterized by:

- Tries to establish Spheres of Influence;
- Presents itself as revisionist force. Using hard power (even in economic relations)
- Holds standart of Hierarchical relations in the context of foreign policy and regionalism;
- Promoting only autocratic regimes in the neighboring countries;
- Encourage ElectoralAuthoritarianism;



## 2 – contrary to that Euro-Atlantic isoftand normative power based on a democratic conditionality

- Respects Freedom of Choice;
- Promoting Democratization and institutional development;
- Transparent election and rule of law;
- Europeanization, harmonization and “import” of reforms;
- Equitable Partnership, Collective Security and Development Perspectives;

While the EU and the United States promote norms and values based on representative democracy, the rule of law and human rights, in the hope of contributing to peace building in the region, authoritarianism, militarization and power politics are on the rise. Common strategies aimed at addressing and overcoming deadlocks, differences and regional security threats, have proven difficult to arrive at. This is also of concern with regard to the diminishing role of inclusive international organizations such as the OSCE and the increasing relevance of the EU with its selective membership. Finally, hitherto tried and tested conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms have been unsuccessful in the Black Sea region and there is a clear need for new and creative ideas with regard to conflict resolution.

### Regional Actors. Western Littoral States

After the collapse of Soviet Union Romania’s Strategic Power Projection to the Black Sea was mainly passive. Among the other military forces Romanian navy was one of the neglected, since last updated in 1998 vessels and military equipment was already outdated. In 2003 Romania acquired two used Broadsward Class Frigates for UK as part of modernization program to harmonize NATO standards. In April 2006 President Traian Basescu resented and approved a new National Security Strategy of Romania. This Strategy aimed to systematically transform the elements of Romanian power. Among the main missions there are: participation to the global security efforts, constructing the new European and Euro-Atlantic identity of Romania, new regional security approach with focus on the Black Sea area, building a Homeland Security system, providing good governance, strengthening economy, transforming the security sector and modernization of critical infrastructure.

But after the annexation of Crimea by Russia and militarization of North Black Sea forced Romania became one of the most active contributors of Euro-Atlantic Security in BSR (it will not be exaggerated if we assume that Romania has brought the strategic significance of the Black Sea into NATO discussions). According to the Romanian military establishment the Russian presence in Crimea is a direct and imminent threat to Romania. Promoting the strategic implications of the Black Sea for European and transatlantic security has been a key goal for Romania, which has put all its diplomatic effort into increasing the awareness of allies and getting NATO to focus more on the South-Eastern flank of the alliance. During last years, Romania has always promoted its national interest so that the Alliance could adopt a more balanced, holistic, and integrated approach to the security of the Eastern flank by promoting a unified concept for the NATO forward presence. This implies recognizing that the threat to European security is indivisible across the eastern flank and places the BSR on an equal footing with the Baltic Sea. After the 2016 Warsaw Summit, which mainly was Baltic-centric (created an imbalance that left unaddressed might risk transforming the Black Sea into the center of gravity of Russian revisionism), Romania actively advocated for a permanent NATO naval presence in Black Sea, it will not be exaggerated if we assume that Romania has brought the strategic significance of the Black Sea into NATO discussions). Bogdan Aurescu a Foreign Policy Adviser to President Klaus Iohannis, during his speech at the center for European Policy Analysis, clearly stated Romania’s regional concerns – “Since Russia Controls the waters of Crimea Romania has de-facto maritime border with Russia already. Black Sea is the most complex security environment on NATO’s doorstep. We are pleased to see that more attention is being dedicated to the Black Sea, but it’s not enough. We must go from reassurance to deterrence. It’s obvious we need more NATO presence in the Black Sea, and we have the full support of the U.S. for this initiative.” Faced with growing Russian Military threats in the Black Sea, Romania has decided to increase its defense spending and modernize its military capabilities. In 2017, Romania begun ten-year ambitious program worth of 8.9 billion Euro. Modernization Program considers:

1. To purchase four corvettes estimated 1.6 billion Euros;
2. Three submarines, which would replace soviet Kilo Class submarines which doesn't meet Romania's Security interests;
3. And development of Romanian shipbuilding industry. Ex-Prime Minister Mihai Tudose during the cabinet meeting clearly expressed Romania's national interest connected to the Black Sea naval development. "... We are going to have state shipyard... Maybe we are going to build some frigates, maybe we are going to build a little boat there... It is not possible for a country with access to both Danube basin and Black Sea it is not to have a shipyard to build a little boat..."

Comparing with Romania Bulgaria still remains passive. Its foreign policy priorities are ambivalent. In 2012-2017 during the rule of President Rosen Plevneliev Bulgaria was highly critical regarding to the Russia's regional politics. He therefore supported a stronger NATO role in the Black Sea region. His successor, President Rumen Radev, who is a former commander of the air force, seeks to maintain close ties with Russia while having a good relationship with the EU and NATO partners. He has made statements seen as being to some extent supportive of Russia's takeover of Crimea. But Radev supports substantial and urgent increases in Bulgaria's military spending and a modernization of military equipment to NATO standards. In 2017 he emphasized the need for 'strong navy forces' to uphold [Bulgaria's] military sovereignty and guard economic and energy interests. Bulgaria also participates in security cooperation activities (e.g. training courses, operations and military exercises) organized by the US Black Sea Rotational Force stationed in Romania and involving US Marines and partners in the Black Sea region (including Romania), the Balkans and the Caucasus. Bulgaria participated in related exercises in 2016, 2017 and 2018.

### Southern Direction. Turkey

**Turkey "has no allies in the Black Sea, only interests"**. Turkey is constantly struggling to find a balance between its national security interests and its commitments as a NATO ally. Aware of both Russia's military superiority and sensitivity, Turkey tries not to compete with Russia in the Black Sea. After the brief Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008, Turkey adopted a neutral stance and consulted with Russia before reaching out to NATO. In 2014, though a vocal supporter of Ukraine's territorial integrity, Turkey did not sanction Russia for Crimea's annexation, limiting its role to negotiating for the freedom of jailed Crimean Tatar leaders. Eventually, it took an overt violation of its airspace at its southern border in November 2015 for Turkey to react, which it did with alarm by shooting down a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 aircraft. But in long-term interests and policies of both countries cannot be correlated to each other long time. Russia's absolutely different interests and goals cannot be relevant to Ankara. According to the "Strategy of Warm Seas" Russia's main goal remains to enhance its influence over Black Sea, its straits and increase its presence in the Mediterranean which automatically means encirclement of Turkey.

Considering above mentioned challenges Ankara's principal task to preserve the 1936 Montreux Convention that grants it exclusive control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, Turkey always implemented its clauses in a strictly impartial way, avoiding potential disputes over Russian ships classification and denying NATO vessels any favorable treatment. The Convention consists of 29 Articles, four annexes and one protocol. Articles 2–7 consider the passage of merchant ships. Articles 8–22 consider the passage of war vessels. The key principle of freedom of passage and navigation is stated in articles 1 and 2. Article 1 provides that "The High Contracting Parties recognize and affirm the principle of freedom of passage and navigation by sea in the Straits". Article 2 states that "In time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of passage and navigation in the Straits, by day and by night, under any flag with any kind of cargo." (Erdogan case). Turkey was authorized to close the Straits to all foreign warships in wartime or when it was threatened by aggression; additionally, it was authorized to refuse transit from merchant ships belonging to countries at war with Turkey. A number of highly specific restrictions were imposed on what type of warships is allowed passage. Non-Black Sea state warships in the Straits must be less than 15,000 tons. No more than nine non-Black Sea state warships, with a total aggregate tonnage of no more than 30,000 tons, may pass at any time, and they are permitted to stay in the Black Sea for no longer than twenty-one days. Although the treaty is often cited as prohibiting aircraft carriers in the straits, there is no



explicit prohibition on aircraft carriers in the treaty. However, the tonnage limits in Article 14, which apply to all non-Black Sea powers, would preclude the transit of modern aircraft carrying ships. In the case of Non-Black Sea powers, these terms make it impossible for transit any modern ships carrying aircraft through the straits without violating the terms of the convention. Thus, Convention denied access to NATO aircraft carrier and other type of vessels more than 30 000 tone, equipped with sophisticated weapon and military applications, because of it is not allowed by the Article 11.

If Turkey's shift to Russia continues in future, there would be opened a new diplomatic front for revising Convention of Montreux regulating passing military vessels in the straits and their period of stay into the Black Sea. Convention of Montreux is one of the legal frame of Black Sea status which also keeps it as closed sea not only for external powers, but for Black Sea littoral states as well. Presumably, US Government has already worked on several scenarios how to make some significant and profitable amendments in the Montreux convention. In the short term, if the Pentagon didn't get permission on the legal (international) basis to pass any type of US maritime forces through straits and stay in the Black Sea more than 21 day, the United States would try to reach strategic goals using NATO as a tool and fulfill so called "light (soft) penetration" in to the Black Sea Region. This scenario will be unacceptable not only for Russia, but for Turkey as well. Turkey is arguing that it already exists into the Black Sea basin responsible institutions and military mission such as "Black Sea For" and Black Sea Harmony (initiated Turkey for fighting against terrorism) for regional navigation security. According to the Turkish strategists there is no necessity to enhance NATO's military activities or increase military forces into the Black Sea. Neighboring countries Non-NATO member states (especially Georgia) also actively participate and promote security of the seaways. Ankara also is afraid that Washington's new initiatives regarding making changes into the Montreux regulations will provoke new debates, threaten Turkey's position and weaken its control over the Straits.

## Frontline Countries: Georgia and Ukraine

### Georgia

Since gaining its independence in 1991 Georgia continuously perceives Russia's foreign policy strategy both on land and sea as aggressive and a major threat to its security. In order to deter increasing threats from Russia, Georgia views membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union as strategic priorities. Georgia actively participates in and supports NATO activities in the Black Sea region, which it sees as a means to ensure stability in the region. On the other hand for Georgia the US remains as a key of strategic partner. According to the National Military Strategy of Georgia 2014, Georgia "has an active cooperation program with the U.S. Department of Defense and is committed to further deepening and sustaining existing collaboration through the framework of the U.S. Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership (Strategy 11). Georgia is hosting naval forces of NATO Member states and participating in large-scale exercises both on sea and land. Frequent flag-show visits of NATO warships in the eastern part and also in order to fulfill maintaining naval forces in the Black Sea there is most important to ensure with naval capabilities such as deep water port for temporary stationing, refueling and for technical support on the both West and especially on the East shores of Sea. Both NATO and US officials openly are fixing that Black Sea deep water ports such as Anaklia and Batumi Port in the East part of Black Sea will be one of the huge leverage to counterbalance Russian military and transit buildup in the Black Sea Basin. Moreover, Anaklia has capacity to become one of the important short-term naval shelters for US/NATO warships and meanwhile important factor keyfor security and economic development. Since new deep water port construction plan had been announced there was huge interest expressed by the top officials of US/NATO/EU

- **The US Vice President Mike Pence:** "The Anaklia deep-sea port shows the potential of a stronger bilateral relationship between our nations. American companies are investing alongside their Georgian counterparts in this multi-billion-dollar project. As we look toward the future, our two nations have untold opportunities to contribute even more to each other's prosperity."

- During official meeting with Prime Minister of Georgia Mamuka Bakhtadze in Washington (June 11, 2019) the US Secretary of State **Mike Pompeo** expressed the hope that “Georgia will complete the implementation of the project (deep-water port of Anaklia). Its implementation will strengthen Georgia’s ties with free economies and will not allow Georgia to be under the economic influence of Russia or China. These imaginary friends are not driven by good intentions.”
- **Elizabeth Rood**, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Georgia: “The Anaklia Deep Sea Port project and special development zones are vital and demonstrate the great potential not only for the development of Georgia but also of the whole region. We are proud that two large American companies are involved in this project – SSA Marine and “Conti Group, Rood said. The broader involvement of the American government agencies in the project shows the importance of this project for the US.”
- **The Commander of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command, Sir Clive CC Johnstone**: “In general, constructing a deep-sea port is important for any country and it is brilliant that Georgia is investing in this project... “I think this is a brilliant, ambitious vision. And if you have strong economy and stability, it will build the security of the country and anything that contributes to the strengthening country’s security is a good thing,” he added.
- **Retired US 3 star General Ben Hodges**: “Anaklia has high potential to become a European and Eurasian regional logistic centre. I believe that after the launch of the port the United States and other member countries of NATO will become more interested to ensure the safety of the country, as Georgia’s role in the economic field will be seriously grown... ...before Georgia becomes a NATO member it should be closely involved in Black Sea security“.
- **Former deputy assistant secretary of defense Michael Carpenter**: “The U.S. has a strong strategic interest in completing the Anaklia deep-water port facility. I think Russia would prefer not to see this investment happen.”
- **Former Diplomat Mathew Bryza** – Strategically for Georgia, the Anaklia port is a game changer. It provides Georgia, for the first time I might add, direct access to large-scale shipping from around the world. Obviously, it has a national security impact in terms of traditional military security, but it also has a great impact on Georgia’s economic place in the world. ... There are promising new logistical opportunities to deliver, for example material, food and other support, goods. For example, US military personnel in Afghanistan might consider using the Anaklia Port instead of having to transit military cargo into Afghanistan from Turkish ports, like Mersin, and drive across Turkey into Georgia. So there will be a lot more business, a lot more economic activity, which will reinforce Georgia’s strategic relationship with the United States. The port will also establish Georgia as a stronger global trading hub, which will be great in terms of strengthening its own sovereignty and independence and general security.
- **Henrik Hololei**, Director-General for Mobility and Transport of European Commission: “One of the important projects is the Anaklia port. Georgia needs deep sea port in the Black Sea. Today Georgia’s ports are not able to receive about 75% of the ships, because there is no deep sea port in the country. Anaklia is not only about port, it is about ecosystem. And it is a very ambitious project and we are very keen to see this project also take shape. It is among the priority projects between Georgia and European Union and of course, we would like to see this project going forward.

If we broadly review official statements and comments of NATO/US/EU top-officials and diplomats it is clear that stability of Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture partly depending not only Inter-sea line from Baltic to Black Seas but on complex area including Black Sea Basin itself and South Caucasus.

But it should be noted that constructing of a new deep water port in Anaklia became one of the disputed issue in the internal political arena of Georgia. Ruling political party Georgian Dream officially declares that building of a new port is one of the most priorities of Georgia hoping that it would increase transit of cargo from East to West and vice-versa. But observing current political approach to Anaklia issue, it becomes evident that ruler party under the influence of party leader Bidzina Ivanishvili, artificially obstructing realization of project using several institutions. Currently consortium was left by American company known as Conti International. Reaction from population was passive. Only opposition parties, several non-governmental organizations and think tanks reacted properly.

Observing given developments it can be concluded that in the strategic thinking of Georgia's political and military elites sea perceived and valued by limited specific opportunities – with the desire to receive both economic and political dividends (even more, historically Georgia's political and military elites, population and society are mostly „land-oriented“. Even according to the ancient Greeks Georgians means “tiller of the land”). It is considered only part of the land-transit system, so it is not fully understood its strategic opportunities and importance. Superficial actions do not give a corresponding result.

## Ukraine

Since 2014 Ukraine become one more victim of Russian aggression in the Black Sea region. Annexation of Crimea and separatist war (officially known as Anti-terrorist Operation) in Eastern part of Ukraine supported by Russia, sharply reduced Ukraine's Black Sea coastline and Especial Economic Zone. Ukrainians also lost control over the Kerch Strait and access to the defence industries, military bases, shipbuilding facilities, shipyards (capable of building and repair missile and aircraft carriers, large antisubmarine ships, heavy transport ships, coastguard ships and multipurpose icebreaking supply vessels) maritime infrastructures located in Crimea. The Ukrainian navy also lost two-thirds of its warships, including its most modern platforms. Thus, results of territorial lost, conflict in Eastern Regions and Russian military build-up in Crimea has become by far the most important security issue for Ukraine, overshadowing all other security considerations for the moment. Tenses between Russia and Ukraine equally were ongoing on land and offshore (Kerch incident).

In light of these severe losses and the realization of the important role maritime forces can play in the war in the east and in protecting Ukraine's interests in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), there is a growing recognition within the Ukrainian government of the need to rebuild the Ukrainian navy. Ukraine's president, Petro Poroshenko, stated unequivocally that Ukraine, was, is, and will remain a maritime state and announced ambitious plans to “revive” the Ukrainian navy, stating that in the future it would be equipped with state-of-the-art precision weapons.

Navy, ports and maritime infrastructures are important not only for security and defense, but for economic development as well. In June 2015, the then deputy head of the Ukrainian navy, Andri Ryzenko, pointed out that Ukraine's prosperity, its economy, and the potential growth of tax revenues depend on realization of the country's maritime potential. According to statistics quarter of Ukraine's gross domestic product (GDP) is generated by the five regions with access to the sea. Ukraine's export-oriented economy depends on cheapest transportation using seaways. Despite loss of several ports, Ukraine retains four important commercial ports in Odessa, Chornomorsk, and Yuzhny, located on the northwestern coast of the Black Sea, and Mariupol' in the Sea of Azov, which is one of the busiest commercial maritime hub responsible for transporting 70% of industrial outputs (mainly steel production and machinery). Considering these important maritime economic and commercial interests, rebuilding the Ukrainian navy clearly is necessary to protect Ukraine's national interests.

In order to secure Ukraine's EEZ and maritime facilities first action was to rebuild naval forces mainly coast guard or so called “Mosquito Fleet” able to ensure security of seaways. Second important decision was relocation of survived Ukrainian navy to Port Odessa where Ministry of Defense planning to invest several millions for constructing surface and underwater military facilities. Thus, Odessa got status of main sea base of Ukraine, where deployed navy headquarters as well. The Kerch group was relocated to Berdyansk. But Russia tries to disrupt Ukraine's naval rebuild trying to seize port Mariupol' using separatist militias, illegally locking Strait of Kerch and controlling movement of Ukrainian navy and also from time to time sabotaging port facilities in Odessa.

Thus, both Georgia and Ukraine presents itself littoral states having only capabilities to develop only coast guard forces. Otherwise they can be a reliable partners for maritime powers responsible to deter Russia's aggression into the Black Sea basin. Both Georgia and Ukraine offer strategically important onshore and offshore facilities, diplomatic and political support as well. Counter-balance Russian rising military activities in the Black Sea presents one of the most important challenge for Euro-Atlantic Security.

**Georgia and Ukraine** has similar interests:

1. Deter Russia's aggression – Secure Security and Stability;
2. Freedom of choice and foreign policy action – EU/NATO membership;
3. Development of Alternative Transit Capacity;
4. Mare Liberum and Free of Navigation in the Black Sea;

## Conclusion and Suggestions

Thus, Balance of Power Collapse of Soviet Union order and Spheres of Influence came to the end. Regional order into the certain area was destroyed, but new one has not emerged yet. These circumstances create the so-called Limitrophe Zone where Global and regional Actors try to establish comfortable conjuncture for itself. Moreover, New Status and consequently new order of the region are essential not only for regional, Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security, but also for Global Security Agenda as well, because of “security for one is security for all” (F. D. Roosevelt). But there is contrast division between concepts of Future Security Architecture of Black Sea and its littoral. For western powers most important issue of strategic agenda in the region is “New Status” and determining so called “New Order” based on liberal values, International law, and mutual respect, freedom of choice and respect of sovereignty.

Main consequences of defining New Status of Black Sea should be the following:

- Establishment of “Mare Liberum” (freedom of Navigation) into the Black Sea region. First of all, this point considers revising and changing of existed regime of navigation established by Montreux Convention (1936);
- Maintaining of Maritime and littoral Security;
- Demilitarization and arms control even conventional. Limitation of surface and submarines forces, missile and antimissile systems;
- Deepening regional integration and economic cooperation;
- Increase transit capacity East-West, North-South.

Contrary to the West Russia's foreign policy and Defense strategy are still based on principle of “Balance of Power”, “Spheres of Influence”, Buffer Zones” and “Sanitary Cordons” and using hard power to gain its control over the region. It also considers restoration of old style (Cold War) order keeping Black Sea as “Mare Clausum” and South Caucasus exclusive zone of Russian Influence and Security. But Russian policy-makers and strategists still really (de facto) do not recognize sovereignty and choice of freedom right of neighboring countries and traditionally still considering that Big Powers should determine foreign policy and Security agenda of neighbors.

Once again, if we consider that the concept **that power gives absolutely different status to the interests and the activities of the global actors**, it is hard to imagine whether the all actors of global politics can agree on common positions or not. **While there exist various interpretations of the problems, approaches and views**, there will also exist a base of confrontation and fragmentation as well, which will involve all actors (regional and global) and keep the region under the increasing risks. Also it can be proved that until the Status of region and also regional Order are not finely defined or agreed, it will always be existed sense of unpredictability.

## References:

1. Christopher Harress, (2015, 3 September), "Amid Russian Hostility in the Black Sea, US Navy to Sustain Military Presence in Region," International Business Times. <http://www.ibtimes.com/amid-russian-hostility-black-sea-us-navy-sustain-military-presence-region-2081301>;
2. David B. Larter, (2014, 2 December), The new cold war: Putin's forces target U.S. Navy and allies, Source: <https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2014/12/02/the-new-cold-war-putin-s-forces-target-u-s-navy-and-allies/>. Accessed time 12/03/2019
3. Tavberidze, V., (2019), Georgia's Strategic Game Changer Infrastructure project will have enormous political, economic and security impact. (interview), Source: Institute for War & Peace Reporting, ULR: <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/georgias-strategic-game-changer>, 20.08. 2019;
4. Larrabee, F. Stephen (2009): "The United States and Security in the Black Sea Region." Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 9, no. 3 301–15. doi:10.1080/14683850902934309.
5. Philip Breedlove, (2015, 25 February), "Statement of General Philip Breedlove," U.S. European Command, Department of Defense, last modified February 25, 2015, <http://www.eucom.mil/mission/background/posturestatement>. Accessed time: 15/03/2019;
6. Siemon t. Wezeman and Alexandra Kuimova, (2018, December), Georgia and Black Sea Security, SIPRI Background Paper, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Source: <https://sipri.org/> p.1
7. Steve Scherer, (2016), 'US to Russia: We're staying in the Black Sea', Business Insider, 17 June 2016, <https://www.businessinsider.com/r-us-says-it-will-stay-in-black-sea-despite-russian-warning-2016-6?IR=T>, Accessed time: 12/02/2019;
8. "US Army Is Expanding Capabilities for Dynamic Presence in the Black Sea Region," (2016, 6 October), Defense Blog, Military and Defense News, <http://defence-blog.com/army/u-s-army-is-expanding-capabilities-for-dynamic-presence-in-the-black-sea-region.html>
9. Henrik Hololei, (2019), We are very keen to see Anaklia project take shape, 2019-01-29 Source: <http://www.accentnews.ge/en/news/details/66309>. Accessed Time: 30/03/2019;
10. Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, 05.09.2014, Source: NATO Official Web-site ULR: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official-texts-112964.htm>;
11. Warsaw Summit Communiqué, (2016), Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016, Source: Official web-site of NATO, ULR: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official-texts-133169.htm>;



## Reasons for Immigration of the Vaynakh (Kists) to Georgia and the Qadiriyya Sufi Order in the Pankisi Gorge

### Abstract

The Pankisi Gorge, the life of the Kists, their time-honoured customs and religion always represented an object of study and research, but the events having taken place in Syria from 2011 made this issue even more urgent. Khvtiso Mamisimedashvili in the book *Pankisi: The Past and Present* offers a quite detailed description of the Pankisi Gorge, which is located in the Akhmeta municipality, in the upper reaches of the river Alazani. The Pankisi Gorge stretches over 20 km. To the north of the gorge, paths over the Caucasus lead to Khevsureti, and to the northeast – to Tusheti (p.11). A road is built to Tbatana, and from there a bridle path is leading to Alaznistavi. From Alaznistavi paths are leading to Tush community-villages. From Tusheti, through the Kerigo pass, a bridle path descends to Chechnya, namely, the Khildikharo Gorge, and through the Kachu pass – to Acharo. It is possible to arrive in Chechnya by the passes of Atsunta, Tebulo, Ukarecho, Dano and Lashkari mountains.

In the first centuries AD the Pankisi Gorge was included in the Kakheti Eristavate (“Duchy”). At that time the Kakheti Eristavate did not cover the same territory which is known as Kakheti at present. At that time on the current territory of Kakheti there existed several regions settled with Georgian tribes: Hereti, Kukheti, Kakheti, Tsuketi, Sujeti, Kambechani. The Kakheti Eristavate proper was situated in the upper reaches of the Iori and Alazani rivers, including the mountainous areas. Namely, according to Leonti Mroveli and Vakhushti, Kakheti included “Pshav-Khevsur (who were called Pkhovian), Tianeti, Ertso, Irtoskhevi, Pankisi Gorge.” (პაპუაშვილი, 1970). Around the villages on hills and mountains everywhere can be seen village and settlement sites, fragments of various vessels and weapons are scattered all around. At many places kvevris (wine jars) and winepresses occur which have survived wars and destruction. It should also be taken into consideration that Pankisi in old Georgia represented a significant economic region. The paths leading to the North Caucasus passed through this Gorge. Christianity was spread here from the 1st half of the 4th c., which is also indicated by the abundance of the Christian monuments of the Early Feudal period (პაპუაშვილი, 1970).

Beginning from the 4th c. Christianity became more and more established in the Pankisi Gorge. This process was especially facilitated by the emergence of powerful centres of Christian culture near Pankisi such as the Iqalto Academy and Alaverdi. In the gorge there are numerous settlement sites of the Feudal Period, churches and monastery type monuments with kvevris, winepresses and wine cellars. E.g. a church of the Early Feudal Period has survived to the present day in village Birkiani, at Tskvitadzis Qure, where on November 23 the Tush and the Kists celebrate Giorgoba – the Feast of Saint George. About one hundred meters away from it there is a watchtower.

In historical Kisteti, at Vaynakh village sites, even at present a lot of towers have survived, which bear representation of crosses. In the churches of Tqobaierdi and Aliberdi Georgian inscriptions are preserved. In the graves brought to light by archaeologists and other persons the deceased are buried according to the Christian rite – with the head to the West. One of the deceased Kist was buried with an icon- medallion of St. George. At the Museum of Grozny numerous hewn stones and stone crosses with the Georgian Asomtavruli (capital) graphemes are kept. (Aia №2, 1997).

In the 2nd half of the 17th c. the Pankisi Gorge was a part of the Alaverdi Eparchy. However, it is also noteworthy that the boundaries of the eparchies changed frequently over the centuries. At different times the Pankisi Gorge



was within the Eparchies of Nekresi, Kharchasho, Martqopi and Alaverdi (p. 75). An interesting picture of the social-political, economic, demographic and national- religious situation of the Pankisi Gorge of that period is found in the document of the population census of the 1st quarter of the 18th c., preserved at K. Kekelidze Institute of Manuscripts. After this census, as a result of frequent invasions of Daghestanian feudal lords, the Pankisi Gorge became completely depopulated: the majority of the population perished, a part of the people immigrated to new places. It becomes obvious from the materials that in the 1st quarter of the 18th c. the Pankisi Gorge was mono-religious and mono-national. Apparently, more than one hundred families lived there, all of whom were Orthodox Christian Georgians. In the records of the population census of Eastern Georgia of the 1st quarter of the 18th c. only seven villages of the Pankisi Gorge are mentioned. Vakhushti in his historical and geographical description of Georgia and in the map drafted by him names 19 villages (ბერძენიშპილი, 1990). Likewise, in the Description of Kartli and Kakheti by Ioane Bagrationi, composed in 1794-1799, also 19 villages of the Pankisi Gorge are listed.

At the beginning of the 19th c. there did not exist a resident population in the Pankisi Gorge, which is confirmed by the fact that in the Census of Kakheti Population of 1801-1802, none of the villages of the Pankisi Gorge is named. At present the populations of the Pankisi Gorge are ethnic Chechens, and practically all of them are Muslim Sunnites. Their majority was Sufis, but in the gorge the number of people increased greatly who identify themselves with Salafism. At the end of the 1990s Chechen refugees settled in the Pankisi Gorge massively. According to the official information, in October-November 1999, through the Shatili-Omal passes, 6-7 thousand Chechen refugees arrived in Georgia from Itum-Kade, most of them being women, children and elderly people. In the subsequent period (i.e. over 2 years) the period of migration of refugees still continued. At present, the Pankisi Gorge is populated by the Kists, the Ossetes, the Georgians (Pshavians, Tush and Kakhetians). The main differentiating feature between the Kists and other ethnic groups is in the language and religious affiliation. The Kists, who were considered as a part of the Chechen ethnic group, in the Soviet period were fully integrated with the Georgian society. They spoke the Georgian language and mixed marriages were also frequent. Serious changes took place after the Chechen War of 1994, when the Chechen refugees settled in the Pankisi Gorge. The Kists were distanced from the Georgian population. It is noteworthy, however, that the Kists (or Chechen-Kists) are descendants of the Vaynakh and they live in Tusheti. The majority of the migrated Chechens live in the villages of the Pankisi Gorge. According to Georgian historiography, the Chechen-Kists appeared in Tusheti in 1840-1870. It may be noted that the situation is not so one-sided, as some historians state that in the 19th c., when up to one hundred Vaynakh families under the guidance of religious leader Joqolo and Dui moved from the upper reaches of the river Chanti-Argun to the south, the Vaynakh population already lived in the Pankisi Gorge.

At the end of the 1890s the Chechen-Kists lived in villages Omalo, Duisi, Dzibakhevi, Joqolo, Birkiani, Khalatsani (Shua-Khalatsani), Artana and Akhmeta. Not to mention the materials of caméral description, M.Machabeli in the work concerning the economic situation of peasants of the Tianeti Province, published in 1887, noted: "The Kists live in Kisteti of Tianeti (Kisteti of Tianeti refers to several villages of mountainous Chechnya, namely, the Mitkho Community, which at that time, according to the administrative division, was within the Tianeti Province (Kh.M.) and also in the Pankisi Gorge, where they immigrated from the Maist Community in the period of the Viceroy, Prince Vorontsov, and founded three villages: Joqolo, Dui (Pankisi) and Omalo" [132. 328]. As is known, the period of service of Viceroy Mikhail Vorontsov was 1845-1855. Thus, according to M. Machabeli, the Kists did not settle in the Pankisi Gorge earlier than 1845 (p.119).

In an interview, Meka Khangoshvili answers the correspondent's question as to what the difference is between the Kists and the Chechens in the following way: "The difference between the Chechens and the Kists is approximately the same as that between the Kakhetians and the Gurians: The Chechens, the Kists and the Ingush belong to the Vaynakh tribe. Their language, religion and customs are the same. The difference is that we live in Georgia for almost two centuries, due to which the Chechens became assimilated with the Georgians.

In a certain way, the Chechen traditions underwent modifications as well". She also notes: "I have read in my grandfather's archives: 'We, people of three different nations, lived in harmony in this gracious land'. Thus, my grandfather was well aware of the fact that the Chechens lived on the territory of Georgia." The "people of three different nations", according to M. Khangoshvili's explanation, imply, above all, the Georgians, who returned to the Pankisi Gorge in the course of time, and in addition, the Chechens and the Ossetes, who moved to Pankisi from Java and Tskhinvali in 1901-03.

As regards the term "Vaynakh", M. Khangoshvili explains that in the scholarly literature the term "Vaynakh" is used to refer to the Chechens and the Ingush living in the North Caucasus. Thus term also unites the Kists living in Georgia and the Tsova-Tushs, who are also called the Batsbs. This term has remote historical roots, it stems from the period when this people came into existence. From time immemorial the Chechens, the Ingush and the Kists call themselves the Vaynakh, which means "our people". It does not matter where a person lives and to which community or he/she belongs. Above all, the person considers himself/herself as a Vaynakh: "Veinakh stag" ("a man from our people", "Veinakh moakhk" ("the country of our people"), "Veinakh moatt" ("the language of our people"), etc. Whether the Chechens or the Ingush, they regards themselves as the Vaynakh – one ethnos and brethren with respect to one another.

In an article published in Literary Georgia on website of the electronic archives of the Georgian Press, we read: "The fact that we, the Georgians and the Kist-Chechens, are kindred peoples is also confirmed by other historical sources as well. According to Marie Brosset, Teimuraz I in his letter sent to the King of Russia stressed that a part of the population of Chechnya and Ingushetia in the 1630s followed the Christian religion. In addition, Nikolay Marr states that the Georgian language often was the state language for the North Caucasian tribes. And Prince Teimuraz declares that the Kists-Durdzuks-Ingush as tribes speaking Georgian from the beginning" (ბერძენიშვილი, 1990).

Researcher Khvtiso Mamisimedashvili concerning the life of the Pankisi Kists and the Vaynakh, in general, writes the following: "After World War II rapid Islamization of the population of Joqolo began. Before that period, as eye-witnesses relate, there was even a pig farm in the village. The conversion of the population of Joqolo to Islam was completed at the beginning of the 1990s. Today they are Muslims" (p.27).

In the article Islamization of the Kists in Georgia of the 20th c. by Metropolitan Anania Japaridze, published in journal Iberia, the author notes: "An impressive fact in the history of religion of Georgia is that the process of conversion to Islam of the Kists immigrated to the Pankisi Gorge in the 19th c. ended in the 1990s; at the time of settling in this region of Georgia the Kists were Christians and similar to the Georgian mountaineers performed Christian religious rites. In particular, Islamization of a part of the Kists living in the Pankisi Gorge began at the end of the 19th c. during the Russian rule in Georgia (at the same time, the majority of the Kists again remained Christians), the process intensified after the second conquest of Georgia by Russia in the 1920s, the influence of Islam spread rapidly after World War II and the complete Islamization of the population ended at the beginning of the 1990s.

It is interesting what forced the Kists in the 19th c. to leave their homeland and settle in the Pankisi Gorge, which was under the Russian authority?! In this regard, Kh. Mamisimedashvili writes: "On the basis of ethnographic materials, Leila Margoshvili arrives at the conclusion that the reason of the movement of the Vaynakh to Pankisi was their hard economic state, blood feud and severe measures carried out by Shamil to spread Islam in mountainous areas of Chechnya. As is known, Shamil disseminated Islam there by fire and sword, those who refused to accept Islam, was oppressed greatly and had to seek a reliable refuge" (ibid.p. 24).

A. Ziserman offers significant information concerning the Kists' religious life as well. He notes that Shamil's Murids in vain tried to disseminate the belief of Allah among them. The number of preachers of Islam increased in the Kist villages at the beginning of the 20th c. The Sufi variety of Islam gained a foothold among the Kists of the

gorge in the form of the Naqshbandi and Qadiriyya directions, at the same time, here Muridism was adjusted to the local specificity and moved away greatly from the worldview of these religious fraternities spread in the Muslim world.

“In 1909 preacher Isa Efendi arrived in the Pankisi Gorge from Azerbaijan, he propagandized the Nakshbandiyya teaching and had many followers. The founder of Qadiriya, another direction of Muridism in Caucasia, is considered to be Sheikh ‘Abd al-Qādir Gīlānī. As regards Kunta-Haji teaching, it was introduced to the Pankisi Gorge by Machig Mamaligashvili, having returned from Ingushetia in 1927. It is also noteworthy that as the Chechens were converted to Islam in the 18th c., and the Ingush – at the end of the 19th c., the Kists who had migrated earlier, had not time to accept Islam and arrived in Georgia with their old religion” (პაპუაშვილი, 1970).

As noted above, in Pankisi, as in the North Caucasus, the Qadiriya and Naqshbandi Sufi orders were disseminated. However, it is noteworthy that in the process of working on Shamil’s letters (Shamil’s 100 Letters) we have not found addresses or appeals concerning the Pankisi Gorge. Georgia, and the more so the Pankisi Gorge, is not mentioned in the writing of Shamil (1858) either, which is preserved in the document kept at the National Archives of Georgia. E.g. “Address of right-believing ruler Shamil to the beloved brethren, qadis, honorable people and the entire community of Argun. May the peace, mercy of Allah, his protection and defence from any misfortune be fulfilled? May it be known to you that the entire population of Daghestan is equated with my entire population, there is no difference between them, I do not consider some of them as kinsmen and respectable relatives, and others – as distant persons and enemies. The time-honoured customs have been inherent in me from the very beginning, they express only care for the people who find themselves in some trouble and who lack any means to overcome it and remedy the existing situation. May Allah eradicate gjaours and destroy their fortress by the hands of his faithful slaves who struggle for their faith. The Lord may protect us from gjaours and rid us from them and then the new order will be established. Hard work and poverty will be replaced by prosperity and wealth. The rest will be told you by the persons to whom this letter will be transferred, listen to them. May you be in good health and in safety. Sunday (1858)” (ზაქარაია, 1962).

For example, Ahmed Abu Bekr Ogli, born in village Barkh, wished to move to the Ottoman Empire together with his family. A family living in the neighbouring village, with three children and a servant, wished the same. It becomes clear from the letter sent to the Consul General on October 23, 1863 that this case was with Ibrahim Hasan, going to Daghestan, who must have completed his affairs in order to resettle his family in the Ottoman Empire subsequently. The document is also noteworthy concerning the exile of man from Caucasia who meditated dhikr, which contains Abdul-Selim’s appeal for pardon and request to return to the homeland. This person was 23 years old, at first he was imprisoned in Grozny, and then on December 16, 1864, was sent to Smolensk. On May 27, 1866, he received a letter informing him that his family had been sent to Turkey and he was asked whether he wished to move with his family to the Ottoman Empire. Abdul-Selim submitted a written consent to the ruler of the Smolensk Gubernia, in which he noted: “Expressing my consent I pursued the only object to meet my mother, sister and brothers, but I am unable to support the members of my family in Ottoman Turkey. I prefer to die than to live in Ottoman Turkey and have no means of subsistence. I admit that I am guilty, but you are more merciful than I am guilty. I beseech you to show mercy upon me, to pardon me and allow me to return to my country. God has mercy on a guilty person who repents. I swear by God that for the rest of my life I will be obedient to you and not to teach any Dhikr, to take into consideration your orders and serve you no matter what kind of work may fall to my lot. Although it is ordered by you that I must clean streets in your cities, I will entrust to all my relatives, whose number reaches five hundred, to act in the same manner, to obey your orders and to restrain themselves from anger. It will be sufficient for us only to see our country. My uncle is 63 years old, he does not have any resources to move to Ottoman Turkey either. He only wishes to live and die in his homeland. I entreat Your Majesty to inquire about my behavior with the authorities of Smolensk”. In Collection materials are represented concerning the Chechens exiled in the Ottoman Empire as well as documents reflecting their return to the homeland. It becomes clear from the archival materials that in 1865-66 the Chechen ideology, thought, requests did not include the return to Georgia in Pankisi Gorge.

The situation changed drastically after the Second Chechen War, when Wahhabism was disseminated in the region. Wahhabism demanded from its followers, the so-called believers complete obedience and established for them strict requirements. Wahhabis must obey the following basic requirements: a) to believe that all Muslims are brethren, no matter in which country they live; b) to observe strictly the Muslim moral-ethical principles; c) not to indulge in great luxury, entertainment is unacceptable; d) each Muslim must make efforts to spread and consolidate Islam; e) apostates must be brought back to the true religion, even if use of force becomes necessary; f) Jihad or a “holy war” must be undertaken against any other religion. Wahhabism teaching lies in the foundation of the state religion of Saudi Arabia.

As the main sources of dissemination of Wahhabism on the North Caucasus territory are regarded the Embassy of Saudi Arabia and various organization, financed by the world Islamic organizations, e.g. “Shamil Society”, “King Fahdi Madrasah”, “Ahmed Al-Daghestan” Foundation, “Islamic Solidarity Union”, “Ibrahim Ben-Ibrahim” Foundation, “Islamic Congress”, etc. Means of propaganda are used, such as dissemination of million copies of the Koran and other religious literature, as well as visits to “the holy places” free of charge, education of the youth at foreign fundamentalist centres, foundation of Islamic “centres of culture”, bribing separate religious figures, journalists, deputies and officials.

From 1992 massive propaganda of Wahhabism ideas began in Chechnya and Daghestan. One of the first to disseminate the new teaching in the Chechen Republic was Khatab, who earlier had participated in the War in Afghanistan on the side of the Mujahidins. He was mostly engaged in teaching the youth, attracted them into his circle not only by religious appeals but also by material support. Many of his pupils became subsequently leaders of the so-called “Shariath” military formations.

A significant factor of spreading Wahhabism as a phenomenon of a geopolitical character in North Caucasia is its financing by numerous international Islamic centres, foreign cultural, educational and charitable organizations. Until the middle of 1999 in Daghestan there functioned actively branches of a number of foreign Islamic organizations, including: international Islamic organization “Salvation” (headquarters in Saudi Arabia), “SAAR foundation”, “Taibat al-Hairia” (headquarters in the USA), “Ibrahim al-Hairia (headquarters in Egypt).

The centre of “Wahhabism” in North Caucasia was Urus-Martan, where there existed Ilia Ahmadov’s “Jamaat”. In 1998 in Gudermes a fight occurred between the warriors of Arbi Baraev and members of Sulim Ymadayev’s “National Guard”. On July 25, 1998 on the initiative of Akhmad Kadyrov a meeting took place in Grozny, where Wahhabism was criticized and by the order of the President of the Republic “Wahhabism” was proclaimed illegal. Some of Wahhabi Jordanian missionaries were expelled from Chechnya.

In the 18th c. the process of bringing the highlanders under the Russian influence, opening the Russian representation, protection of the mountaineer peoples from the influence of the Ottoman Empire, pillage from the Crimean Khanate and the Persian expansion was completed, the creation of the single military line and the southern boundary cordon of the Empire was completed as well. From the same period the spread of Islam began in Chechnya, which in the 19th c. found its development in Daghestan. The conditions which the spread of Islam found there were the following: 1. Economic poverty; 2. Mutual enmity and blood feud between tribes of highlanders; 3. The awkward and severe policy carried out by the Russian Empire, disregard of the customs, culture and lifestyle of the highlanders; 4. The weak influence of the Christian church of the Empire (which is confirmed by the above-mentioned appeal of Imam Shamil to the society of Argun). In Islam spread in this area two directions were identifiable: Naqshbandi (which rejected a loyal policy and had a tendency towards the Ottoman Empire) and Qadiriya (which showed loyalty). Naturally, for the Russian Empire the dissemination of the Qadiriya order was more acceptable. Russian Empire did not oppose the spread of Islam as a means of unification of the mountaineer peoples. This facilitated the Russian Empire to carry out a unified flexible policy or strict military campaign with respect to the highlanders.

## Conclusion

The influence of similar processes was observable in the Soviet period from the middle of the 20th c. The repressions of the Soviet system affected the Chechen people especially severely, but later on, after the return of the Chechens to their historical territory, the Soviet Authorities facilitated the dissemination of Islam. Before the beginning of the 1990s this process was successful in the sense that centres of conflict did not appear. At present the status quo existing before the 1990s is restored in Chechnya, whereas the Wahhabism problem is not solved in the Pankisi Gorge. That is why the problems concerning the Pankisi Gorge are sensitive for the Chechen-Kists living in Pankisi proper, for Georgia and the entire region as well.

## References:

1. ბერძენიშვილი, მ., (1990), საქართველოს ისტორიის საკითხები, საქართველოს სსრ მეცნიერებათა აკადემია, ივ. ჯავახიშვილის სახ. ისტორიის, არქეოლოგიისა და ეთნოგრაფიის ინსტიტუტი, გამომცემლობა „მეცნიერება“, თბილისი.
2. ზაქარაია, პ., (1973), საქართველოს ძველი ქალაქები და ციხეები (მეცნიერულ-პოპულარული ნარკვევი), საქართველოს კულტურის ძეგლთა დაცვის საზოგადოება, გამომცემლობა „მეცნიერება“, თბილისი.
3. ზაქარაია, პ., (1962), კახეთის საფორტიფიკაციო ნაგებობანი, საქართველოს სსრ მეცნიერებათა აკადემია აკად. ს. ჯანაშიას სახელობის საქართველოს სახელმწიფო მუზეუმი, საქართველოს სსრ მეცნიერებათა აკადემიის გამომცემლობა, თბილისი.
4. მამისიმიძევილი, ხ., (1970), პანკისი ნარსული და თანამედროვეობა, ივანე ჯავახიშვილის სახელობის თბილისის სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტის ფოლკლორისტიკის დეპარტამენტის შრომები, N7.
5. პაპუაშვილი, თ., (1970), შერეთის ისტორიის საკითხები, ნარკვევები სოციალურ-ეკონომიკური და პოლიტიკური ისტორიიდან (უძველესი დროიდან XII ს. I მეოთხედამდე), საქართველოს სსრ მეცნიერებათა აკადემია, ივ. ჯავახიშვილის სახელობის ისტორიის, არქეოლოგიისა და ეთნოგრაფიის ინსტიტუტი, გამომცემლობა „მეცნიერება“, თბილისი.
6. Encyclopaedia of Islam and the Muslim World. Richard C. Martin.

## Archive materials:

1. Кавказская археографическая комиссия ф. 416 оп-4. 6/сведения об обычаях кавказских горцев (без даты)
2. Кавказская археографическая комиссия ф. 416 оп-4. 61/отрывки из описания военных действий в кавказской линии в северном и нагорном дагестане сделанного поручиком Жерве (1842 г.)
3. Кавказская археографическая комиссия ф. 416 оп-7. 924/кратки обзор состояния кавказской области
4. Кавказская археографическая комиссия ф. 416 оп-3. 619/прошение чеченца абдус-селям тутгири
5. Кавказское Военно-Народное Управление 1860-1883 гг. Ф-545 оп-1. Кн-I 23/Переписка о правилах висепения в оренбургский край Кавказких переселенцев, возвратившихся из Турции
6. Кавказское Военно-Народное Управление 1860-1883 гг. Ф-545 оп-1ю Кн-I45/Переписка о переселении в Турцию жителей Дагестанской области
7. Кавказское Военно-Народное Управление 1860-1883 гг. Ф-545 оп-1ю Кн-I 90/Переписка о переселении чеченцев в Турцию из Терской области. Правила переселения и маршруты
8. Кавказское Военно-Народное Управление 1860-1883 гг. Ф-545 оп-1ю Кн-I 95/Переписка по делу переселения чеченцев в Турцию
9. Кавказское Военно-Народное Управление 1860-1883 гг. Ф-545 оп-1ю Кн-I 249/Просба переселившихся в Турцию Дагестанских князеи Решид Бея и племянника его Гень Хаджилбея о дозволении им возвратиться на родину
10. Кавказское Военно-Народное Управление 1860-1883 гг. Ф-545 оп-1ю Кн-I 336/сведения о жителях Дагестанской области, Каитаго-Таба саранского округа, мирза Аллах и др. Для возвращения на родину.



## Libya and the Impact of Tribal Conflict on the “Arab Spring”

### Abstract

In the MENA region and also in some other parts of the world tribes and tribalism has strong influence on shaping of each country's internal and external policy. Tribalism as a phenomenon was the focus of several researches beginning from anthropological perspectives to the political issues and its influence on ongoing political processes and violence in the Middle East and especially in Libya after “Arab Spring” revolution in 2011 when the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was toppled. This article attempts to show similarities and differences of tribalism influence in Libya, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

According to the several sources, in Libya there are 140 tribes and 30 of them are significant. Country has been divided between ethnicities and groups for a long time, including Berbers from North Africa and Arabs tribes from south. All of them are Sunni Muslims and speak Arabic, but “The prospect of increased friction or violent conflict between the country's tribes, clans and ethnic groups – specifically between the Arabs and Berbers – remains a serious source of concern,” (GHARIZI, O., 2018) said Anthony Skinner, Middle East analyst at political risk consultancy Maplecroft. In 1969 Colonel Gaddafi led a coup to overthrow the king. Since he came to power, Colonel attempted to reduce the influence of the tribal system. Indeed he simultaneously diminished the power of the other tribes, giving economical privileges to others and he also established alliances through marital ties and sometimes exploited threat of punishment. It is worth to mention, that Gaddafi's Qadhafha tribe is one of the smaller one and not powerful historically, but according to analysts, it became wealthy under his rule and sometimes accused for making up the core elements of the “regime protection units”. Gaddafi surrounded himself with his tribe members and appointed them to the different most sensitive posts to ensure his own and government safety. This kind of policy led to tribal tension, within the army on the part of the Maqariha tribe. Tension reached such high level that according to some analysts, Maqariha could be the first place of uprising against Gaddafi. Considering that a large number of its members occupied important positions in government and the security apparatus. The Loyal tribes benefited themselves from material privileges while opposing tribes were punished. “In March 1997, the Libyan parliament passed a ‘code of honor’ which enabled the imposition of collective punishment against tribes and clans – usually through the withdrawal of government services – whenever they engaged in activities against the regime” (Otterman, Sh., 2005). Such discrimination became the main reason of tribal tensions and grievances in Libya. For example, the first area of the revolution in Libya was the eastern part of the country-where the most important oil resources were located and this place was settled with the most marginalized tribes. So it is clear, that for the Libyan authority apparatus Tribalism was an instrument to maintain control on society through tribal sheiks. Some Libyan Tribes became one of the non-institutional pillars of country's central power and sheiks began to fight against opposition groups on their territories. Gaddafi wanted to eliminate tribal conflicts through granting them with additional responsibility to enforce the rule of law of a central government.

Now in Libya there are several large forces, based on a tribal and ethno-religious basis. This is the Tobruk parliament, now in Libya there are several large forces, based on a tribal and ethno-religious basis. This is the Tobruk parliament, cooperating with the head of the Libyan National Army, Marshal Khalifa Haftar, and the Tripolitan clans, represented by the Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord Fayes al-Sarraj. There was also an Islamist parliament, which self-dissolved in 2015, when an agreement was reached on the creation of a government of national accord. Sarraj, is a completely non-independent figure: he depends on Tripolitanian structures, West Libyan tribes and external support. Haftar is also not an independent politician: he relies on international



support and depends on the tribes in the east of the country. There is also the city of Misurata with its armed forces. These are other representatives of the local tribal elite, who do not obey either Haftar or Sarraj, although they are supporting Sarraj. There are still unfinished Islamists, some of whom were affiliated with the “Islamic State”. Different factions of Islamists clash with each other. There are other actors. All of them are fighting for oil, for smuggling weapons, for control of water supplies. Also “Turkey has propped up the embattled GNA, becoming increasingly involved in a proxy war against regional rivals Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, which support Haftar’s forces” (Tribalism in Afghanistan, 2001).

Syrian population also belongs to different tribes, according to The Royal Institute of International Affairs sources northeastern Syria contains a significant tribal presence. Syrian Arab tribes are important players between conflicting sides in the country. Last year, on December 21 in northern Aleppo took start first conference of the Supreme council of Arab tribes and clans. The council unifies more than 100 clans and tribes, including Arabs, Kurds, Turks, Alawites and Druzes. Some of the tribes are allying the Syrian regime and others joined opposing groups, after the civil war began in the country.

After the 1963 revolution the Alawites were holding of the country’s highest military elite posts, al-Assad’s Nu-mailatiyyah clan and the Matawirah tribe. “Asad’s tribe, al-Matawirah, belong a number of other major figures in theregime, including Brigadier Muhammad al-Khawli, Adviser to the President, Chief of Air Intelligence, and Chairman of the Presidential Intelligence Committee; Brigadier ‘All Duibah, the head of Military Intelligence; Brigadier ‘Ali Aslan, the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Bureau of Military Operations and Training; and Major General ‘Ali Slih, Commander of the Air Defense Forces and the Missile Corps” (Otterman, Sh., 2005).

The high-ranking officer corps also included Sunnis who were semi-Alawites in their kinship and were the closest group around Hafez al-Assad. Vice President from 1984-2005 Abul Halim Khadam was Sunni, his wife from the tribe of Matawirahs), Prime Minister Abdul Rauf al-Qasim, Deputy Speaker of the People’s Council Mahmoud Az-Zubi Ba’ath Party Secretary-General Abd al-Lah al-Ahmar The commander of the armed forces, Hikmat Shihab, was one of those Sunnis who held high positions in 1987. Minister of Defense Mustafa Tlas was a member of a mixed family, with a Sunni father and Alawi mother. Most of the Sunnis who had risen to prominence in the armed forces had the same background after the Ba’ath party came to power. Shihab and the Tlas were born and raised in the village, and their families were not from the old, privileged Sunni upper class, they shared a newly formed socioeconomic class elite of minorities.

Real number of tribes in Iraq not known exactly, there are hundreds of them with 1000 tribal organizations. “About 75 percent of Iraq’s population is either a member or close associate of one of the country’s approximately 150 tribes. The tribes, which comprise multiple family-based clans, have wielded considerable influence since modern Iraq’s founding in 1921. In contemporary Iraq, tribes and tribalism are most prominent in Sunni areas – Anbar, Salahadin, Kirkuk, Nineveh – and the southern, mainly Shia province of Basra. Tribal leaders, called sheikhs, settle disputes within their tribes, some of which cut across ethnic and sectarian lines. Tribal networks can help members gain employment, secure government services and protect members from external threats” (The roots of Afghanistan’s tribal tensions, 2017). Many Iraqi military officers, intelligence and security service officials were recruited from prominent tribes because of their links to President Saddam Hussein’s family, clan and tribe, as was happening in Syria, beginning from 1960s, “Tribal ties, however, brought Saddam to power: he was a cousin of President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr as well as the chief enforcer of the Baath party’s security force. For Saddam, tribal values and loyalties as well as Baathist ideology and Arab nationalism were intended to enforce pride in his and the country’s uniqueness. More important, they gave the Iraqi leader tools to reinforce his own power and control” (Tribalism in Afghanistan, 2001). As some experts consider, building relations with tribes could help to end insurgency against U.S. Tribes are main power-holders in Iraq and sheiks have high authority among communities and there is no other power to help U.S. forces to establish close relations with Iraqi population. Shiite Religious leaders are more potent political actors than Sunnis, because of their lower public profile. In the south part of country with Shiite domination, many tribal sheiks are intermediating between authorities and population and the Coalition Provisional Authority regularly discussing reconstruction and security issues with them.

At a practical level among the Sunnis, tribal leaders command local constituencies, often in remote territory inhospitable to external interference; this makes tribal support most important asset to any outside actor—be it “Islamic State”, Baghdad, the US military, or others seeking to exert control over tribal areas. Tribal values and vernacular are frequently invoked in Iraqi political discourse.

Tribes and tribalism is also plays important role in Afghanistan. Most Afghans are Sunni Muslims, but Hazara people adopted Shia Islam from Safavid Persians, country itself is a multi-ethnic and there are 40 major ethnicities with 50 separate languages and dialects: Pashtuns, Hazaras, Kafirs, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Durrani, Ghalji, Farsiwan (Parsiwan or Parsiban), Qizilbash, Baluchis, also Brahuis and Gujars. Majority of Afghan Population are focused to their tribe rather than country’s common interests and these attitudes have negative influence on the political life. Internal violence which erupted in the last decades in the country, is caused by these ethnic tensions. Pushtuns aren’t fighting enough, against their relatives from Taliban. “For example, the main Tajik commander around Mazar-e-Sharif, Atta Mohammed, is married to a Pashtun and owes his life to his in-laws who were able to smuggle him out of the area when the Taliban took over. Similarly, the current foreign minister, Dr. Abdullah, had a Pashtun father from Kandahar while his mother was a Tajik from the Panjshir valley. One of the current deputy defense ministers, Zabet Saleh Registani, has a Hazara mother and a Tajik father. The current Tajik Interior Minister, Yunus Qanuni, is married to a Pashtun, and the former Tajik President, Burhanuddin Rabbani, has a Pashtun daughter-in-law. Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity is also complicated by the fact that the Afghan notion of ethnicity is different than the view commonly held in the West” (Otterman, Sh., 2005).

## Conclusion

After studying, processing and comparing all the materials, it is clear that in the list of discussed countries, tribalism is the key factor of tensions within the states. So it wouldn’t be right approach considering Middle Eastern crisis from the side of regional key players interests. The causes of tensions and discontent have been accumulating inside the country for decades. There is a clear similarity between Libya, Syria and Iraq. All leaders of listed countries surrounded themselves from the members of their own tribes, granted them with privileges and marginalized other ethnic, confessional groups. Such kind of rule of the country leads to long term Civil war as we can see after “Arab Spring” wave.

So it is impossible to achieve any positive change without full involvement of all tribes and factions in the political life of the each countries. The most acceptable form of power would be to transform all these states into a parliamentary republics and to strict the power of the heads of Libya, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

## References:

1. GHARIZI, O., & AL-IBRAHIMI, Al., (2018, 17 January), BAGHDAD MUST SEIZE THE CHANCE TO WORK WITH IRAQ’S TRIBES, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/baghdad-must-seize-chance-work-iraqs-tribes/>
2. Otterman, Sh., (2005, 2 February), IRAQ: The Role of Tribes, Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-role-tribes>
3. Yaphe, J., (2000), Tribalism in Iraq, the Old and the New, Volume VII, Number 3, The Middle East Policy Council, <https://mepc.org/journal/tribalism-iraq-old-and-new-0>
4. The roots of Afghanistan’s tribal tensions, (2017, 31 Augustos), <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/08/31/the-roots-of-afghanistans-tribal-tensions>
5. Tribalism in Afghanistan, (2001, 11 September), <https://www.ohiohighered.org/sites/ohiohighered.org/files/uploads/military/Toolkit/AppendixK.pdf>

Georgian Text Editor:  
Tamar Gabelaia

გამომცემლობის რედაქტორი:  
**თამარ გაბელაია**

English Text  
Editor:  
Nana Katchabava

ინგლისურენოვანი ტექსტის  
რედაქტორი:  
**ნანა კაჭაბავა**

Typesetting  
Mariam Ebralidze

კომპიუტერული უზრუნველყოფა  
**ნინო ებრალიძე**

Cover Designer  
Mariam Ebralidze

**გარეკანის დიზაინი**  
მარიამ ებრალიძე



0179, თბილისი, ი. ჭავჭავაძის გამზირი 14  
14, Ilia Tshavtchavadze Ave., Tbilisi 0179  
Tel: +995 (32) 2250484, # 6284; #6278  
[www.press.tsu.ge](http://www.press.tsu.ge)